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INTRODUCTION

The past forty years have witnessed sweeping reforms in legal
doctrines. In tort law these winds of reform have produced a dramatic
expansion in the duty of care. Common law tort rules that limited the

responsibility of economic elites to those dependent on their conduct
were systematically modified or eliminated. For example, in the 1960s,
a manufacturer's duty to the consumer was expanded by the elimination
of the negligence standard and its replacement with strict liability.1 In
1. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 77 (N.J. 1960);
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the 1970s, a personal injury defendant's most powerful defense,
contributory negligence, was replaced by comparative negligence.2 In
the 1980s, the property owner's bastion of protection against reasonable
care requirements-the trespasser, licensee, and invitee duty
classification structure-was eliminated or modified.3 Elite providers of
services such as doctors, and to a lesser extent lawyers, were held to
have new duties concerning informing patients and obtaining consent for
their actions.4
Simultaneously, the courts reevaluated ancient doctrines that gave
excessive power to the government, perhaps the nation's most powerful
elite. Since 1960, the Supreme Court has imposed limitations on
previously unchallenged governmental power in Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence.5 More recently, as the Supreme Court has
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 899-900 (Cal. 1962); RICHARD A.
57-67 (1980). See generally George L.
Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modem Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985); Robert L. Rabin,
Restating the Law: The Dilemmas of ProductsLiability, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 197
(1997).
2. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Cal. 1975); VICTOR E.
SCmVARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 1-2 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1993).
3. In states such as New York, property owners now have a duty of reasonable
care to all entrants. See Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872 (N.Y. 1976). In states
such as California, there is no duty requirement concerning trespassers committing
certain felonies. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 847 (West 2000); see also Kathryn E. Eriksen,
Comment, Premises Liability in Texas-Time for a "Reasonable" Change, 17 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 417, 418-21 (1986).
4. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A
New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 226-27 (1985); Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B.
Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable
Causation,1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 607, 607 n.1 (1988); see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
5. See Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure,the BurgerCourt, and the Legacy of
the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1320, 1320-26 (1977); Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure in the Warren and
Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 155-56 (1980); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v.
Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in
Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1368 (1983). Although the pace of
rights development has slowed under the Burger and Rehnquist courts, many courts are
still imaginatively interpreting doctrines to create new areas of protection. See Tracey
Macin, The CentralMeaning of the FourthAmendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197,
201 (1993); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a FourthAmendment, 39 UCLA
L. REv. 1, 18 (1991). A dramatic example is the unprecedented and subsequently
vacated decision of a panel of the Tenth Circuit that held, in a decision that was
followed by two district courts, that the ancient governmental practice of granting
leniency to testifying codefendants is a violation of a federal bribery statute and must
therefore be banned. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1343 (10th Cir.
EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILrrY LAW

been less willing to expand those doctrines, state courts have
independently continued the process of limiting governmental power.'

Courts have also been zealous in expansively interpreting statutes that
provide rights to non-elites such as those that protect the environment

against industrial depredations.7

The legal malpractice tort, however, has managed to withstand the
winds of legal change. Particularly crucial has been the refusal to apply
alternative causation doctrines. The refusal to apply causation doctrines

that have been embraced in other areas has significant social effects. As
a result, the consumers of legal services receive less protection from the
courts than do the consumers of products or medical services.
The minimization of the role of malpractice actions as a tool for
protecting the recipients of legal services is particularly important. One
of the central justifications of the tort compensation system is that it is

an effective means of altering the conduct of potential defendants.!
Malpractice tort litigation is the common law's mechanism for enforcing

standards of professional conduct. In malpractice actions, those injured
by professional malpractice come to the court seeking compensation.
The courts, in deciding the cases, give compensation to the sPecific

plaintiff and create rules of conduct for the rest of the profession. This
1998), rev'd en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Lowery, 15 F.
Supp. 2d 1348, 1351, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 1998), rev'd, 166 F.3d 1119 (11th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Fraguela, No. CRIM.A. 96-0339, 1998 WL 560352, at *1 (E.D. La.
Aug. 27, 1998), vacated, 1998 WL 910219 (E.D. La. Oct. 6, 1998).
6. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The
Emergence of State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1141, 1143 (1985); Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Divided We Stand: State Constitutions in a More Perfect Union, 18

HAsTiNGs CONsT. L.Q. 723, 726-30 (1991); Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword:Reliance on
State Constitutions-Beyond the "New Federalism", 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. at vi,
vii-x (1985); Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: The Once "New JudicialFederalism" &
Its Critics, 64 WASH. L. REv. 5, 6 (1989); Bruce Ledewitz, The Role of Lower State
Courts in Adapting State Law to Changed Federal Interpretations,67 TEMP. L. REV.
1003, 1004 n.5 (1994); Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court:
Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional
Rights Adjudication, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1015, 1016-17 (1997).

7. See Rhodes v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 1998); Committee to Save
the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 448-51 (10th Cir. 1996); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Mathews, 410 F. Supp. 336, 337-38 (D.D.C. 1976); Kravetz v.
Plenge, 424 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315-19 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
8. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4,
at 25 (5th ed. 1984) ("The 'prophylactic' factor of preventing future harm has been quite
important in the field of torts. The courts are concerned not only with compensation of
the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer."); Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving
Behaviorand Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REv. 677, 679 (1985).

9. See Risa B. Greene, Note, Federal Legislative Proposals for Medical
MalpracticeReform: Treating the Symptoms or Effecting a Cure?, 4 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB.POL'Y 563, 581 (1995) ("Traditionally, the goals of tort law include compensating
victims for their injuries, deterring wrongdoers, and vindicating societal values.").
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judicial remedy is a particularly appropriate medium for the enforcement
of representational standards'" because the tort obligation to compensate
serves three functions: it compensates the victim, penalizes the
wrongdoer, and deters others. Because malpractice is defined as a
failure to conform to the appropriate standards of the profession, judicial
rulings formalize attorney standards. The court sets the standard of care
in decisions on the sufficiency of evidence of breach. Once a breach of
professional standards is proven, it is clear that the defendant failed to
act competently and breached the trust of the client. Proof of a single
element of malfeasance by itself deprives the defendant of any claim that
her obligations to her client were performed professionally. It is this
aspect of the tort that makes it the most equitable vehicle for imposing
standards of professional conduct.
In a malpractice action, the judicial ruling on the propriety of the
representation is not an amorphous abstraction. The proof of breach
rests squarely on the conduct of a particular attorney based on her
representation of the client. The verdict specifically finds the conduct in
question impermissible. The resulting malpractice standard affects, by
general deterrence, the conduct of the entire profession. The standard of
care, however, is only one element of the tort. Even conclusive proof
that the attorney breached her duty to a client is not enough to establish
liability."
The finding that representation was defective will have no impact on
professional conduct unless it is enforced by the imposition of financial
penalties-compensation. For these judicial rules to have an impact on
representation, the legal malpractice plaintiff must be able to establish
10. In determining whether there has been negligent conduct, an appropriate
standard of care must be recognized. Lawyers in the conduct of their profession are held
to the higher "reasonable attorney" standard rather than merely the "reasonable person"
standard. 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 18.2, at
550-51 (4th ed. 1996).
11. See Rouse v. Dunkldey & Bennett, 520 N.W.2d 406, 409 (Minn. 1994).
Additionally, in suing for inadequate settlement, it has to be proven that the client would
have prevailed, not that there was only a possibility or even that it was likely. It must be
established that the case was legally meritorious and factually provable. See Carlson v.
Fredrickson & Byron, 475 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Minn. C. App. 1991), overruled in part by
Rouse v. Dundey & Bennett, 520 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1994). In effect, the mechanism
by which the causation element is implemented in litigation malpractice cases is to have
the jury decide the underlying claim as part of the malpractice trial. Thus, the name
given to this causation element is "'the case-within-a-case."' Rouse, 520 N.W.2d at 409

(quoting Rouse v. Dunkley & Bennett, No. C6-93-777, 1993 WL 430351, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1993)).

that the defendant violated all of the elements of the tort. In particular,
before the breach of the professional duty will be penalized, the client

must prove that the breach caused an injury. 12 The impact of the
causation element is thus conceptually antagonistic to the purpose of the
breach element. The breach element permits the courts to set standards
of professional conduct. However, the causation element may excuse

the deficient attorney from any tort responsibility for her unprofessional

conduct, thereby limiting the effectiveness of the tort as a vehicle for
enforcing these standards. 3 Causation, therefore, is the tort law's last
refuge for the shoddy practitioner. 4 It poses the greatest barrier for
12. Simply stated, the plaintiff must prove that "but for" the negligence of the
attorney, the client would have prevailed in the underlying action. See, e.g., Basic Food
Indus. v. Grant, 310 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Pool v. Burlison, 736 S.W.2d
485, 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Katsaris v. Scelsi, 453 N.Y.S.2d 994, 996 (Sup. Ct.
1982); Rorrer v. Cooke, 329 S.E.2d 355, 369 (N.C. 1985); Chocktoot v. Smith, 571 P.2d
1255, 1257 (Or. 1977); 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 10, § 19.11, at 612 (discussing
causation for pain and suffering injuries in legal malpractice claims); Lester Brickman &
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible Under Fiduciary,

Statutory and Contract Law, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 149, 151 n.9 (1988). The jury in the

malpractice action is actually presented the evidence that would have been introduced
during the trial of the underlying action in which the defendant attorney was allegedly
negligent, and then asked to decide what the jury in that case would have done. "[Tihe
malpractice client must reconstruct the underlying action. If the client were a plaintiff in
the litigation, the burden is to show the existence of a valid claim upon which there was a
greater than fifty percent likelihood of prevailing but for the attorney's error." Polly A.
Lord, Comment, Loss of Chance in Legal Malpractice, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1479, 1481
(1986).
13. See Erik M. Jensen, Note, The Standard of Proof of Causation in Legal
Malpractice Cases, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 666, 690 (1978); see also John Leubsdorf,
Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 136
(1995). Leubsdorf states that a number of courts have limited a convicted criminal
defendant from recovering for malpractice unless it is shown "not just that he or she
would have been acquitted for malpractice, but also that he or she was in fact innocent,
or has received post-conviction relief setting aside the conviction. Such holdings reflect
a fear of overstimulated defense lawyers or overlitigious convicts." Id. at 136 (footnotes
omitted).
14. See Lord, supra note 12, at 1480 ('The formidable obstacle is proving cause
and injury, which together determine whether the negligence will give rise to an action
for damages."). "Cause in fact has been accepted to mean the client's ability to establish
that, but for the attorney's negligence, the underlying action would have terminated in a
more favorable result than actually occurred." Id. at 1480 n.13 (citing Spangler v.
Sellers, 5 F. 882, 894-95 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1881)). "Of course, if the mistake your client
made and admits resulted in his client's inability to bring suit, you will need to rely on
the traditional old defense of attacking the 'case within a case."' Don W. Fowler,
Attorney Malpractice: The Defense View, LMG., Winter 1993, at 23, 25. Fowler stated:
The judgment rule has been particularly helpful in defending malpractice
claims arising out of ongoing litigation-for example, when a dissatisfied
litigant sues his lawyer alleging that the lawyer should have called a particular
witness or should have asked a certain question on cross-examination. The
courts traditionally have protected lawyers under those circumstances. They
generally recognize, even if litigants do not, that in every lawsuit one side
loses. Many appellate opinions observe that a litigator is faced with a host of
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those who have received inadequate professional services. 5
The requirement that a claimant prove that the defendant caused the
injuries should not be eliminated from the tort-it is inherent in our
concept of liability. Culturally mandated standards of fairness refined
by centuries of legal analysis confirm the intuitive feeling that no person
should be liable unless her conduct truly injured the plaintiff. From the
schoolyard to the courtroom, the phrase "no harm, no foul" reflects our
society's standards of liability.' 6 It is part of the historic development of
the negligence tort.'
Culture necessarily prevents any serious
consideration of the complete abandonment of the doctrine.
Nonetheless, outside the confines of the legal malpractice tort, the exact
contours and the details of the causation doctrine have been critical
issues in the American law of torts. 8
The doctrinal development in this area has been driven by the fact that
although the causation doctrine satisfactorily balances the equitable
claims of the parties in the typical case, many cases are atypical. In the
typical negligence action, it is pragmatically possible to prove that the
defendant acted improperly and that this impropriety injured the

plaintiff. However, in the atypical case, the plaintiff has a far more
tactical decisions during the course of a lawsuit, some of which must be made
on a moment's notice during trial.

Id. at 26. But see Stewart v. Hall, 770 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that it
was an error for the trial court to refuse to admit evidence and instruct the jury on the
issues in the underlying dispute that gave rise to the malpractice claim).
15. The tension between these elements is not unique to the malpractice tort. It is
reflective of the checks and balances approach of Anglo-American jurisprudence. The
elements serve differing purposes and, thereby, balance the tort. The standard of proof
element implements a concept of justice based on the premise that liability is the
appropriate response to wrongful conduct. The causation element limits the scope of
liability; it is based on the theory that justice protects the individual against State
intervention without individualized proof of responsibility. Under this justice theory,
wrongful conduct is not sufficient to justify a penalty. Before a penalty can be imposed,
the plaintiff must show that it caused compensable harm.
16. See A. Dan Tarlock, EnvironmentalLaw: Ethics or Science?, 7 DUKE ENV. L.
& POL'Y F. 193, 212 (1996) ("Private adjudication links responsibility and liability and
the restrictive concept of cause-in-fact is grounded in notions of fundamental fairness
common to all major legal systems.").
17. See LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 132 (1927); Paul J. Zwier,
"Cause in Fact" in Tort Law-A Philosophicaland HistoricalExamination, 31 DEPAUL
L. REV. 769, 781-84 (1982). See generally OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW (Little, Brown & Co. 1948); Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in
Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1962).
18. See generally Lori R. Ellis, Note, Loss of Chance as Technique: Toeing the
Line at Fifty Percent, 72 TEx. L. REV. 369 (1993) (examining the loss of chance
causation doctrine).

complex proof burden on causation. In these cases the plaintiff's burden
cannot be met by merely proving what actually happened. The plaintiff
must prove what would have happened in a world that did not include
the defendant's negligence. This burden of proving hypothetical events"
is created whenever there is a claim that the plaintiff's injuries were not
caused by the defendant's conduct but would have occurred anyway.
Proof of a hypothetical is, obviously, a much more imposing burden than
simply proving history.
The burden of proving a hypothetical arises in a wide variety of cases.
For example, in automobile accident cases in which a plaintiff was not
wearing a seat belt, it has been argued that the plaintiff should be
required to prove that the injuries would have happened with the
seatbelt; 3 in "twin fire" cases the plaintiff is confronted with disproving
the claim that the other fire would have caused the injuries;2 in asbestos
cases the plaintiff must show causation as a result of exposure;2 and, in
medical malpractice cases involving delayed diagnosis or improper
treatment of life-threatening diseases, the plaintiff must prove that she
would not have died with proper treatment.' The burden of proving a
hypothetical also arises in the legal malpractice tort. In such cases, the
plaintiff must prove, for the case-within-a-case
element, what would
24
have happened but for the lawyer's negligence.
Proof of this type of hypothetical involves extensive knowledge both
of the pecific events of the particular transaction and of other similar
events.
Courts have carefully scrutinized the appropriateness of
applying the traditional burden of proof in these types of cases and,
except in the legal malpractice tort, have generally rejected traditional
19. See David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEx. L.
REV. 1765, 1768 n.10 (1997); Robert N. Strassfeld, If... : Counterfactuals in the Law,
60 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 339, 340 (1992).
20. See Swajian v. General Motors Corp., 559 A.2d 1041, 1046 (R.I. 1989)
(rejecting the seatbelt defense argument on the basis of no common law duty to wear
seatbelts).
21. See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 46
(Minn. 1920), overruled on other grounds by Borsheim v. Great N. Ry. Co., 183 N.W.
518 (Minn. 1921).
App. Ct. 1990).
22. See Leng v. Celotex Corp., 554 N.E.2d 468,471 (Ill.
23. See Kuhn v. Banker, 13 N.E.2d 242, 247 (Ohio 1938).
24. See Daugert v. Pappas, 704 P.2d 600, 604 (Wash. 1985) ("A majority of courts
have therefore concluded that when an attorney is negligent in filing an appeal, the client
bears the burden of proving that the underlying case would have been successful but for
the negligence of the attorney.").
25. To satisfy the burden of proving this hypothetical the plaintiff must acquire
sufficient information to establish a baseline of normal consequences against which to
compare the impact of the negligent conduct. See Vern R. Walker, The Concept of
Baseline Risk in Tort Litigation,80 KY. L.J. 631,665-72 (1991-1992).

26. It is not at all clear that the legal profession has the capacity to implement
effective rules of self-regulation. See Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice:Reforming
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allocations when the plaintiff is in a dependency relationship with the

defendant. 27 Analysis of the critical cases demonstrates that whenever
plaintiffs are found to have been in a dependent relationship with the
defendant(s), courts have rejected the traditional burden and duty rules
in favor of status-based rules such as "burden switching" and "loss of

chance."8
The traditional burden of proof allocation has been rejected in
dependency situations because it represents a system bias in favor of the
defendant. This bias reflects the tort law's implementation of the ethical

and moral values of individualism.29 Under natural law and Puritan

morality-based concepts of fairness, the natural order of the universe
may not be changed unless the defendant's wrongdoing justifies the
intercession of the State. 0 The judicial adoption of individualistic values
extends to the assumption that the defendant's wrongdoing cannot be
penalized unless the wrong has been proven.3 Thus, the defendant
deserves to be absolved of responsibility unless all aspects of liability
are certain; the defendant is provided with a civil assumption of

innocence. This presumption mandates the righteous vindication of a
Lawyers and Law Professors,70 TUL. L. REV. 2583, 2588-89 (1996) (noting the silence
in the legal profession regarding its malpractice epidemic); David B. Wilkins, Who
Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801, 807 (1992) (stating malpractice
"litigation is now a viable alternative to professional discipline").
27.
28.

See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.

29. The traditional system, although based in historical moral and natural law
factors, also gains support from modem economic theories explaining the dynamic by
which law effects human activity. See generally Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two
Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of

Injury, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1473 (1986). According to Professor Bush, a change in
burden allocations that made allegations easier to establish represented a shift from
"individual to group responsibility." IL at 1484. Since alternative proof allocation
schemes make defendants responsible for risk creation as opposed to actual injury, see
id. at 1484-92, they might create incentives for baseless litigation. In a litigation
management system that is completely dependent upon settlement to sustain itself,
change in proof burdens would create an inducement for defendants to settle cases
despite the absence of a credible factual basis to believe that they were responsible.
30.

For an interesting perspective, see DAvID LrrLE, RELIGION, ORDER,

AND

LAW

114-15 (1969) (explaining that in the Puritan tradition, the individual, if free from State
coercion, would perform God's "right order").
31. See Zweir, supra note 17, at 787.
32. See RoscoE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 85-102 (1921). Pound
identifies the core principles of a natural rights' foundation for American law as one
based on the belief that the protection of individual rights is the primary function of law.
This natural law concept lead to the creation of the Bill of Rights. See Zweir, supranote
17, at 792.

defendant unless uncertainty is banished.3
It is, however, an
inappropriate value by which to judge conduct when the accused has
committed acts that impede the plaintiff's opportunity to prove the
charges.'4
The development of alternative doctrines has been inexorable. For
almost two hundred years these doctrines have been applied to modify

the impact of the traditional duty and causation doctrines so that
plaintiffs who were denied proof by a defendant's conduct would not
also be denied compensation. 5
This Article will undertake an examination of the sources of various
alternative causation doctrines and their applicability to the legal
malpractice tort. Based on this analysis, recommendations are made to
apply alternative proof doctrines in litigation malpractice cases. The
scope of both this analysis and the proposed doctrinal changes is limited
to the litigation bar, because the relationship between an attorney who
represents a client in litigation is completely different than that between
an attorney and a client in a transactional setting. Litigation attorneys
control discovery, motion practice, and strategic decision-making. As a
result, they have far greater control over access to information, and thus
the resulting effects, than their colleagues in other segments of the
profession. Their negligence deprives plaintiffs of access to information
needed to prove the causation element of malpractice. Litigation
malpractice thus has the essential element found in those cases in which
alternative doctrines have been applied.
There is also a similarity between the relationship that litigation
attorneys have with their clients, and the one that doctors have with
patients. Both professionals possess such great superiority of knowledge
about his or her domain that they dominate the relationship. Neither
patients nor litigation clients know enough about the process to
effectively control critical decisions. Rather, they are dependent upon
the professional.36
33. In a civil case, the plaintiff has three burdens: the burden of pleading, the
burden of production, and the burden of persuasion. The burden of pleading means that
one must allege the elements of the claim; the burden of production means that at trial

one must produce evidence that tends to demonstrate the proposition at stake; and the
burden of persuasion means one must persuade the trier of fact that one's version of the
facts is more likely than not to be true. See JoHN J. COuND Er AL., CwIL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND MATERIALms 510-12, 992-93 (7th ed. 1997).

34. See Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort
Reform, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 435,438-39 n.7 (1995).

35. See generally David Hamer, 'Chance Would Be a Fine Thing': Proof of
Causationand Quantum in an UnpredictableWorld, 23 MELB. U. L. REv. 557 (1999).
36. For other criticism of the causation requirement in legal malpractice cases, see
Joseph H. Koffler, Legal Malpractice Damages in a Trial Within a Trial-A Critical
Analysis of Unique Concepts: Areas of Unconscionability,73 MARQ. L. REV. 40 (1989).
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The similarity between the doctor-patient relationship and the
litigation attorney-client relationship is central to this analysis, which
will focus on the difference in impact and in doctrines in the medical and
legal malpractice torts. Medical malpractice litigation will be used as a
standard of comparison. Medical malpractice was chosen because tort
litigation has had a tremendous impact on the practice of medicine and
because, not coincidentally, alternative proof doctrines have been
applied in medical malpractice cases.Y"
This Article's analysis has three components. Parts II and III analyze

the factors that have substantially impacted medical tort litigation but
not legal malpractice. Part IV analyzes the historical development of
alternative duty and proof doctrines to determine the pragmatic problems
that have generated their imposition. Finally, Parts V and VI analyze the

factors that mandate the adoption of three of these doctrines in litigation
malpractice actions. The three doctrines are: (1) the "substantial factor"
test; (2) the burden-switching technique; and (3) the loss of chance
valuation of damages.
II.

THE IMPACT OF TORT LAW ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

A.

The Impact of Tort Law in General

There are two areas in which the deterrent impact of tort law has been
overwhelmingly apparent: products liability and medical malpractice.
These two areas may be the tort system's greatest successes. Products
liability litigation has profoundly changed the way products are labeled
and designed.38 Medical malpractice tort litigation has made a noticeable
37. Medical malpractice litigation has not grown by chance. It has developed into
a dominant force in part because of substantive changes in rules of law that assisted
injured patients in their efforts to be compensated. Burdens of proof have been shifted
from plaintiff patients to doctor defendants, new injuries have been recognized, and new
duties have been created. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,781 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 690 (Cal. 1944); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop.,
664 P.2d 474, 476-77 (Wash. 1983); see also Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976) (imposing a duty on psychotherapists to warn those
specifically threatened by their patients); Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642
N.E.2d 514, 515 (Ind. 1994) (requiring pharmacists to cease refilling certain
prescriptions pending "direct and explicit instructions" from the prescribing physician).
38. An analysis of this can be found in DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS
AND COMPENSATION 619, 630-77 (3d ed. 1997). There was a widespread movement
among courts to begin accepting the idea of strict products liability whenever product
safety did not meet reasonable consumer expectations. Reasons given by judges were

and substantial impact on the practice of medicine.39 The factors causing
the dramatic impact of tort litigation in these areas are many; however,
the fact that alternative doctrines of proof and duty have been applied in
both of these torts has been central to their development.

Over the past twenty years, one of the most critical concerns of the
medical community has been the increase in the cost of medical
treatment attributed to the practice of "defensive medicine."'
It is
generally accepted that anxiety about potential tort liability has changed
the way medicine is practiced. 4' Doctors now order more tests and
recommend more invasive treatments than in previous years. 42 The

technological revolution in medical treatment might be the predominant
cause of this change in medicine, but there is little doubt that the
heightened concern over lawsuits has also played a substantial role in

restructuring patient treatment. 43 Doctors fear negligence claims based

based under three headings: practicality, justice and fairness, and social welfare. From
there courts went on to say that a product could also be defective because of the kind of

information that did or did not accompany it. Companies were forced to ensure that their
products and labels complied with all requisite safety and health standards. See id. at
619.
39. See generally Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An
Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 VIS. L. REV. 443; Bryan A. Liang,
Assessing Medical Malpractice Jury Verdicts: A Case Study of an Anesthesiology
Department, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121 (1997); Jerry Wiley, The Impact of
Judicial Decisions on Professional Conduct: An EmpiricalStudy, 55 S.CAL. L. REV.
345 (1981).
40. See Ann G. Lawthers et al., Physicians' Perceptionsof the Risk of Being Sued,
17 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 463, 479 (1992); John H. Sullivan, To the Legislatureon
Health Care: 'Do No Harm',SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB, Jan 2, 1998, at B5. See generally
William B. Schwartz & Neil K. Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence: An
Economic View of Medical Malpractice,298 NEwENG. J. MED. 1282 (1978).
41. It is not the purpose of this Article to weigh the beneficial effects of
malpractice litigation on patient treatment against its adverse consequences.
Specifically, as a result of malpractice litigation, or the fear of litigation, the individual
patient receives more medical services, such as additional diagnostic tests. See Lisa
Perrochet et al., Lost Chance Recovery and the Folly of ExpandingMedical Malpractice
Liability, 27 TORT & INs. L.J. 615, 625 (1992). These services may help individual
patients; however, the increased expense of medical services may be an overall detriment
to society. That complex issue has been a matter of dispute for decades. The significant
fact is that there has been an impact on medical practice, while litigation has not had any
significant impact on the practice of law.
42. See id.
43. See Bryan A. Liang, Medical Malpractice:Do PhysiciansHave Knowledge of
Legal StandardsandAssess Cases as Juries Do?, 3 U. CHI.L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 59, 60
(1996) (discussing how medical malpractice influences the standard of care); Perrochet
et al., supra note 41, at 625 ("[L]ost chance liability exacerbates the problem of
defensive medicine in the current climate of attempts at cost containment... [This
gives] 'strong incentives for physicians to perform medically unnecessary tests or
treatments to reduce their risk of liability."' (quoting GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CASE STUDY IN CALIFORNIA 23 (Dec. 1986))); see also
Lawthers et al., supra note 40, at 479; Michelle L. Truckor, Comment, The Loss of
Chance Doctrine: Legal Recovery for Patientson the Edge of Survival, 24 U. DAYTON L.
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on the failure to pursue every diagnostic possibility'

and now act

accordingly.
A comparison of the degree to which legal and medical practices have
been influenced by tort litigation reveals that tort law has not been

effective in altering the legal profession's degree of concern for the
quality of legal services. The contrast is stark. Although there has been
a substantial increase in the amount of legal malpractice litigation,45

unlike its medical counterpart, anxiety about malpractice liability does
not permeate the legal community. Commentators do not write about
the increased cost of legal services, at least not associated with the fear
of malpractice litigation. However, newspapers write about the

astounding cost of medical malpractice insurance.46 Although lawyers
are not indifferent to the possibility of malpractice actions,47 there is no

REv. 349, 369 (1999).
44. See Allen K. Hutkin, Resolving the MedicalMalpractice Crisis:Alternatives to
Litigation, 4 J.L. & HEALTH 21, 40 (1989-1990) ("Physicians and patients must
communicate and interact on an equal level and discuss different choices of treatment.
Patients must realize that complications can and do occur."); see also Jeffrey R. Wilbert,
et al., Coping with the Stress of MalpracticeLitigation, 171 ILL. MED. J. 23, 25 (1987)
(noting that medical care providers often view malpractice suits as personal attacks on
their competence and discussing doctors' abilities to personally cope with malpractice
lawsuits).
45. See Ramos, supra note 26, at 2583, 2584 ("[L]egal malpractice claims costs
lawyers and their insurers... billions of dollars [each year]."). See generally John P.
Freeman, Current Trends in Legal Opinion Liability, 1989 COLUm. Bus. L. REv. 235
(1989). Another indication of the increase is that the legal malpractice treatise by Mallen
and Smith has doubled in size in the last decade. Compare RONALD E. MALLEN &
JEFFREY M. SMrrH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (3d ed. 1989) (containing two volumes), with
MALLEN & SMrTH, supra note 10 (containing four volumes).
46. In the 1980s, medical malpractice premiums for neurosurgeons and
obstetricians approached two hundred thousand dollars annually. See Milt Freudenheim,
Costs of Medical MalpracticeDropAfter an 11-Year Climb, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1989,
§ 1, at 1.
47. See James I. Sullivan, Impact of EthicalRules and Other Quasi-Standardson
Standardof Care, 61 DEF. CouNs. J. 100, 101 (1994) ("Analysis of the legal malpractice
standard of care frequently requires consideration of the potential impact of ethical
rules."). "The fundamental concept of a general standard of care is essentially an

unchanging principle that proscribes negligent or other wrongful conduct on the part of
the attorney. The general standard attaches with the commencement of the attorneyclient relationship." Id. at 100. "Practical recommendations and guidelines relating to
many areas of law practice are found in a broad range of publications authored for the
practicing lawyer." Id. at 104. "In a legal malpractice case, admission of statements
from a practice manual or a continuing legal education handbook suggesting the proper
method of handling the task at issue will have a major impact in determination of the
specific standard of care." Id. at 105; see Gary A. Munneke & Anthony E. Davis, The
Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice: Do the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Define It?, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 33 (1998).
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indication that anxiety about legal malpractice litigation has caused 4a
lawyer to abandon his practice. The same cannot be said about doctors.
The divergence in the impact of tort litigation on two of the nation's
most important professions would be benign if it could be credibly
established that there is less legal malpractice than medical malpractice."
Unfortunately, there is no practical reason to believe that lawyers are
more attentive to their clients' needs than doctors are to their patients'
needs." In fact, the increased concern about the quality of representation

among those in professional legal organizations strongly suggests that
the legal profession has as much of a malpractice problem,5' if not more,
48. See Sara C. Charles et al., Sued and Nonsued Physicians' Self-Reported

Reactions to MalpracticeLitigation, 142 AM. J. PSYCmATRY 437, 440 (1985) (stating
that many doctors who have been sued avoid seeing certain kinds of patients); Howard
R. French, New York ObstetriciansReport a Crisis,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1988, at BI ("A
study by the New York chapter of the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists shows that nearly 10 percent of the state's approximately 2,000
obstetricians are abandoning baby delivery each year.... ).
49. Less complimentary possibilities, of course, abound: (1) lawyers are protected
by their colleagues on the bench who have created rules beneficial to an
attorney/defendant; (2) the legal community has no consensus of what constitutes
professional standards; (3) lawyers may be more adept than doctors in hiding their inept
performance; (4) clients may not wish to sue lawyers; (5) lawyers may not wish to sue
other lawyers and, thus, refuse to take legal malpractice cases; and (6) lawyers don't do
much anyway. Some argue that lawyers create special rules for themselves. See
Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 12, at 151 n.9.
50. See generally Fern Schair Sussman, Lawyer Regulation for a New Century,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8, 1993, at 2 (discussing client dissatisfaction with the legal profession).
There is virtually no way to quantify the incidence of legal malpractice outside of
counting legal cases. Anecdotal evidence of incompetence abounds, however. In any
gathering of trial attorneys, comments such as the following, taken from a luncheon of
trial advocacy teachers at the National Institute for Trial Advocacy's 1995 Northeast
Regional Intensive Trial Advocacy Program at Hofstra Law School, are routinely heard:
'"That guy didn't have the slightest idea of what he was doing"; "I can't believe that I got
away with that"; "He agreed to the settlement without even talking to his client"; "Can
you believe that she didn't ask for a jury trial with those injuries?"; "He let discovery end
without ever finding out the name of the defendant company's doctor, although his
complaint alleged that the company should be responsible for that doctor's intentional
infliction of emotional harm"; "She let the case be placed on the trial calendar without
having obtained the client's complete medical records from his own treating physician."
51. See Note, The Evidentiary Use of the Ethics Codes in Legal Malpractice:
Erasinga Double Standard, 109 HARv.L. REV. 1102, 1114 (1996) ("Observers have, in
fact, suggested that legal malpractice victims are systematically under compensated.").
In a footnote, the author elaborates on the point:
This conclusion was based on two facts: first, legal malpractice doctrine gives

lawyers greater protection than medical malpractice doctrine gives doctors (for
example, lawyers have less expansive duties to third parties than doctors do);
and second, in medicine, malpractice usually creates a new injury that makes it
relatively easy to establish causation of harm, whereas legal malpractice
usually involves a failure to remedy an existing problem-a failure that can
result from any number of factors.
Id at 1114 n.94. For a sampling of case-within-a-case issues in legal malpractice cases,
see Better Homes, Inc. v. Rodgers, 195 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. W. Va. 1961); Coon v.
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than the medical profession.
Even the most heavily publicized cases reveal obvious incidences of
shoddy representation- Lawyers in major criminal cases involving
wealthy clients-cases that are so extensively covered by the media that
the attorneys are clearly on notice that their conduct will be exactingly
scrutinized-routinely fail to comply with the simplest and most obvious

professional requirements.

There is simply no credible basis upon

which to believe that the difference between the impact of malpractice
litigation on the legal profession as opposed to the medical profession is
a reflection of the greater competence of the bar.
The medical and legal malpractice torts share a common purpose.

Both protect individuals who claim to have been injured by inept
professionals, as well as controlling the conduct of a profession. In
thirty years, the medical malpractice bar has gone from losing cases
because of the "conspiracy of silence among doctors" to winning a

seemingly endless stream of million-dollar verdicts. 3 In contrast, there
has been no similar progression in the legal malpractice tortFm
B.

The Special Impact of Tort Law on Medical Practice

There are several reasons for the substantial impact of medical
malpractice litigation on the practice of medicine. The most important
are: (1) the potential size of the verdicts; (2) access to medical experts;
(3) the affluence of the defendants, which translates into an ability to pay
Ginsberg, 509 P.2d 1293 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Weiner v. Moreno, 271 So. 2d 217 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Gladden v. Logan, 284 N.Y.S.2d 920 (App. Div. 1967).
52. In the Michael Tyson rape prosecution, for example, defense attorneys failed
to comply with a 48-hour discovery rule. The result was that potentially valuable
witnesses were not allowed to testify for the defendant. See Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d
276, 283-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). In the William Kennedy Smith rape prosecution, the
consensus of media and professional analysis was that the prosecutor was unable to
adequately represent the interests of the public in either cross-examination or final
argument. See Christine Evans, ProsecutorFaulted by Analysts, MIAMI HERALD, Dec.
12, 1991, at A20; David Zeman, MisconductAlleged in Rape Case, MIAvIHERALD, June
14, 1991, at B4.
53. See Michael Hoenig, Random Thoughts on Damage Issues, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 9,
1991, at 3 ("Although it still makes headlines, the million dollar recovery is no longer an
oddity nor is it the exclusive domain of a few skilled practitioners.").
54. There is clearly a bias in the legal system. It is purely a semantic debate to
discuss whether the bias is discrimination in favor of attorneys, as suggested herein, or
discrimination against doctors. See Dale L. Moore, Disparate Treatment of the
Allocation of Power Between Judge and Jury in Legal and Medical MalpracticeCases,
61 TEM. L. REv. 353, 356 (1988).
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large verdicts; (4) the highly developed dissemination of malpractice
litigation results, via medical publications and continuing education
programs directed to the profession's members; (5) the ability of doctors
to conquer disease being significantly oversold; and (6) the success of
the malpractice bar in obtaining judicial and legislative modifications of
traditional tort rules that ease the task of obtaining large verdicts.
1.

PotentialVerdicts

Medical malpractice litigation is fueled by the opportunity for huge
verdicts which necessarily translates into substantial profits for
attorneys.
With large verdicts and contingent fee payment
arrangements, both lawyers and clients have an incentive to litigate. The
"invisible hand" of the capitalistic profit motive provides all parties with
a chance to profit from litigation. This profit incentive encompasses any
medical case with substantial injuries because, even if the chances of
demonstrating negligence or causation are slim, long shots sometimes

win.
That the opportunity for substantial profit exists as an incentive is both
appropriate and important. It has been argued that the best way the legal
system can provide compensation for those who cannot afford the high
cost of a lawyer's hourly billings is the contingent fee arrangement.55
This is not a criticism, but rather a reflection of the genius of the
common law system in developing such a simple and effective engine
for social change and victim compensation. Attorneys have an incentive
to invest the money necessary to bring the action because of the prospect
of enormous profits on their investment. 6 Clients are given a chance to
gain compensation without enduring the anxiety of economic risk.
The economic potential of litigating has created mechanisms that
heighten the chances of plaintiffs succeeding in medical malpractice
litigation. Several decades ago, the medical malpractice plaintiff was
afflicted by what was called "the conspiracy of silence."C That term
referred to the reluctance of doctors to testify against their colleagues.
55. For a defense of contingency fee arrangements in legal cases, see Michael
Napier, ForMany, English Rule Impedes Access to Justice, WALL ST. ., Sept. 24, 1992,
at A17.
56. A consortium of plaintiff malpractice attorneys organizing the funding of a
litigation campaign against the cigarette industry is just one example of the type of
investment that the contingent fee system encourages. In 1994, a group of 65 law firms
committed to invest $100,000 per firm for this purpose. See Patrick E. Tyler, TobaccoBusting Lawyers on New Gold-Dusted Trails, N.Y. THMES, Mar. 10, 1999, at Al; see also
Glenn Collins, Judge Allows Big Lawsuiton Tobacco, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 1995, at Al.
57. See Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 144-45 ("Starting in the nineteenth century,

the medical profession sought to protect itself from malpractice claims by discouraging
doctors from testifying against each other.").
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Because expert testimony is virtually always necessary to establish

professional malpractice, meritorious lawsuits were often lost because of
the inability to find a doctor willing to testify for the plaintiff." The
flow of cash into the malpractice bar eventually solved the problem.
Now, there is so much medical malpractice litigation that medical
professionals can make a comfortable living by becoming professional
experts.,9 These medical professionals derive their income as forensic
experts. 60 Thus, the economics of medical malpractice litigation has
created an industry of captive doctors whose livelihood depends upon
litigation. Plaintiffs can now select among available experts rather than
suffer from the inability to find even one.6' In fact, the economics of
these cases has contributed to the creation of the new legal and social
problem of junk science.62
2. Access to Medical Experts
The availability of medical experts has given the medical malpractice

plaintiff's bar the information to establish causation baselines. The data
provided by the experts have made it possible to prove the hypothetical
outcome of nonnegligent treatment. Substantial economic resources
58. See Michael P. Ambrosio & Denis F. McLaughlin, The Use of Expert
Witnesses in EstablishingLiability in Legal Malpractice Cases, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1351,
1367 (1988) ('"The need for a specialist expert witness can create additional problems to
the malpractice client already troubled by the difficulty of finding attorneys to testify
against fellow attorneys .... ").
59. It is not difficult to find advertising from such professional experts. See Legal
Experts and Services, N.Y. L.J., July 30, 1999, at 8 (containing six advertisements for
experts willing to testify).
60. See id. See generally AMERICAN LAWYER MEDIA, 1999 N w YORK
DIRECTORY

OF EXPERT WITNESSES AND

CONSULTANTS

(1999); THE

NATIONAL

DIRECTORY OF EXPERT WITNESSES (1999) (containing 304 pages of detailed information
on named experts).
61. Indicative of the nature of this industry is the, perhaps apocryphal, remark of
an unidentified plaintiffs' personal injury attorney who claimed that experts who testified
frequently could be divided into three categories: "There are plaintiff's whores,
defendant's whores, and testifying whores."
62. The Supreme Court recently strengthened the power of judges to reject opinion
evidence in an effort to keep "junk science" out of the courtroom. See Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1992). However, some have argued that
Daubertand its progeny have had the opposite effect. According to Robin S. Conrad,
attorney for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, "The problem has been that these so-called
experts can march into court and testify to just about anything ....Often, these people
have degrees that might impress a jury, but their conclusions are not based on scientific
evidence." David G. Savage, High Court Limits 'Junk Science' Claims, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1997, at A29.

have enhanced the plaintiff s ability to meet the burden of proving what
would have happened but for the doctor's negligence.
3. Affluence of Defendants
Medical malpractice defendants come from some of the most affluent
segments of society-doctors and hospitals. While large verdicts could
routinely be gained against criminals who rape, rob, and murder, those
verdicts would never be collected. Verdicts against the medical
profession are routinely collected because the doctors have the assets to
pay or to obtain insurance.63 That fact obviously enhances the incentive
to sue, as large jury verdicts translate into large payments.
4.

Information Transfer

Doctors are bombarded with information regarding malpractice issues
in drug company advertising, professional magazines, and continuing
education programs.6 These abundant sources of information are also
vehicles for intimidation. The perception is that the medical profession
is overwhelmed with malpractice lawsuits. The reality is that they are
not.
5.

Public Perceptionof a Doctor'sAbilities

The fact that lawyers are encouraged to litigate malpractice actions
does not mean that verdicts will be high. Certainly, the size of the
verdict is affected by the nature of the injuries. Incapacity results in loss
of income and the likelihood that future medical expenses will be
incurred, which can lead to millions in damages.
Part of the
computation involves the public perception of the medical profession. If
doctors were seen as people eager to help but generally unable to
conquer fate, it would be far more difficult to establish negligence.
Doctors, however, have developed an enormous body of knowledge and
the ability to cure diseases that ravaged humanity for eons.67 Surgical
techniques have restored function and saved limbs in a way unheard of
63. See Ramos, supra note 26, at 2583.
64. See Interview with Dr. Joel Weintrub, in Henmpstead, N.Y. (Apr. 5, 2000)
(remarking on being "bathed" in unsolicited information about medical malpractice over
35 years of practice as an ophthalmologist).
65. See French, supra note 48, at B 1.
66. See id. ("[T]he American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists said 41
percent of the claims were dropped by plaintiffs or dismissed in court without an
award .... ).
67. The bubonic plague was wiped out with penicillin. Open heart surgeries,
including valve and total heart transplants, defy the comprehension of the laity.
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before World War HI.6 The lay belief is that doctors are virtually
infallible. Thus, if a plaintiff has horrendous scarring after plastic
surgery, the perception is that it must have been the doctor's fault. If a
baby is born with a defect, it must have been the doctor's fault. Because
the perception of the medical profession's miracle-performing ability
may exceed its scope.6 juries are easily persuaded that a "bad result" is

not the unavoidable consequence of disease, but rather the consequence
of inadequate medical care."
The medical malpractice plaintiff's bar is readily able to obtain
expertise sufficient to establish a prima facie case, and experience has

shown that juries are not reluctant to find liability. Doctors are aware of
every bizarre verdict and have developed an almost hysterical fear of

7
liability. 1

6. Modificationof TraditionalTort Rules

A seriously injured person who can prove that medical malpractice
prevented recovery will obtain compensation. The injured person,
however, cannot always so easily establish liability. Despite the
uncertainty, lawyers have been willing to invest time and money in the
cases. They are willing to pay for depositions, investigators, and expert
68. The case of John Wayne Bobbitt is arguably the most notable example. See
Lawrence K Altman, Artful Surgery: Reattachinga Penis, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1993, at
C3.
69. See David Plotkin & Francis Blankenberg, Breast Cancer-Biology and
Malpractice, 14 AM. J. CLIN. ONCOL. 254, 264-65 (1991). Plotkin and Blankenberg
state:
The scientifically uninformed but ever hopeful public greets the purported
breakthroughs [in breast cancer research] with enthusiasm. When treatment

failure occurs following diagnosis which could have occurred earlier, there is a
strong tendency to conclude that disability and/or death ensued because of a
doctor's negligence. Until we correct the unduly high expectations of our
diagnostic and therapeutic capabilities in this field, all of us will suffer the
social consequences.
Id. at 265.
70. This issue is discussed in detail in Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d 1384 (Ind.
1995), in which the doctor in charge failed to diagnose the patient's recurrence of cancer,
and that failure drastically reduced the patient's chance of survival. See id. at 1385-86;

see also Kuhn v. Banker, 13 N.E.2d 242, 243 (Ohio 1938) (describing the defendant's
failure to take an x-ray until it was too late to reset the fractured bone in the patient's hip,
despite having been informed by the patient that the broken bone was grating).
71. A doctor's worst fear is "an expensive court fight and a multimillion-dollar
jury award." Chad Terhune, Crisis Might Be Looming for Birth-Injury Program,WALL
ST. J., May 6, 1998, at Fl.

witnesses. When all of these resources fail to establish a prima facie
case, the attorneys are even willing to invest in litigation to change the
law.72 The potential for profit has encouraged
investment in law reform
73
litigation, which has been successful.
Of the six factors discussed in this section, three are equally prevalent
in legal malpractice litigation: the access to expert testimony, affluence
of the defendants (lawyers versus doctors), and network of information
about liability 74 are fundamentally the same. Certainly, there is a
difference in the element relating to the attitude of the public toward
lawyers and doctors. Doctors may be revered, whereas lawyers are more

likely to be feared.75

The two remaining factors have important

differences in the legal malpractice arena: the predictable
size of verdicts
76
is less constant and the cases are harder to win.

72. See Collins, supra note 56, at Al; Tyler, supra note 56, at Al.
73. See William Glaberson, Lawyers Feeling Society's Backlash, NEw ORLEANs
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 5, 1999, at Al (noting that lawyers are sometimes more capable
of tackling problems than government); Leslie Wayne, Lawyers Set Sights on Beating
Bush, Na~v ORLEANS TIMS-PIcAYuNE, Mar. 26, 2000, at Al ("[M]oney won in lawsuits
is being strategically reinvested by plaintiffs' lawyers in... more litigation."); see also
Perrochet et al., supra note 41, at 626 (discussing the potential impact of new health care
legislation on recovery). The authors state:
[J]urisdictions [that] have balked at barring recovery on causation grounds
where a physician has acted negligently.... have taken two approaches to
allow a patient to sue for damages even though the patient probably would
have been in the same physical condition absent the defendant doctor's
negligence. The first approach is to relax the reasonable medical probability
causation standard and allow recovery where the patient proves the physician's
conduct deprived the patient of a possibility of a medical result. ...
The alternative approach is to define the decreased possibility as a
compensable injury. Jurisdictions which follow this course adhere to the
"reasonable medical probability" standard of causation, but require the plaintiff
to show that the physician's conduct probably caused a lost chance of
improvement or cure.
Id. at 615-16.
74. See Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 107-08 ("Finally, legal malpractice cases
offer courts an unusual opportunity to effectuate the rules they promulgate by
influencing lawyers' conduct. Lawyers read malpractice decisions, and will heed the
possibility of personal liability."); id. at 102 ("The time has come to consider legal
malpractice law as part of the system of lawyer regulation.").
75. See John Tierney, Bar Sinister: Lawyers Earn Public's Wrath, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 1999, at B1.
76. See Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little
Secret,47 VAND. L. REV. 1657 (1994). The author states:
According to the ABA Study, only between 1.0 and 2.6[%] of lawyers each

year face a claim or lawsuit for legal malpractice. A full [67%] of claimants or
plaintiffs receive no compensation, [70%] of those who do settle receive less
than $1,000, and only [1%] of those who go to trial win.
Id. at 1660 (footnote omitted). Professor Ramos presents data to show that the number
of suits is actually higher. See id. at 1670.

420

[VOL. 37: 401,2000]

Alternative Liability in Litigation Malpractice
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

H.

THE LACK OF IMPACT OF MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION

A. A Wider Range of Verdicts
The size of verdicts is critical to the success of tort litigation as a
mechanism for changing conduct. Verdict size has an impact on two
different sets of actors: the class of potential defendants and the
litigation attorneys.' In the American litigation system, most p1aintiff's
tort attorneys are paid a designated percentage of the recovery.' Part of
the contingent fee attorney's responsibilities is the advancement of
money to pay the costs of the litigation, such as expert witnesses and

depositions.

9

The economic self-interest of the tort litigation bar is

thereby utilized to further the social interests in gaining compensation
for the injured party. 0 The collateral result of this system is that
litigation interest shifts to the most profitable areas. The creation of
economically maximizing conduct drives the attorney into profitmaximizing areas of work.8 ' The smaller the verdict, the smaller the
77. See Latin, supra note 8, at 678-79 (introducing a sophisticated economic
analysis of how different liability rules affect behavior, which, although explicitly
referring to potential defendants, applies equally to attorneys whose "problem-solving"
behavior is oriented to their personal profit). Utilitarian analysts would identify this type
of conduct as driven by system based efficiencies. High potential verdicts drive a
plaintiff's attorney to vindicate the rights of the poor and injured, maximizing social
good. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV.
537, 569 (1972).
78. See Burk E. Bishop, Lawsuits, Contingent-FeeContracts, and Bankruptcy, 47
OKLA. L. REv. 515, 531 (1994); Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A
Monopoly of Champions or a Marketfor Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 625, 62627 (1995); Note, Settling for Less: Applying Law and Economics to Poor People, 107
HARv. L. REv. 442,448 & n.23 (1993).
79. See Tyler, supra note 56, at Al (reviewing the impact of huge recoveries on
the incentives for attorneys to pursue specific types of large-scale tort litigation with lawchanging potential).
80. The relationship between the efficacy of malpractice litigation as a mechanism
for changing defendant behavior and the economic self-interest of the actors is reflected

in the development of a variety of proposals to enhance the chances of profit in suing
attorneys. See, e.g., Ramos, supra note 26, at 2583; Ramos, supra note 76, at 1682-86,
1725-31 (identifying greed as one of the most common reasons for legal malpractice
litigation). Although mandatory insurance is a solution to the problem of collection, it
does not solve the problems caused by the special defenses to liability and damages
possessed by the legal malpractice defendant.
81. Such "unintended consequences" of legal rules is quite common. See, e.g.,
Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory

incentive to litigate and, likewise, the smaller the incentive for attorneys

to spend money on law reform litigation.
It was the opportunity for financial success that fueled the legal
community's willingness to fund medical malpractice and products
liability law suits. Plaintiff's attorneys funded and brought seemingly

endless medical malpractice and cigarette litigation despite the abundant
precedent of defendant victories. Obviously, the attorneys would not
front such costs if they did not believe that their money was invested
soundly. They certainly were interested in prompting a change in the
law that would benefit the public interest. However, the inducement to

put up thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of dollars of their own

money was most likely not the potential law reform, but rather the belief
that the investment would reap fees in the millions.

If legal malpractice suits tend to return smaller verdicts than other
types of tort actions, then profit-maximizing conduct will drive attorneys
away, into the more profitable areas. 2 Thus, a significant question is
whether the size of legal malpractice verdicts is a function of client

injury, or a result of legal rules controlling legal malpractice litigation.
Doctors often treat patients with diseases that endanger either their
capacity to enjoy life or their life itself. Mistreatment can create
physical distress that reduces earning capacity, requires additional
medical treatment, and may lead to death. The damages caused by the
negligent doctor can, therefore, be great. Compensation for loss of
income in a death or incapacity case can be millions of dollars. 3
Disclosure,73 TEX. L. REV. 753, 785-86 (1995) (concluding that mandatory disclosure
rules will have the opposite of the intended economic consequences); Rena I. Steinzor,
The Legislationof Unintended Consequences, 9 DuKa ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 95, 104-09
(1998) (discussing the legislation of unintended consequences in environmental law).
See generally LENORE J. WEZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA

(1985)

(discussing the unanticipated effects of new divorce rules on women and children).
82. This perception of the relationship between fee generation and lawyer
litigation generation was so common that many legislatures adopted rules limiting
recovery in medical malpractice litigation. The recovery of the client was not affected,
but the attorney's fee was reduced to encourage settlements and deter litigation. The
legislatures acted in an effort to reduce the rate of increase in medical malpractice

premiums. See Frank P. Grad, Medical Malpractice and the Crisis of Insurance
Availability: The Waning Options, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1058, 1083-84 (1986);
Betsy A. Rosen, Note, The 1985 Medical MalpracticeReform Act: The New York State
Legislature Responds to the Medical Malpractice Crisis with a Prescription for
Comprehensive Reform, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 135, 173 (1986).
83. See McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 373 (N.Y. 1989) (regarding further
proceedings on a $9.7 million jury award to a 31-year-old comatose plaintiff who
suffered severe brain damage as a result of oxygen deprivation during a Caesarean birth,
which award was reduced by the trial judge to $4.8 million); Cruz v. Mt. Sinai Hosp.,
594 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (App. Div. 1993) (reducing to $6.5 million a $15 million jury
award to a 17-year-old plaintiff who suffered from cerebral palsy and quadriplegia as a
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Compensation for future medical expenses for a patient who has been
disabled can be equally high. Of course, the award for pain and
suffering can dwarf even substantial tangible injuries."
Civil lawyers, on the other hand, seldom cause death or physical
injuries. These lawyers deal primarily with economic losses. The
litigator is trying either to avoid a loss or to gain compensation for a
loss. The damages are therefore limited by the economic facts of the
litigation itself.' A suit to recover $150,000 has a maximum value of
that sum. There are no collateral injuries to enhance the amount of the
judgment such as future medical expenses, loss of income, and the like.
Since the size of a legal malpractice verdict depends upon the value of
the underlying case, some legal malpractice verdicts can be quite large.
A successful legal malpractice claim in a medical malpractice case, for
example, can result in the same dollar verdict against the attorney as that
which would have been found against the original doctor. Similarly, a
successful legal malpractice claim in a multimillion dollar corporate
litigation would lead to a multimillion dollar award against the attorney.
result of oxygen deprivation during and shortly following birth); Chazon v. Parkway

Med. Group, 563 N.Y.S.2d 488, 489-90 (App. Div. 1990) (increasing to $3.1 million a
$2.5 million stipulated damage award following a jury award of $4.3 million to father of
child who suffered severe brain damage, retardation, paralysis, and cerebral palsy as a
result of oxygen deprivation during birth); Pjetri v. New York City Health & Hosps.
Corp., 558 N.Y.S.2d 818, 818-19 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (regarding interest on a $7 million

damage award-reduced from a $24.5 million jury award-in favor of a 24-year-old
man who suffered severe brain damage as a result of misplacement of an endotracheal
tube during surgery on a broken leg).
84. See Bermeo v. Atakent, 671 N.Y.S.2d 727 (App. Div. 1998). In that case, the
appellate court increased to $8.7 million a damage award that was reduced by the trial
court to $4.5 million from the jury award of $45,295,573, which the jury had calculated
as follows: $1,600,000 for 16 years of the child's past pain and suffering, $7,875,000 for
63 years of future pain and suffering, $4,070,573 for 29.8 years of loss of earning
capacity, $252,000 for 63 years of future physicians' services and medical equipment,
$472,000 for 63 years of future physical and occupational therapy, and $31,026,000 for
63 years of future group home or home care expenses. See id, at 730; see also Stevens v.
Bronx Cross County Med. Group, 681 N.Y.S.2d 531, 532 (App. Div. 1998) (involving a
$3 million award for past and future pain and suffering); DiMarco v. New York City
Health & Hosps. Corp., 669 N.Y.S.2d 51, 51-52 (App. Div. 1998) (involving a
$1,150,400 award for future medical expenses); Court Decisions, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 27,
1998, at 25; Nicole Goldstein, Verdicts and Settlements, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 17, 1998, at 4.
85. See John H. Bauman, Damagesfor Legal Malpractice: An Appraisal of the
CrumblingDike and the ThreateningFlood,61 TEMP. L. REv. 1127, 1133 (1988). Thus,
whatever damages, fines, surcharges, costs, fees, or exemplary damages resulted from
the attorney's negligence are recoverable, once the plaintiff client demonstrates that the
judgment in the underlying case is unmerited and attributable to the attorney's
malpractice. See id.

On the other hand, legal malpractice verdicts in modest cases would lead
to modest awards.
Legal malpractice verdicts are, therefore, less consistent than medical
malpractice verdicts. The injuries caused by legal malpractice are
limited to the damages of the underlying actions. There are attorneys
who specialize in gaining compensation for children injured by birth
trauma. It seems that every defendant is a doctor, every plaintiff is
devastatingly injured, and every plaintiff's verdict is enormous. Other
attorneys have "collected" asbestos, lead, or breast implant cases. All
are areas in which verdicts are potentially high. 6 Such specialization is
impossible in legal malpractice litigation; thus the verdicts will be less
However, representation of legal
predictable and often lower.
malpractice plaintiffs can be very lucrative. The fact that it is a less
predictable source of income in no way establishes that it is not

profitable. Therefore, the difference in the scope of litigation in the two
areas cannot be explained by differences in profitability.
B. Legal Impediments to EstablishingLiability
The amount of recovery, however, is only one part of the calculation
made by those whose conduct is influenced by legal outcomes. As in
any business, certainty of profit combined with volume can compensate
for smaller recoveries in individual transactions.
Actions for legal malpractice contain the same elements as any other
negligence lawsuit. Plaintiffs must prove duty, breach, causation, and
damagesY As in medical malpractice cases, to establish "breach" the
plaintiff must prove that the attorney "fail[ed] to exercise the knowledge,
skill, and ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the
legal profession similarly situated."'"
Nonetheless, legal malpractice actions can be some of the most
difficult cases to establish. One reason is inherent in the nature of legal
representation. There are few set rules and fewer public perceptions of
anticipated outcomes. For example, an operation that fails because of a
suture failure is not an unavoidable accident; it is clearly an error that
justifies compensation. Unfortunately, legal representation does not
have the background of modem science. There is no public perception
86. See Daniel Wise, Opt-Outs Stir Concern OverBreast ImplantSettlement, N.Y.
L.J., July 18, 1994, at 1; Daniel Wise, Plaintiffs' Bar Appears Wary of Breast Implant
Settlement, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 25, 1994, at 1; $10.4 Million Award for Asbestos Claims,

N.Y. L.J., June 3, 1994, at 2.
87. See Shaun McParland Baldwin & Lisa C. Breen, Malpractice Claims by
Primary and Excess Insurers: Is the Honeymoon Over?, 62 DEF. COUN s. J. 18, 18

(1995).
88. Id.
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of attorneys as miracle workers. Indeed, the public does not think highly
of attorneys. 9 Because the attorney is not considered a miracle worker,
a bad litigation outcome is not automatically seen as the result of lawyer
error.9° Further, because lawyers do not base their conduct on science,
complaining clients may be perceived as vindictive rather than abused. 9'
Because the ease of getting a verdict is an important factor in the success
of tort litigation as a tool to police the legal and medical professions, it is

useful to identify the factors other than the innate differences between
the nature of the professions that contribute to reduce access to
compensation.
Many rules interact to reduce the size of potential verdicts. Attorneys

have retained protections against payment for pain and suffering,"
receive special consideration for erroneous strategic decisions,93 and
benefit from the deductibility of the unearned legal fee from a
malpractice judgment.94
There is, however, only one rule that
significantly reduces the client's probability of winning the case. That
rule is the traditional "cause in fact" rule that is applied to litigation

malpractice.95

89. The American Bar Association's Commission of Disciplinary Enforcement
found that "lawyers are more likely to be criticized than many other professions."
Sussman, supra note 50, at 2.
90. For example, in tax cases, the complexity of the Internal Revenue Service's tax
computations or revenue rulings makes it difficult to establish the correct result, let alone
the role that attorney error may have played. There is no "smoking gun" type of
evidence that will appeal to a jury, no broken suture or erroneously read X-ray that will
sit in front of them. Instead, the plaintiff must explain the nuances of the tax code and
the tax system to the jury in order to win.
91. In a malpractice case stemming from an underlying criminal action, the
convicted criminal is not likely to be seen as an attractive plaintiff. Likewise, in cases
stemming from civil marital actions, the trauma of the divorce may be seen as causing
the client to be so embittered that the malpractice action is little more than a spillover
from the hostility directed at the former spouse.
92. See 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 10, § 19.11, at 612.
93. See Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 930 (6th Cir. 1980); Allen Decorating,
Inc. v. Oxendine, 483 S.E.2d 298, 301-02 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Simko v. Blake, 532
N.W.2d 842, 848 (Mich. 1995).
94. See Moores v. Greenberg, 834 F.2d 1105, 1113 (1st Cir. 1987). But see
Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 555 N.E.2d 611, 611 (N.Y. 1990)
(prohibiting attempted deduction for unearned legal fee).
95. The case-within-a-case requirement has obvious relevance to litigation
malpractice claims, but is also a significant hurdle for plaintiffs suing negligent attorneys
in other situations. For example, a failure to communicate a settlement offer can be

defended by the claim that the offer would not have been accepted. See 675 Chelsea
Corp. v. Lebensfeld, No. 95 Civ. 6239 (SS), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14076, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1997).

Under this rationale, the failure to advise about possible

It is in the interpretation of this causation rule that the legal and

medical malpractice torts differ. In difficult proof cases involving
medical malpractice, causation burdens have been modified. Medical
malpractice tort reform decisions are based on a consensus of belief
among judges and legislators that certain medical malpractice plaintiffs
deserve special protection. 96 These policy makers responded to injuries
that were horrific, such as injuries involving death, disfigurement, and

pain.97 The appeal of reformulating legal rules to protect medical
malpractice victims' interests was deep and visceral.98 It has also been
effective. Oncological diagnostic negligence would be unprovable if

courts had rejected the alternative proof doctrine of loss of chance.
Similarly, many types of injuries stemming from surgical malpractice
would be virtually unprovable if the courts refused to switch proof

burdens." In these types of cases, the abandonment of traditional proof
standards has been essential to the expansion in the use and impact of
the medical malpractice tort.
The victims of legal malpractice do not bear the scars of an

incompetent surgeon. An examination of the history of alternative duty
and proof doctrines, however, will establish that their proof problems are
indistinguishable from the type of proof problems that have led courts to
develop the alternative doctrines.

clauses that could be added to a contract to protect the client could be defended by the
claim that the plaintiff cannot prove that the other side would have accepted the
modifications.
96. Although not a medical malpractice action, the degree to which a common
understanding of the danger caused by specific types of defendants can engender law
changes is reflected in the legislative and judicial actions depriving cigarette
manufacturers of the intervening cause or assumption of risk defenses in suits by the
states seeking compensation for Medicare expenses. See Larry Rohter, FloridaPrepares
New Basis to Sue Tobacco Industry, N.Y. Tmms, May 27, 1994, at Al.
97. See, e.g., Correa v. Hospital S.F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1188-89 (1st Cir. 1995)
(involving woman with reported chest pains and dizziness who, after having been given
a number by hospital personnel and told to wait, left two hours later to seek other
assistance and died soon thereafter); Salathiel v. State, 411 N.Y.S.2d 175, 176-77 (Ct.
CI. 1978) (involving a doctor's puncture of the plaintiff's cribiform plate while
attempting to insert a nasogastric tube into plaintiff' s nostril, and the required corrective
surgery which severed the plaintiff s olfactory nerve).
98. Only after the medical profession became sophisticated in lobbying was there a
change in the progress of legal change. Using the claimed malpractice insurance crisis,
the medical profession was able to gain statutory modifications of pro-patient common
law rule changes of the prior decade, such as continuation of the statute of limitations
until the date of discovery of an injury. See Cheryl A. Fisher, Comment, Is There Light
at the End of the Tunnel? Putting a Stop to the Controversy of Which Statute of
Limitations to Use in a Medical Malpractice Action in Texas: Bala v. Maxwell, 909
S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1995), 22 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 345, 376 (1997); Rosen, supra note
82, at 137-44.
99. See infraPart IV.D.
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IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE PROOF DocTNs:
How MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PLAINTIFFS HAVE
BECOME THE BENEFICIARIF-S OF ALTERNATIVE
PROOF OPPORTUNITIES

A.

HistoricalDevelopment of a Complex Legal System

The common law system is dynamic. Law develops through an
accumulation of decisions in individual cases. The rule of precedent
limits chaos, but does not prevent change. Some rules appear and
flourish '0 while others disappear ' ' or are dramatically modified over
time. ' u Any serious endeavor to propose change must consider the
factors that support existing doctrines and the forces, if any, that have
been found sufficient to justify changes in these doctrines.
The case-within-a-case segment of the legal malpractice tort is merely
the causation element of the negligence tort. The recommendation to
adopt alternative causation doctrines can be accepted only if the

traditional causation doctrine is modified. It is thus necessary to
investigate the sources of that doctrine to identify both how it developed
and what has been held sufficient to justify changes.

Because the cause in fact standard has its roots in moral, historical,
and natural law developments unique to the Anglo-American culture, it
has won broad acceptance in the legal academy.'

3

This standard

100. Prior to a single judicial decision in 1960, strict liability was not the law in
products liability litigation. The decision in Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161
A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), revolutionized the duty of manufacturers. See id. at 77 (replacing
negligence with strict liability). It was quickly followed in some form in almost every
jurisdiction. See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791,793-99 (1966).
101. Mitior sensus arose several hundred years ago as a mechanism to reduce the
amount of slander litigation. It required dismissal of actions when the underlying
statement was susceptible to a non-defamatory interpretation. It was never adopted in
libel actions and has been abandoned. See RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 1115 (6th ed. 1995) (citing J. BOWER, ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION 332-35
(1908)).
102. The contributory negligence doctrine, for example, once dominated the
negligence liability world, but has now been replaced by comparative negligence. See
SCHVARTZ, supra note 2, at 1-3.
103. See Zweir, supra note 17, at 785-95. Zweir identifies five cultural foundations
for the traditional proof allocation of cause in fact: (1) the Puritan tradition of protection
of individuals from the State; (2) the sixteenth century battles of the courts against the
King's discretionary powers; (3) natural law theories espousing the supremacy of
individual rights; (4) the political theory of social contract; and (5) the frontier tradition

represents a definition of fairness that maximizes individual rights,

which is known as individualism. °4 Careful analysis yields little basis to
dispute the claim that a view of fairness dominated by individualistic
concepts had an influence on doctrinal development in this area.
Morally based perceptions of individual responsibility and dignity"
engendered the cause in fact element in the personal injury tort and the
decision to allocate proof of that element to the plaintiff. Concerns
about excessive governmental intrusions also played a critical role in the
development of proof of causation standards." Thus, proof of causation
as a predicate to liability is morally and philosophically mandated in our
culture. Before an individual can be held accountable by the State for
her actions, she must be proven to have caused injury.'O According to
the legal academy, the mandate is so ingrained in the culture that it has
been referred to as the decree of the divine hand. There are, however,
other value systems that can be used to determine fairness in the
allocation of tort law obligations. 8 Status, defined as an identification
of fairness with reference to groups of people, has generally been
of independence. See id.
104. See POUND, supra note 32, at 37.
105. See Bush, supra note 29, at 1474, Zweir, supra note 17, at 809.
106. See Zweir, supra note 17, at 785-95.
107. See id. at 809.
108. There has been virtually endless analysis of the underlying conceptual bases
and fundamental purposes of tort law. Deterrence, distributive justice, compensation,
loss spreading, economic efficiency, and the like have been compared, contrasted, and
dissected. See generally Jay Tidmarsh, A Process Theory of Torts, 51 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1313 (1994); Nancy A. Weston, The Metaphysics of Modern Tort Theory, 28 VAL.
U. L. REv. 919 (1994). Although such analytic efforts are critical to a general
understanding of tort law, they are academic exercises that seldom further the
achievement of significant change in existing doctrines because the analyses are so
complex and interwoven that virtually any result can be justified or criticized by their
application. Whether causation issues are thought to be pure policy issues, perceived as
factual inquiries, or thought to be derived from the social purposes of the law matters
little, because all of these are primarily analytic fulcrums by which the proponent's view

of fairness can be furthered.

See Morton J. Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective

Causation, inTHE PoLrrlcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE

CRITIQUE

201, 211 (David Kairys

ed., 1982) (regarding causation issues as pure policy issues); Bush, supra note 29, at
1475 (dividing the social policy bases of causation into utilitarian and corrective justice
categories); Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735, 1739
(1985) (regarding causation issues as factual inquiries); Richard W. Wright, The
Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsibility: Unscientific Formalism and False
Semantics, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 553, 578 (1987) (regarding causation issues as pure
policy issues). The proposed changes in litigation malpractice doctrine, however, can be
supported under any of these competing perspectives. Indeed, the intellectual furor
surrounding the proper goals of tort law may well be the result of the widespread
acceptance of liability insurance. Insurance undermines the need to protect the
individualistic interests of the defendant. Damage awards will be paid by insurance, not
the individual. This reality leaves the goals of a tort system open for reinterpretation.
The catalogue of theories represents a segment of the ideas that have been offered to fill
the gap vacated as insurance undermines individualistic values.
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perceived as the alternative to individualism in the development of tort
law.'0' The historic causation doctrine has been analyzed as exclusively
based on a vision of fairness centered on the desire to protect the
individual." °
However, an understanding of one element of the tort law cannot be
complete without an examination of the factors that influence the other
elements. The law is a composite of various elements that combine to
create duties and rights. The personal injury tort obviously consists of
elements other than cause in fact. Individualistic values influenced the
creation of the causation doctrine."' The examination of causation out
of the context of the entire tort might lead to an overestimation of the
impact of individualistic values and an underestimation of the consistent
importance of status values. To determine the extent to which
individualism influenced judicial rule making, the interplay between
causation and the other tort elements must be analyzed. Substantive
rules must be considered in their interplay with the procedural rules.
A system of law incorporates substantive and procedural rules. The

substantive rules establish the element of proof while the procedural
rules define the quantum of proof; the substantive rules are only
effectuated in the procedural system created for their enforcement. An
element of proof based on individualistic concerns could exist but would
have little practical effect if the quantum of proof were extremely low.
The element, if too easily proven, would amount to little more than a
statement of principle."' It could only be of substantive impact if it were
buttressed by a quantum of evidence requirement that made it difficult to
prove. In other words, the quantum of proof standard could be used to
balance the degree to which the tort protected individualistic interests at
109. The status role focuses legal rule making on the "role voluntarily assumed by
the defendant and the defendant's relationship, arising out of the role assumed, to the
general class of persons who may be affected by one who plays such a role." Barbara B.
Rintala, "Status" Concepts in the Law of Torts, 58 CAL. L. REV. 80, 86 (1970). See
generally JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
REsPoNsiBiLrry 222-51 (1970) (discussing collective liability as an alternative to
individualism as the source of just legal rules); Matthew 0. Tobriner & Joseph R.
Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprisein the New IndustrialState, 55
CAL. L. REV. 1247 (1967).
110. See Zweir, supra note 17, at 809.
111. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
112. The claim that no person could be convicted of a crime unless he were proven
guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt," for example, would have nothing but rhetorical
value if the courts held that there was no reasonable doubt when the defendant's guilt
was "more likely than not."

the expense of other values. Individualism, as suggested in the academic
literature, may have been the ultimate value in tort causation rule

generation." 3 However, it may have been but one of many values that
were balanced against each other to formulate the tort. The issue is
whether other value systems can be found in the set of rules controlling
causation and its proof.

Divergent sources of rules in tort law are reflected in the quantum of
evidence standards. A comparison of proof standards in criminal and
civil cases readily reveals differing value bases. The Puritan, natural

law, and "pioneer spirit of individualism" values explain the standard of
proof in criminal cases. This standard, proof to a moral certainty,"'
embodies the purity of thought and crucial concern with protecting the
individual from the crushing burden of State intervention."' The
standard incorporates a definition of fairness that is centered upon the

protection of the individual against the State with the force of Puritan or
natural law "moral" conviction. The preponderance standard of civil
cases, on the other hand, is far less protective of the individual., 6 It
permits State intrusion without rigorous barriers of certainty. The rule is

so permissive in its slim barrier against governmental intrusion that
individualistic values do not seem protected. The preponderance of
evidence standard is far more readily explained by utilitarian or social
welfare-based definitions of fairness."7 Although academic analyses
113.

See supra note 105 and accompanying text.

114. The "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is often defined as proof to a
moral certainty. See Amy K. Collignon, Note, Searchingfor an Acceptable Reasonable
Doubt Jury Instruction in Light of Victor v. Nebraska, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 145, 148-49
(1996) (discussing how many states have now put the language of moral certainty into
pattern jury instructions).
115. See Zweir, supra note 17, at 785-95.
116. Burden of proof standards combine two distinct issues. The first is the
measurement of the amount of proof or certainty that is required. The second is the
allocation of burden. This discussion is limited to the first aspect of the civil standard,
the amount of proof. The decision to allocate proof burdens on the plaintiff is clearly a
continuation of the common law concern with the protection of individual rights. "The
preponderance of the evidence standard reflects society's 'minimal concern with the
outcome' as well as the conclusion that the parties should 'share the risk of error in a
roughly equal fashion."' Michele L. Jacobson, Note, RICO Post-IndictmentRestraining
Orders: The Process Due Defendants, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1162, 1183 (1985) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982) (quoting Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979))); see Neil Orloff & Jerry Stedinger, A Frameworkfor
Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-EvidenceStandard,131 U. PA. L. REv. 1159, 1160
(1983) ("Professor Kaye defended the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard by
pointing out that it results, overall, in fewer dollars being erroneously paid."); Vern R.
Walker, Preponderance, Probability and Warranted Facyfnding, 62 BROOK. L. REv.
1075, 1076-78 (1996) (discussing burden of proof problems and solutions in tort law).
117. See Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.L 656,
656 (1974-1975); Fletcher, supra note 77, at 567; Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection
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have suggested that status values were abandoned for centuries and only
recently resurrected as a source of tort rule making,"' the preponderance
of evidence standard is a reflection of the continuity of status influences.
This substantial distinction between proof burdens in civil and criminal
cases suggests the need to reconsider the role of status in early tort
development.
The divergence between the concepts of fairness
represented in the individualist-based criminal standard and the
utilitarian-based civil standard could not have gone unnoticed by the
common law courts. They could not have been oblivious to the impact
of procedural rules on substantive rights. The preponderance standard is
sufficiently removed from individualistic protective values that its
adoption must be considered an intentional mitigation of the rigors of
individual-rights-based elements of the system.
Of the sources
identified as leading the individualistic tradition,"9 only the English
courts in their battles with the Crown would seem to find a limited
preponderance scope of protection sufficient. Their battle was against
the unfettered discretion of the Crown; the imposition of any obligation
to a hearing before royal action was a great victory.'
On the other hand, the frontier influence and the pioneer spirit are hard
to reconcile with such a meager standard of proof. It is unlikely that
those frontier individualists whose spirit supported the cause in fact
standard would have been appeased if they understood the more subtle

reality of the preponderance definition of proof. Furthermore, that the
Puritans in their zeal to ensure that every individual was judged by the
"inflexible rule of the strict law"'' would have felt that their interests
were protected by the very permissive preponderance standard is even
harder to believe.
The standard of proof seems to stem from pragmatic utilitarian values.
A dispute resolution system, like the judicial system, must gain the
confidence of the public if it is to succeed as an alternative to self-help
or other primitive compensation schemes. Plaintiffs must win a
substantial percentage of cases or they will not have a sufficient
in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV.
851, 861-62 (1984).
118. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 109, at 1249.
119. See Zweir, supra note 17, at 785-95.
120. See id. at 789 ("The court ruled that the king violated the law of the land
because a person's property could not be forfeited without adjudication and an
opportunity to be heard." (emphasis added)).
121. POUND,supra note 32, at 51.

incentive to use the system. Potential litigants are individuals whose
conduct can be molded by legal incentives.' 2 The divergence between
the criminal and civil standards can be explained by the fact that the
utilitarian concern of molding a system so that adversaries will be
induced to use it exists only in the civil litigation environment.
The criminal justice system need not create incentives for disputants
to use the system. It is a tool of the State and the opposing parties are
not willingly present. In the criminal system, the Puritan, natural law,
and English court tradition of individualism are truly represented in both
the concept of individual responsibility and the standard of proof. On
the civil side, however, the status of the parties-injured plaintiffs
deserving a forum to resolve disputes about compensation-mandate a
different degree of protection. Whether the lawyers exploited the
popular rhetoric of individualism to gain acceptance of their rulings or
believed in those values while finding that they had to be balanced
against other interests of justice can, of course, never be known. '23 It is
certain, however, that the causation values of individualism were
substantially eviscerated by the standard of certainty that was developed
to define them. The preponderance of evidence standard permitted the
courts to maintain a terminology' 4 consistent with the individualistic
concerns engendering the causation requirement, but was also far more
flexible. Once the preponderance standard was applied, proof of
causation was diminished to facts sufficient for a reasonable person to
believe that it was a little more likely than not that the defendant caused
injury.'5 The common law courts' response to the mandate that the law
should protect individualism was, in the modem argot, to define proof

down.'
When the entire system of regulating personal injury disputes is
considered, the degree of influence of individualistic concerns appears
122.
123.

See Latin, supra note 8, at 679.
See Richard H. Weisberg, Three Lessons from Law and Literature,27 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 286, 291 (1993). See generally STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TMXT INTHIS
CLASS? (1980); ROMAN JAKOBSON, LANGUAGE IN LrrnuATuRE (Krystyna Pomorska &

Stephen Rudy eds., 1987).
124. See generally Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 75, 90-92 (1991) (discussing how terminology creates a complex system
because of the expectations people have about institutional competence).
125. Whether the 51% certainty standard survived individualistic attacks because
even the most fervid of Puritans understood that accommodations to reality would be
required if the system were to retain general support, or because so few could read that
the significance of the procedural rule was not generally understood, is buried in history.
126. See Amy L. Wax, Against Nature-On Robert Wright's The Moral Animal, 63
U. CH. L. REv. 307, 339 (1996) (discussing Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's
description of the normalization of previously unacceptable behavior as "defin[ing]
deviancy down," meaning accepting behavior as it becomes more common).
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modest. The common law courts have been responsive to varying
perceptions of fairness and to diverse audiences. Thus, the courts
formulated a system of law that simultaneously balances competing
concerns. Some rules are responsive to concerns of individualism,
others to social justice or utilitarian values. The total product always has
been a sophisticated amalgam of competing influences-the total more
nuanced than any individual rule.'"
A further example of the intertwining of status and individualistic
values in the formation of tort doctrines is found in the "vicarious
liability" doctrine. Pursuant to this master-servant doctrine, an employer
can be found liable as a result of the negligent conduct of an employee.'2
This liability exists without regard to the conduct of the employer.
Because the doctrine does not require proof of wrongful conduct by the
employer, it cannot be attributed to the law's concern with the protection
of individualism; rather, it reflects status values.1 29 The group threatened
by the conduct of employees was seen as requiring substantive
protections against the group of employers.'
The only thread
connecting the doctrine to individualism was rationalizing language
found in some early decisions.'
Therefore, courts have always considered both individualistic and

status concerns, and tort law reflects a continuing process of balancing
the competing interests. The individualistic causation standard was
balanced by the status-based proof standard, and the negligence

standard 132 was ameliorated by the status-based vicarious liability
127. See POUND, supra note 32, at 20 (explaining that status values dominated the
legal system in the feudal era); R.H. Graveson, The Movement from Status to Contract,4
MOD. L. REv. 261,272 (1941).
128. See KEETONETAL., supra note 8, § 69, at 499-501.
129. The precise origin of the respondeat superior doctrine is unknown; however, its
roots have been traced to Roman times. The traditional Anglo-American doctrine
combines status values of fairness in the basic imposition of liability with individualistic
values in the scope of employment concept (a limitation on the employer's liability).
The latter is a doctrine of the English courts and was developed by Lord Holt. See
Douglas McGhee, Once Bitten, Twice Bitten: The Minnesota Court of Appeals Limits the
Recovery of SexAbuse Victims in Oelschlager v. Magnuson, 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 191, 200
& n.69 (1997).
130. See FEINERG,supra note 109, at 233.
131. See Bush, supranote 29, at 1477.
132. Whether the negligence standard itself is an individual rights based rule is a
matter of debate. CompareKEETON Er AL., supra note 8, § 30.4, at 165 & n.8 (asserting
individualistic basis), with HOLMES, supra note 17, at 81-82 (finding utilitarian and
deterrence justifications), andRIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 180-81
(2d ed. 1977) (attributing the doctrine to a judicial intuition of economic efficiencies).

doctrine-together creating a system of justice responsive to all.
The interplay between values that produced the cause in fact and
preponderance of evidence compromise did not end the tensions
between individualistic and status-based concepts of fairness. The
development of legal doctrine is an endless continuum of rule creation
and modification. Often the initial rule stemmed from concepts of

fairness evolving from one set of values, while the subsequent
modifications were engendered by considerations of different value

sets. 3

B.

The Patternof Judicial Value Selection

The critical issue in unraveling the nature of this value switching is to
separate the "fact sets" that induce application of status values from
those that lead to the creation of individualistic rules. Fact sets are the
core facts that courts use to classify problems.'
The purpose is to
identify the fact sets that have persuaded courts to classify a problem as

one of group interests-a legal problem that must be solved by
application of status based rules. Because courts have modified rules in
the effort to create legal doctrines that fairly balance the interests of the
parties and society, the resources that must be examined to discover

these critical fact sets are the cases in which doctrines have been
changed. Of course, the repository of decisions in the Anglo-American
jurisprudence is vast; however, the concern in this exploration is limited.
It is to determine whether the litigation malpractice tort is the type of
case in which individualistically based rules should be modified. Thus,

it is only necessary to analyze cases in which courts have made statusUnder any analysis, the non-individual rights themes cannot be completely ignored. The
addition of an element focusing on the defendant's state of mind-negligence-rather
than basing liability solely on conduct represents a submersion of personal responsibility
values to those of group interest.
133. See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact,9 STAN. L. Rlv. 60, 73
(1956) ("All rules of conduct.., exist for purposes. They are designed to protect some
persons under some circumstances against some risks.... The task of defining the proper
reach or thrust of a rule in its policy aspects is one that must be undertaken by the court
in each case as it arises.").
134. Theorists tend to develop their arguments by premising values and then
incorporating fact types. See generally Jules L. Coleman, Property, Wrongfulness and
the Duty to Compensate, 63 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 451 (1987); Robert Cooter, Torts as the
Union of Liberty and Efficiency: An Essay on Causation, 63 Ci.-KENT L. REv. 523
(1987); Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective CausationJudgments in Liberal
Political Theory, 63 Cfu.-KEN'r L. REv. 579 (1987); Michael S. Moore, Thomson's
PreliminariesAbout Causation and Rights, 63 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 497 (1987); Alan
Schwartz, Causationin PrivateTort Law: A Comment on Kelman, 63 Ci.-KEN'r L. REv.
639 (1987); Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 Cm.-KEN L. REv. 407
(1987). However, judges follow a different pattern of analysis. Their work requires
them to start with the facts and, thereafter,discover the relevant policy.
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justified modifications to individualistically based rules. By looking at
cases in which courts have changed or abandoned doctrinal paths based
on individualistic value systems, the fact sets motivating the courts to
switch can be identified. These critical moments of judicial change are
the windows into the courts' core value system. In these cases the
underlying pattern, which the courts have cycled through value system
rule making, can be discerned.135
There are many cases inwhich individualistically justified tort rules
have been modified because the balance of equities reflected in the cause
in fact and preponderance rules did not end the tension between

competing values.'36 Although concerns over the fairness of proof
allocations were satisfied through this compromise for well over a
century, substantive law issues and issues of sufficiency of proof

continued to create perplexing problems.'37 Doctrines that had been
crafted to achieve fairness goals, as defined by individual rights
standards, were attacked because they did not produce acceptable results

in certain types of cases.'38
The core problem confronting the courts in these cases was the rigidity
of the individualistically based doctrines. Individual rights concepts

achieved acceptable results in most situations. Over time, however, the
courts began to encounter a significant number of situations in which

application of the individual-rights-based rule did not lead to acceptable
135. Unfortunately, in this effort, analysis at the most abstract levels will not be
sufficient. Professor Bush, for example, persuasively argues that communitarian
concepts were best suited to balance rule development between the twin dangers of
collectivistic and individualistic excesses. See Bush, supra note 29, at 1529-63. He and
other scholars have explored the language of judicial decisions to discern the "judicial
intuitions" of the courts, id. at 1530 n.189, considering the degree to which the courts are
"committed to ensuring that legal rules express and effectuate transcendent values of
human dignity." Id. at 1532 n.194. His conclusions, and those of other scholars, are
extremely helpful in explaining the past. See generally Gerald E. Frug, The City as a
Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1980); Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander
Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1590-99 (1985). Many of these
scholars assume that judges seldom consciously apply an academic analysis to the cases
before them. If true, the authors and their work stand little chance of significantly
persuading courts and affecting the future development of doctrine. Similarly, the
corrective justice analysts attempt to explain the entire complexity of tort law with a
single theory that was never articulated by a judge. See generally ERNEST J. WEmNRM,
THE IDEA OF PRiVATE LAW (1995); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973),
136. See Bush, supra note 29, at 1480-1502 (examining tort cases that modified
traditional cause in fact and burden of proof rules).
137. See id.
138. See id.

results. In these exceptional cases, status values seemed to dominate the
court's perception of the appropriate result.' 39 Thus, individualistically
based rules were not perceived as leading to equitable results. The
judicial response was to create exceptions to the original doctrine.'4"
These problematic cases often arose because changing patterns of
commerce and technological development altered the nature of human
interactions upon which the original decision to apply individual-rights-

based rules had been premised. 4' Individualistically justified rules are
based on the belief that discrete actors in society are similarly situated.
The predicate for imposing rules based on fairness values that stem from
individualistic premises is a perception of human interaction in which
the individual is an autonomous entity with freedom to act.' 42 Under this
view, each has "individual" control over her destiny; each is an
autonomous being. Thus, individualistically justified rules protect the
individual by imposing identical responsibilities on all parties to a
transaction. Whether the transaction is the sale of a commodity, the
security of one's property, or proof of fault in a legal action, each
individual has the same rights and obligations. However, changes in
social structure caused by or reflected in changes in technology produce
many situations in which individuals are not equally empowered. In
these situations, the individualistically justified rules lack fairness.
When
the parties are not equal, rules of fairness predicated upon equality
43
fail.
This inquiry will not be limited to causation cases because the
substantive law development in the area of duties-specifically strict
liability-and the procedural law development in alternative liability
share common themes. They are similar in two ways: they both contain
doctrines that were created as exceptions to rules based on
individualistic values, and the doctrines were created in cases containing
fact sets in which the courts were required to decide problems that
stemmed from similar relationships between the parties.
An examination of these crucial cases reveals a common theme. The
critical component of the fact set in which status values have been found
to dominate arises when the relationship between the parties contains
139. See infra Part IV.C.
140. See Bush, supra note 29, at 1480-1502.
141. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 109, at 1247 (presenting the theory that
legal change is an effort to adjust to changing patterns of industrial development).
142. See Zweir, supra note 17, at 781-84.
143. Literature contains encapsulations of this distinction that are clearer than the
most august legal analyses. "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as
the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." JACQUES
ANATOLE FRANcoIs THIBAULT, Le Lys Rouge, in JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONs 655, 655 (15th ed 1980).
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three elements: (1) conduct by the defendant, (2) that monopolizes
access to information, and (3) deprives the plaintiff of independent

resources sufficient to protect her interests.' 44
Information domination that produces helplessness is a fact set that
cannot be resolved by reference to individualistic values. When the
defendant's conduct imposes a dependant status on the plaintiff, the

defendant may argue for protection of her individual rights, but the
plaintiff's dependence deprives such arguments of moral force.'45 When
that dependent status has been caused by the conduct of the defendant,
the courts have been persuaded for more than a century that
individualistic rules must be modified to protect the plaintiff.'" The
pattern by which strict liability, loss of chance, burden switching, and
other status-based doctrines developed can be traced through a
continuum of decisions over almost two hundred years.47
C. The Patternof DoctrinalChange

The doctrines most obviously affected by the tension between
individualistic and status values are the doctrines of duty and sufficiency
of proof. Their connection in this area is that changes in these doctrines

were induced by the desire to assist plaintiffs who were seen as
144.

See Joseph H. King, Jr., "Reduction of Likelihood" Reformulation and Other

Retrofitting of the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 495 (1998)
(discussing a set of similar factors that should identify the loss of chance doctrine).
145.

The general belief that the individual must be protected against the State does

not vary. However, since that concern is only one of the value sets that courts refer to
when rules are made, the importance of individual rights protection is always balanced
against other social goals. As economic and social development produce changes in the
relationship between groups of individuals, the relative importance of the need to protect
the individual varies. Thus, in 1956 Professor Malone could write that "attempts to use
the substantial factor formula in malpractice cases (where the similar claim is made that
the physician's treatment substantially enhanced the danger of the patient's death) have
not met with any success." Malone, supra note 133, at 95. Forty years later, that
statement no longer reflects the state of the law. In medical malpractice cases the courts
are now extremely willing to use substantial factor and other proof easing rules. See
infra Part IV.D. The difference is a change in perception about the relationship between
the doctor and the patient. The doctor is now seen as far more powerful, because
technological advances have created resources to diagnose and routinely cure illnesses
that had been invariably fatal. This scientific development changed the perception of the
doctor patient relationship. When that changed, the patient became the dependent and
the doctor the controlling member. As a result, the same claim that had been rejected for
decades suddenly "met with success."
146. See Bush, supra note 29, at 1480-1502.
147. See infra Part 1V.C.

victimized by individualistically based rules. A change in the standard
of proof assists plaintiffs in surmounting their information deficit with
respect to that which has already happened, so that they may gain
compensation in court. A change in the scope of the defendant's duty
assists a plaintiff in two ways: (1) it reduces the chance of being injured,
and (2) increases the chance of gaining compensation when injured. The
increased chance of gaining compensation occurs because there is a
direct relationship between the scope of duty and the plaintiff's burden
of proof. The greater the defendant's duties, the less onerous the
plaintiff's burden of proof. 4' The decreased chance of being injured
arises because defendants as a whole have a greater responsibility to
protect potential plaintiffs.
The issue of duty became an early battlefield between individualistic
and status-based rule systems.

49

This was a central area of judicial

analysis because of its critical role in defining the scope of an
individual's responsibility. Rules that limit duty are based on an
assumption that plaintiffs are not at serious risk because they are
autonomous and can take effective action to protect themselves."50 They
are thus individualistically justified doctrines. The decision to impose
greater duties reflects the judicial view that the group of potential
plaintiffs does not have the ability to adequately protect its safety, and
that the tort law must be invoked to create a greater degree of safetyrelated conduct by the defendants.
Sufficiency of proof became a significant issue because the
148. The most obvious example of the relation between duty and burden of proof is
a change in duty to strict liability from negligence. In this instance, the plaintiff's burden

of proof is simplified by the removal of an entire element. The plaintiff is now freed
from having to establish that the defendant was negligent. This type of increase in duty
is the most dramatic type of change in the burden of proof. The plaintiff is not merely
assisted in proving a fact; the need to prove that fact is totally removed.

149. See infra Part lV.C.1

150. The autonomy assumption even explains the "no duty to trespasser' rule. This

duty-limiting rule is based on the perception that the plaintiff group is, by definition, a
group that has voluntarily acted in a manner that places them outside of the scope of
legal protections-trespassing. They were free to make the choice and chose to act in
violation of their legal obligations. Exemptions such as the "attractive nuisance"
doctrine and the "known trespasser" doctrine are based on factual analyses, which
indicate that the trespasser was not truly acting as an autonomous entity or was not
acting against the law, the children were not autonomous, and the owner's tolerance of
the trespassing made it less pernicious. See generally Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17
Wall.) 657 (1873) (regarding the attractive nuisance doctrine); Excelsior Wire Rope Co.
v. Callan, 1930 App. Cas. 404 (appeal taken from Eng.) (regarding the known trespasser
doctrine). In states in which the "no duty to trespasser" rule has been eliminated, the
courts have clearly based their judgments on the view that the volitional act is not
sufficiently heinous to lead to exclusion from safety protections provided by tort law
duties and remedies. See Pridgen v. Boston Hous. Auth., 308 N.E.2d 467, 476-77 (Mass.
1974); Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868, 871-73 (N.Y. 1976).
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compromise between causation and preponderance of evidence did not
satisfy the problems of proving the "breach of duty" element in certain
types of cases.'
Causation inherently involves establishing
probabilities.
Breach, on the other hand, appears to focus on more
concrete matters. Breach of duty is a combination of two elements: (1)
the defendant's conduct and (2) the noncompliance of that conduct with
the legal standard.153 The first is a purely factual issue. Nonetheless,
litigation involving defendant conduct requires that the courts resolve
tensions between standards of fairness and allocations of proof.

Establishing what the defendant did became entangled in an entirely
different problem of access to information. The parties had radically
different degrees of access to information in certain types of cases.' In
these difficult cases, the plaintiff was increasingly seen as lacking either
the capacity to protect herself against the risks created by the defendant
or the resources to acquire facts necessary to prove that the defendant's
conduct violated a legal standard. The information-deprived plaintiffs
were not autonomous, and the individualistically justified rules did not
lead to results perceived to be fair.
In both types of cases-those where the plaintiff was perceived as
lacking the ability to protect herself against risks created by the
defendant, and those in which the plaintiff was perceived as lacking the
ability to acquire necessary facts regarding the defendant's conductstatus-justified rules were adopted.'
Duties changed when the
information-dependent plaintiff was deprived of the capacity to protect
herself, and burdens of proof changed when the deficit was limited to
establishing breach.' 56 Decisions to alter duty and proof standards are
thus different means of responding to the same problem. Within the
common law can be found an endless series of rules, exceptions,
codifications, and recodifications; the entire range exceeds the scope of
any single analysis. However, the unifying themes that induce similar
problems to be resolved through similar legal devices can be identified.
The nature of the balancing process, as it has evolved in this mixed
151. See infraPart IV.C.4.
152. Malone identifies the critical causation proof question as follows: "How great
must be the affinity of causal likelihood between the defendant's wrong and the
plaintiff's injury... ?" Malone, supra note 133, at 72.
153. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OFTORTS § 282 (1965).
154. See infraPart V.CA.
155. See infra Part IV.C.4.
156. See infraPart IV.C.4.

area of proof and standard of care, is revealed in the core cases in which
changes have been dramatically wrought by a single influential decision.
These areas are examined in the following sections.
Three related duty 57 doctrines are particularly revealing. They
demonstrate the critical role of the dependency fact set on the common
law courts' decisions to impose greater duties on defendants. The three
doctrines are: (1) privity in torts, (2) artificial impoundments, and
(3) strict products liability.'58
1.

Duty: Thomas v. Winchester

Privity in tort law is a doctrine limiting a party's duty to those with
whom she was in direct contact. It represents an extension of contract

principles into tort law. Two centuries ago, privity was an impenetrable
barrier protecting manufacturers and merchants from suit by any person
not a party to the sales contract. If a person hired a carpenter to build a
bridge over his stream, others who used the bridge could not sue the
carpenter for defects in the bridge's construction. The carpenter's duty
was solely to the purchaser. However, the lack of a remedy for all those
injured by defective construction seems harsh by modem standards of
duty. In the past, products were not mass-produced; they were
specifically created for the individual purchaser. Because the carpenter
constructed the bridge according to the purchaser's desires, the
purchaser's satisfaction was the predominant economic reality for the
carpenter. Limited legal duties simply made the law a reflection of the
economic realities of the time. The privity doctrine thus reflected the
perception that individuals had the capacity to care for themselves. It
was one of the many legal rules based upon individualistic concepts of
fairness.
As industry centralized at the end of the eighteenth century, the
pattern of economic interaction changed. Goods were often created
157. The duty cases are particularly important in assessing the proper standards for
judging the conduct of litigation attorneys, because the service provided by the attorneys
shares some of the same attributes of the products sold in the duty cases. The products
involved in the privity and products liability cases were distributed in a manner that
prevented independent scrutiny by the consumer. Legal representation in litigation is
similarly inaccessible and cannot readily be reviewed by the client. Both the products
and the service are bought in reliance upon the care of the provider.
158. The commonality between the factors that convinced courts to switch proof

burdens and impose strict liability is not a novel perception. Ezra Ripley Thayer made

an early and clear analysis of this relationship. See generally Ezra Ripley Thayer,
Liability Without Fault,29 HARV. L. REv. 801 (1916) (arguing that the adoption of a
strict liability standard for artificial impoundments was unnecessary since cases could

have been decided in the plaintiffs favor more expediently through the application of res
ipsa loquitur).

440
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without regard to a specific purchaser. The goods were packaged,
labeled, and sent into a newly created stream of commerce. The face to
face relationship that supported individual fights concepts, and thus the
privity rule, was no longer the prevailing type of commercial
relationship.
59 the court had to consider the viability of
In Thomas v. Winchester,"
an individualistically based rule in the context of this newly unfolding
economic universe."6 The defendant prepared, bottled, and labeled a jar
of medical herbs. Unfortunately the jar was mislabeled; it contained a
poison. The defendant sold the jar to a pharmacist who then resold it to
the plaintiff's husband. The plaintiff consumed the herbs and was
injured. 6 ' In reviewing the case law precluding liability outside of the
ambit of privity, the court noted that the limitation on liability was based
on the general perception that the purchaser would be the one injured by
a defectively fabricated product. 2 The court distinguished those
cases, 163 stating that the mislabeled poison "put human life in imminent
danger."' 6' The threat was not limited to the dealer who purchased the
drug-in fact, the dealer in this case was not likely to be harmed.6'
Rather, drug consumers faced the greatest risk of injury. Because of the
pernicious nature of mislabeled commodities, users are not autonomous;
no consumer can protect against this type of danger. The court,
therefore, created an exception to the privity rule.
The three factors necessary to reject individualistic value-based rules
were all present in Thomas. The defendant's conduct-mislabeling the
bottle of herbs-limited the plaintiff's access to necessary information
and thereby deprived the plaintiff of independent resources sufficient to
protect her interests. This plaintiff was not an independent agent capable
of protecting her interests. Thus, the legal obligations of those who
placed her in this dependent position were expanded.
The subsequent expansion of this exception further demonstrates the
way that individualistically based legal rules are changed when the
159. 6 N.Y. 396 (1852).
160. As noted by California's Judge Traynor in a different case, "The
manufacturer's obligation to the consumer must keep pace with the changing
relationship between them ....
." Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443
(Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).

161. See Thomas, 6 N.Y at 398.
162. See id. at 407-08.
163. See id. at 408.
164. Id. at 409.
165.

See id.

economic realities upon which they are based change. In the famous
case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 66 Justice Cardozo carefully

reviewed almost one hundred years of doctrinal development following
the decision in Thomas. In distinguishing one case among several in
which the Thomas exception had not been applied, Cardozo noted that
"[t]he buyer in that case had not only accepted the boiler, but had tested

it. The manufacturer knew that his own test was not the final one."167
Cases such as this did not require the application of status-based rules

because the plaintiff was not incapacitated by the defendant's conduct.
2.

Strict Liability: Rylands v. Fletcher

In Rylands v. Fletcher,'68 a reservoir flooded because it had been built

too close to unused mine shafts. The waters flowed onto the plaintiff's
property, causing injury by preventing the mining of coal.' 69 The
resulting litigation forced the court to choose between trespass and
negligence doctrines, which imposed different duties on the defendant.
The plaintiff in Rylands argued for strict liability on the theory that the

underground entry of the waters onto his property constituted a trespass
or a nuisance. 7 1 The defendants urged the court to apply a negligence
standard.'
The lower court chose to apply a negligence standard.7

nuisance theories were rejected on technical grounds.'73

Trespass and

The court

proceeded to consider whether it would be appropriate to impose a

greater duty on the defendants by regarding them as members of the
class of "insurers." The court refused to treat the defendants as insurers,
because to do so would be contrary to "the ordinary rule of law." 74
166. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
167. Id. at 1052.
168. Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. D. 1865), rev'd, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265
(1866), aff'd, Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868).
169. See Rylands, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. at 332.
170. See id. at 335-37; 159 Eng. Rep. at 740-42.
171. See Rylands, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. at 332-35; 159 Eng. Rep. at 742-43.
172. See Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. at 744-47.
173. See id. at 745. The Court of Exchequer held that there was no trespass because
the release of the waters was the indirect, not direct, result of defendant's conduct. See
id. at 746. The release was indirect because the defendant's conduct was the building of
the reservoir; the release was the result of the collapse of nearby mine shafts. See id.
Nuisance was rejected because the building of a reservoir was a lawful act and because
the level of the waters never rose above that of the "natural surface of the land." Id at
745. Thus, the court reasoned that the released waters would have descended onto the
plaintiff's land in any event, by the work of "gravitation." Id. The court stated that
"there is no better established rule of law than that when damage is done... there must

be negligence in the party doing the damage to render him legally responsible, and if
there be no negligence the party sustaining the damage must bear with it." Id
174.
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It is clear that the court was aware of the tension between status and
individualistic concepts of fairness, which was the central issue in this
case. The court confronted the matter by reviewing the treatment of
common carriers and innkeepers.'75 By the middle of the nineteenth
century, the English courts had already decided that the responsibilities
of common carriers and innkeepers were too great to permit suits against
them to be determined by individualistically based rules.176 The
prevailing individualistically based right to be free from liability, and
thus free from responsibility, for other than reasonable care had been

found to be inapplicable to these types of defendants.'" The need to
impose higher standards of responsibility on these defendants had been
judged more important than protection of their individualism. The
decision to apply status-based concepts to the conduct of innkeepers and
common carriers was based on the common law courts' view of a
common sense allocation of duty commensurate with power. Common
carriers of goods for hire, by definition, had complete control over the
goods. The plaintiff-owner had no power to protect those goods once
they were in the possession of the common carrier. Similarly, the
innkeeper had the sole ability to maintain the premises and guard against
injury to those who paid for their night's rest. Both trades necessarily
placed the recipients of their services in a dependent relationship. The
legal result of actual dependency was the imposition of status-based
duties.
The lower court in Rylands, however, in a remarkable example of
concrete thinking, refused to look to the policy of these status-based
"'
rules. 78
The subsequent decisions by the intermediate appellate court
and the House of Lords also grappled with the problem of choosing
between status and individualistic rule bases. Justice Blackburn, writing
for the intermediate appellate court, focused on the critical facts
demonstrating that the plaintiff had been rendered dependent by the
conduct of the defendants:
standard of care than negligence because they were considered to be quasi insurers. See
id.
175.

See id.

176.

The special duties imposed on these defendants were the "custom of the

realm." Id.
177. See id.
178. Judge Martin actually said that the existence of exceptions to negligence

standards for innkeepers and common carriers proved the rule that "there must be
negligence in the party doing the damage to render him legally responsible." Id

But there is no ground for saying that the plaintiff here took upon himself any
risk arising from the uses to which the defendants should choose to apply their
land. He neither knew what these might be, nor could he in any way control the
defendants, or hinder their building what reservoirs they liked, and storing up in
them what water they pleased, so long as the defendants succeeded in
preventing the water9 which they there brought from interfering with the
plaintiff s property. 17

He specifically discussed the heightened dependency status of the

plaintiff in the case, as distinguished from that of the typical plaintiff:
Traffic on the highways, whether by land or sea, cannot be conducted without
exposing those whose persons or property are near it to some inevitable risk;

and that being so, those who go on the highway, or have their property adjacent
to it, may well be held to do so subject to their taking upon themselves the risk
of injury from that inevitable danger .... 190

Justice Blackburn's analytic distinction focuses the choice between
the two paradigms on the fact of dependency and domination. The
typical plaintiff is aware of the risks and has a degree of control to
minimize them. In that fact set the individualistically based negligence
standard is appropriate. However, the plaintiff in this case had no

control. The paradigm of individualism was not appropriate when the
plaintiff did not have the autonomous power to control exposure to
injury. Status values were more consistent with the nature of the
relationship between the parties. The court thus rejected negligence and
imposed strict liability. 8 '
The three factors of the dependency relationship radiate from this fact
set. The defendant's conduct--creating an artificial impoundment of
water on his property-deprived the plaintiff of information needed to
control the risk, and thereby further deprived the plaintiff of independent
resources sufficient to protect his interests. This plaintiff was not an
independent agent capable of protecting his interests. The legal
obligations of those who placed him in this dependency position were
therefore expanded.

179. Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265, 287 (1866).
180. Id. at 286.
181. Although the significance of Rylands has been seriously contested, once this
set of facts had been identified as one that justified the application of status-based rules,
its general application and the development of a broader doctrine of strict liability
became inevitable. See A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Liabilityfor Bursting Reservoirs: The
Historical Context of Rylands v. Fletcher, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 244 (1984)
(describing the context in which the case was heard); see also Clark-Aiken Co. v.
Cromwell-Wright Co., 323 N.E.2d 876, 877-78 (Mass. 1975) (affirming that a cause of
action in strict liability, as articulated in Rylands v. Fletcher, exists in Massachusetts).
The doctrine of strict liability focused on the use and control of ultrahazardous
instrumentalities. See Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916

F.2d 1174, 1176-77 (7th Cir. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §519 (1977).
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3.

Strict Liability in Products:Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.

The manufacturer-created dependency status of the consumer
recognized in Thomas was rare in the nineteenth century; the privity
exception was therefore narrow. However, the development of the
centralized manufacturing and distribution process escalated during the
next century."s By the middle of the twentieth century Justice Traynor
could say, in his influential concurrence in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co.,"5 3 that:
The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the
soundness of a product, even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and
his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to

build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as trade-marks.
Consumers no longer approach products warily but accept them on faith, relying
on the reputation of the manufacturer or the trade mark.'8

In 1944, Justice Traynor's perception was that the commercial world
was one in which all consumers had been placed in a dependent status.
The sophisticated technical nature of products, the custom of sealed
packaging, and the development of broadly disseminated advertising
combined to preclude the possibility of consumer independence. The
product had to be accepted on faith or not at all. Justice Traynor was
ahead of
his time; however, by the 1960s, the rest of the legal world
85
agreed.
The change in the commercial relationship mandated that
individualistically justified protection for manufacturers be abandoned.
Although Traynor relied upon many technical legal theories to justify his
conclusion that strict liability was essential if justice was to be achieved
when consumers were injured by manufactured products,'8 6 the
importance of the status relationship fact set was central to his analysis

182. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring) ("As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great
markets and transportation facilities, the close relationship between the producer and
consumer of a product has been altered.").
183. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
184. Id. at 443 (citations omitted) (Traynor, J., concurring).
185. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69,77 (N.J. 1960);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

186. See David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33
VAN]D. L. REV. 681, 681 (1980) (discussing how Justice Traynor "shifted the inquiry
from warranty to tort law").

and is reflected throughout the decision.' The dependent status of the
consumer mandated the development of status-based legal doctrines.

Strict liability, which abandons the requirement that plaintiffs prove a
lack of due care, reflects such a status-based rule.
With the development of strict products liability, the threads of duty
and proof burdens intertwined. Removing an element of proof-fault-

eases a plaintiff's proof problems while simultaneously increasing a
defendant's duties. This dual impact represents the inherent connection
between duty and burden of proof rules. Individualistically justified
rules limit a defendant's duties and increase a plaintiff's proof burdens.

The conversion to status-justified rules can occur with changes in either
doctrine; changes in duty rules, however, always impact proof burdens.
Increasing duties reduce proof requirements.
As technological changes expanded the scope of the dependency

The
relationship, the judicial response became more robust.8
individualistic values inherent in the negligence standard itself-the
requirement that moral fault must be proved before a person could be
held accountable----were forced to yield to the status-based strict

liability standard.
The dependency fact set can now be found in all consumer sales. The

manufacturer's

conduct-mass

manufacture

and distribution

of

products-dominates access to information-central design, sleek
casings, shrink wrap packaging, etc.-precluding the plaintiff from

acquiring the information necessary for both protection and acquisition
of proof to obtain compensation in a negligence action. Plaintiffs in this
187. Justice Traynor stated:
[I]t should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability
when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human
beings ....
An injured person, however, is not ordinarily in a position to refute such
evidence,., for he can hardly be familiar with the manufacturing process ....
Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, are ordinarily either
inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public.
Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-43 (Traynor, J., concurring).
188. Subtle shifts in proof burdens such as those in the res ipsa loquitur doctrine had
previously been created to modify the extent of individualistic protections for
dependency-creating defendants. The increased pace of centralized manufacture and
distribution of products rendered such tentative measures insufficient. See generally
Richard A. Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73 GEO. L.J. 1377 (1985)
(discussing the problems in large scale joint liability scenarios).
189. According to Holmes, "the only possible purpose of introducing this moral

element is to make the power of avoiding the evil complained of a condition of liability.

There is no such power where the evil cannot be foreseen." HOLMES, supra note 17, at
95.
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scenario are doubly dependent. They are without information to protect
themselves from injury, and they are without information necessary to
prove fault in court. The response of the legal system was to reduce the
impact of both types of dependence by eliminating the requirement of
proving wrongfulness.'
The removal of a due care defense was
designed to stimulate the class of manufacturing defendants to enhance
product safety, while simultaneously reducing the plaintiffs
dependency-created proof problems.'
4. Burden of ProofCases: Dependency Status Induces Twin
Exceptions to TraditionalProofBurdens-Loss of
Chance and Burden Switching
A review of the duty cases demonstrates the essential role that the
judicial perception of dependency has on decisions to adopt statusjustified rules.
Rules of proof differ from substantive rules

predominantly because proof rules are technical. They affect conduct
indirectly through their impact on the probabilities of winning or losing
in court. The relationship between the conduct of the parties and the
rules of proof is thus more attenuated. The impact of the dependency
fact set, however, may still be seen in the development of alternative
proof doctrines.
The balance represented by the preponderance of evidence standard of
proof satisfied the status interests in the large majority of fact sets.
However, over time, fact sets began to appear in which the dependency
of the plaintiff was especially severe.
When the traditional
individualistically defined burden of proof was applied to these cases,
the results were inequitable. The defendant prevailed because of her
control of information. The mere fact that the defendant won was not
the problem; such a result would be considered fair if the parties were
autonomous actors.' However, when a defendant's verdict is not the
result of innocence but, rather, results from the defendant acting in a
manner that prevents the plaintiff from acquiring the necessary proof to
establish the conduct as wrongful, the result is unacceptable. The
verdict is unacceptable because the dependent status of the plaintiff

190. See supranotes 182-87 and accompanying text.
191. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 101, at 745-46.
192. See HOLMES, supra note 17, at 94 ("The general principle of our law is that
loss from accident must lie where it falls... ).

dominates the perception of fairness.

In such fact sets even the

preponderance compromise is insufficient to protect the dependent,
injured plaintiff. When plaintiffs are forced into a dependent status by
the conduct of the defendant, courts cannot tolerate the result produced
by individualistically justified legal doctrines.

The specific facts held to justify the further imposition of statusjustified rules of proof vary. When the burden was impossible to meet
because of the interaction of multiple parties, the preponderance burden
was modified.'93 When the hypothetical past was simply impossible to
prove, such as in the "seat belt" defense cases, the preponderance burden
was modified.' 9 When the defendants had a special relationship with the
plaintiff through which defendants dominated the acquisition of

information, such as surgical malpractice cases, the burden was

modified.'95
The judicial response to plaintiff dependence has been to revise the

individualistically influenced preponderance standard of proof and adopt
standards more consistent with status values. The doctrinal changes
produced by the application of these new standards range from minimal

to radical. The amount of change is a function of the degree of
dependence. The less autonomy retained by the plaintiff, the greater the
need for protection and the greater the deviation from the
individualistically influenced preponderance of evidence rule.
193. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Cal. 1948).
194. See Partman v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 649 A.2d 275, 277 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1994); Lawrence v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 784, 786 (La. Ct. App. 1968);
Carson v. De Lorenzo, 657 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (App. Div. 1997); Ryan v. Gold Cross
Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 424 n.1 (Utah 1995). The "seat belt" defense arises when the
defendant says that the plaintiff would not have suffered injuries in an automobile
accident if she had been wearing her seatbelt. Many jurisdictions have prohibited the
"seat belt" defense on the grounds that this hypothetical is impossible to determine. See,
e.g., Swajian v. General Motors Corp., 559 A.2d 1041, 1046 (R.I. 1989). Some
jurisdictions permit defendants to introduce proof concerning the aggravation of
damages caused by the failure to wear a seat belt in the damages segment of the trial.
See, e.g., Law v. Superior Court, 755 P.2d 1135, 1145 (Ariz. 1988).
195. The Supreme Court of Alaska stated:
The scope of disclosure required under [the statute] must be measured by what
a reasonable patient would need to know in order to make an informed and
intelligent decision about the proposed treatment.
Under the reasonable patient rule, a physician must disclose those risks
which are "material" to a reasonable patient's decision concerning treatment.
The determination of materiality is a two-step process. The first step
is to define the existence and nature of the risk and the likelihood of
its occurrence .... The second prong of the materiality test is for the
trier of fact to decide whether the probability of that type of harm is a
risk which a reasonable patient would consider in deciding on
treatment.
Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Alaska 1993) (quoting Hondroulis v.
Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 412 (La. 1989)).
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The revisions have been both imaginative and varied. They include:
(1) acceptance of certain types of circumstantial proof (the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine and its "non-delegable duty" modification);" (2)
revision of the definition of "causing" injury (the "substantial factor
test");'" (3) revision of the definition of joint action (the treatment of cotortfeasors as vicariously liable);19 (4) shifting the burden of proof on
cause in fact to the defendant;"9 and (5) recognition of loss of chance as
a compensable injury.2
A review of several significant cases demonstrates that judicial
decisions in these critical cases are actually based on the perceived
dependency relationship. The critical role of the dependency fact set is
not a theoretical explanation developed with the enhanced wisdom of
hindsight. Rather, the courts specifically support their adoption of
status-based exceptions to the traditional doctrines with reference to the
dependency relationship afflicting the plaintiffs.
a. Res Ipsa Loquitur: Byrne v. Boadle
The quintessential proof rule that represents a sense of fairness
attributable to individualism is the rule that imposes the burden of proof
on the plaintiff. As with all individualistically justified rules, the
underlying presumption is that the parties have equal access to

information. If the plaintiff cannot introduce sufficient facts to obtain a
verdict, then the natural allocation of assets should not be changed.
When the lack of equality is caused by the negligent conduct itself,
however, the equities shift. Individualistic values no longer reflect the
reality of the underlying events. Status values become more appropriate.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is an example of how exceptions to
individualistically based rules have been developed when the underlying
paradigm shifts. In Byrne v. Boadle,0 1 a barrel of flour being lowered
from the defendant's premises precipitously fell and injured the plaintiff.
The proven conduct alone might have been considered sufficient
196.

See infra Part IV.C.4.a.

197. See infra Part IV.C.4.b.
198. See infra Part IV.C.4.c.
199. See infra Part IV.C.4.d.
200. See infra Part IV.C.4.c. Professor Robertson has identified eight separate
alternative proof doctrines that have been developed to deal with the problem of
multiplicity. See Robertson, supra note 19, at 1775-94.
201. 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).

449

circumstantial proof of negligence,2 but the court felt it necessary to
develop a formal exception to traditional sufficiency of proof doctrines.
Instead of simply holding that the proven facts were sufficient, because
"the accident alone would be prim[a] facie evidence of negligence,'" 3

the court went on to hold that "the plaintiff who was injured by it is not
bound to sh[o]w that it could not fall without negligence."2
The new rule is partially based on the logical inference that inert

objects cannot move without human intervention and, in this type of

situation, that carelessness is a likely cause of the object's movement. 5
But the analogies used by the court reveal another dimension to the
decision that created the res ipsa doctrine. The court used hypotheticals
to explain the wisdom of the new rule. One hypothetical concerns a
barrel rolling out of a warehouse onto the plaintiff, the other a person
putting pots on chimneys that injure a person passing on the road.' The
importance of these analogies is that they modify the specific facts of
Byrne so that the dependency of the plaintiff is more starkly presented.
In the actual case, the plaintiff could have observed the lowering of the
barrel that caused the injuries."' In the hypothetical, the barrel rolls out
of a window. 3 The change in facts creates a plaintiff with no
opportunity to observe and take evasive action. Pots high on a chimney

are equally unobservable by the typical passerby. The use of these
analogies reveals the court's concern with the dependency relationship.
As far as the court was concerned, the plaintiff had no choice but to

rely on the care of the defendant. As a dependent, the plaintiff cannot be
fairly judged by rules that assume autonomy. The status of dependency
202. See id. at 301 ("A barrel could not roll out of a warehouse without some
negligence .....
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. There is much rhetoric in the res ipsa cases suggesting that the doctrine is
based upon a logical assessment of probabilities. "[If] the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence... that the accident arose from want of care." Scott
v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 159 Eng. Rep. 665, 667 (Ex. 1865). However,
careful analysis has demonstrated that the doctrine does not truly reflect the statistical
likelihood that the defendant was negligent. See David Kaye, ProbabilityTheory Meets
Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MicH. L. REV. 1456, 1465 (1979). Despite the sophistication of
modem probability analyses, it is unlikely that the common law judges were oblivious to
the fact that references to "the ordinary course of things" did not eliminate uncertainty.
The issue for them was which party deserved the benefit of the uncertainty. Expressed in
this fashion, the choice can be seen as one of values, not statistics. The individualistic
value reflected in the traditional plaintiff burden was balanced against the status value.
206. See Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. at 301.
207. See id. at 299 ("[Tihe declaration alleges that the defendant, by his servants, so
negligently lowered the barrel of flour. . . ."). However, at trial the plaintiff testified that
he "saw nothing to warn [him] of danger." Id.
208. Seeid.at301.
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mandated application of rules of fairness that reflected this status. The
court concluded that "those whose duty it was to put it in the right place
are prim[al facie responsible."
The individual's right yields to the
status value.
The factors emphasized by the court were those of the dependency
fact set. The conduct of defendant's servants-putting the barrel in a

dangerously high position and then lowering it-dominated access to
information about the activity. As a result of the defendant's control,
through its servants, of both the barrel and the information about its own
activities, the plaintiff was unable to acquire the proof necessary to gain
compensation for the injuries.1 The defendant placed the plaintiff in a
dependent position. The plaintiff's deprivation of information was
solely the result of defendant's conduct. Thus, an exception to the

traditional rule was justified.21'

The status-justified rule that the court adopted was more limited than

the rules that changed duties. The defendant's conduct, in the actual
case as distinguished from the court's hypotheticals, did not deprive the
plaintiff of an opportunity to protect himself from injury. The barrel was
visible to the public. The plaintiff had an opportunity to avoid relying
on the defendant for his safety by avoiding the area. The plaintiff's

incapacity was thus limited to proof of fault. The court's remedy212was to
modify the proof requirements while leaving the duty unchanged.

209. Id.
210. See id. ("Suppose in this case the barrel had rolled out of the warehouse and
fallen on the plaintiff, how could he possibly ascertainfrom what cause it occurred? It
is the duty of persons who keep barrelsin a warehouse to take care that they do not roll
out...." (emphasis added)).
211. The Byrne court was careful to distinguish the exception created in Byrne from
strict liability. "[1]f there are any facts inconsistent with negligence it is for the
defendant to prove them." Id. The specific allocation of burden of proof on the
defendant accomplished the goal of creating a legal vehicle to protect those in a type of
status-dependent condition. The dependency was sufficient for the application of this
new doctrine, but not so severe that further incursion into the proof-based protections of
defendants was unnecessary. However, the vehicle that was created, the switching of

proof burdens, was now available for expansion in future cases. See, e.g., Summers v.
Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Cal. 1948). See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Collapsing Torts, 25
CONN.L. REv. 717 (1993) (analyzing the way in which tort doctrines develop).
212. In this regard, the non-delegable duty res ipsa cases reveal the way in which
the scope of doctrinal change responds to the degree of the dependence. In the nondelegable duty case, the plaintiff has been forced to depend upon the defendant for safety
as well as for information to establish liability. But the defendant claims that her
conduct was reasonable because she reasonably relied on another to prevent the plaintiff
from being exposed to an unreasonable degree of risk. Thus, in Miles v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 467 P.2d 307 (Wash. 1970), the defendant railroad relied on others to guide the

b.

The SubstantialFactorTest: Reynolds v. Texas &

Pacific Railway Co.
A modest information deficit caused by dependency induced a modest
change in the causation doctrine in Reynolds v. Texas & Pacific Railway
Co.2 More than one hundred years ago, a woman hurried down a
stairway to board her train before it left the station. As she descended

the stairway, she fell. She sued the railroad that was responsible for
maintaining the stairs.1 4 The case has become a common staple of law
school torts classes. Liability was premised on the fact that the stairway

was not properly illuminated.2 5 The defense was based on the fact that
Mrs. Reynolds was unable to identify the exact reason she fell.2 6, Her
ignorance created a potentially fatal evidence problem. Although she
had proven that the absence of lighting created a danger, she could not
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the darkness caused her to
fall.2 7 Mrs. Reynolds was a heavy woman2 8 and she was hurrying down
the stairs.2 9 These factors could cause a fall without regard to adequate

lighting.
Further impediments to Mrs. Reynolds' meeting her burden were
created by the fact that there was no record of her testifying that she
stepped on, tripped over, or slid on any object on the stairs that might
have escaped her inspection because of the dim lighting. The fall might

have been caused by inadequate lighting, or it might have been caused
by the plaintiff s inattention. It might have been a pure accident. These
other causes could not be eliminated because she lacked knowledge.

Without such proof, the evidence presented would be insufficient under
movement of its train during the unloading of logs. It was alleged that the train's
movement caused the death of plaintiff's decedent. See id. at 308. In this type of case,
the plaintiff is dependent upon the defendant for safety. If delegation of duty was a
permissible defense, the railroad would avoid responsibility. By delegating its duty, the
railroad sought both to create the peril and avoid liability for injury. The court protected
those dependent upon the careful movement of trains by rejecting the claim that control
was delegated. See id. at 310. This implies that the duty could not be delegated. Thus,
to protect the safety-dependent plaintiff, the res ipsa doctrine was expanded, changing
the duty owed by the defendant. See, e.g., Colmenares Vivas v. Sun Alliance Ins. Co.,
807 F.2d 1102, 1113 (lst Cir. 1986).
213. 37 La. Ann. 694 (1885). This case has been chosen, although it does not
represent a critical change in doctrine, because it has been extensively analyzed by
Professor Malone in his seminal work, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact. See Malone,
supra note 133, at 74.
214. See Reynolds, 37 La. Ann. at 696-98.

215. Although employees of the defendant may have been holding lamps, there was
no fixed lighting for the stairs or platform below. See id. at 697.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See id. at 698.
See id.
Mrs. Reynolds weighed 250 pounds. See id, at 697-98.
See id.
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the preponderance standard. This result, however, was unacceptable.
Rather than dismiss the action for insufficiency, the court modified proof

standards. The court's rhetoric focused on probability:
[W]here the negligence of the defendant greatly multiplies the chances of
accident... and is of a character naturally leading to its occurrence, the mere
possibility that it might have happened without the negligence is not sufficient
220
to break the chain of cause and effect ....

The "greatly multiplies" language implies a high probability of
causality. However, the court did not explain how dim lighting was
more likely the cause than any other probable cause."' The chance that
the plaintiff fell because of her own inadvertence was as likely as any

other cause.

She had not introduced proof sufficient to meet the

individualistically justified standard of fairness known as a prima facie
case. The defendant, therefore, should have been granted the verdict.
By identifying a new way of describing sufficient proof, a "possibility,"
the court departed from the traditional proof requirement. The status of
the plaintiff as dependent on the defendant railroad was found to be such
an important factor that a rule of proof based on a premise of autonomy
was perceived to be unjust. The dependency of the plaintiff had to
become part of the legal rule used to judge the defendant's conduct. The
connection between the previously discussed duty cases and this proof
case has been developed in the academic literature explaining the
development of alternative proof rules. m
The decision clearly articulated the importance of dependency in

motivating the adoption of the substantial factor standard. The court
noted the location of the passenger train track in relation to the depot,
which required customers like the plaintiff to proceed from a well-lit

220. Id. at 698. The relevant language is "[tihe whole tendency of the evidence
connects the accident with the negligence." Id.(emphasis added).
221. See Malone, supra note 133, at 74 ("It is noteworthy that the court has neatly
avoided all reference to the probabilities requirement.").
222. This ruling has been described as the creation of a special duty. See id. at 74.
The adoption of the "substantial factor" test was described as a "special duty" because
substantial factors are not logically the "preponderant" factor. For proof to be sufficient
the jury should have been able to prove that the accident was more likely than not to
have been avoided but for the lack of lighting. This conclusion is impossible on the
plaintiff's proof. Thus, the decision to permit the case to be considered by the jury
effectively nullifies the contribution of the other possible independent causes: her
hurrying, her weight, and her inattention. In other words, there is a duty to "protect
hurrying stout passengers." Id.

"sitting-room" down the stairway to their train before it left.'
The
plaintiff was encouraged to hurry down poorly lighted stairs?2 The
plaintiff was not an autonomous actor; she was under the control of the
defendant.' Dependency caused the imposition of a status-based rule of

fairness. Whether analyzed as a modification of proof burdens or a
change in duty, the substantial factor test protects status-based interests
to a greater degree than the pure preponderance standard.
It seems that the essential factor motivating the court to adopt this

status-justified rule was the dependency of the plaintiff. The three
factors of the dependency fact set are present. The conduct of the
defendant (encouraging a hurried passage down a poorly illuminated
stairway) dominated access to information (the darkness prevented
plaintiff from observing essential details of the accident), and thus
deprived the plaintiff of access to information necessary to exclude nonnegligent causes. The plaintiffs lack of information was the result of
the defendant's conduct in encouraging the plaintiff to hurry through the
dark.
c.

Multiple Causes: The Roots of the Burden Switching
and Loss of Chance Doctrines

A fact set that often creates tension between individualistic values and
status values is the multiple cause scenario. Because individualistically
based burdens of proof require the plaintiff to prove that each defendant
was individually responsible for the plaintiff's injuries, the involvement
of multiple defendants can create fatal proof problems. These problems
are especially obvious when the conduct of several actors merges to
cause an undifferentiated injury. The plaintiff must prove that each
223. See Reynolds, 37 La. Ann. at 697-698.
224. See id. at 697. The court stated:
The train was behind time. Several witnesses testif[ied] that passengers
were warned to 'hurry up.' Mrs. Reynolds, a corpulent woman, weighing two
hundred and fifty pounds, emerg[ed] from the bright light of the sitting-room,
which naturally exaggerated the outside darkness, and hasten[ed] down these
unlighted steps, ma[king] a misstep in some way... [and] incurring the
serious injuries ....

Id. at 697-98.

225. The degree to which this language incorporates the dependency relationship
into the standard of proof is reflected in the following analysis. Assume that the

defendant wished to argue that plaintiff's decision to hurry down the stairs and proceed
before her eyes adjusted completely to the dark were critical factors in her fall, and that
those actions would prevent her from winning the case. The court's holding that the
absence of illumination was an event "of a character naturally leading" to the fall, id. at
698, effectively eliminates that argument. The defendant caused the plaintiff to hurry. It
is the defendant's responsibility to avoid dangers that "naturally lead" to persons being
careless. The dependency relationship changes the duty, even if the change in duty is a

minor one.
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defendant caused the injury; however, it is often not possible to know
exactly which defendant or defendants caused injury and how much
injury was caused by each.
The problem of multiple causes of indivisible injuries has produced
the most remarkable changes in proof standards in the tort system. The
specific facts in cases raising this problem have been enormously varied.

They include: multiple cause cases, such as when twin fires destroy the
plaintiff's property;2 indivisible injury cases, such as when two cars
strike the plaintiff in near succession; 7 impossible allocation cases, such
as when hundreds of manufacturers sell diethylstilbestrol (DES) in a

generic form;z and even statistically imponderable cases, such as when

the defendant's conduct raises the probability of a person contracting
cancer.229 In these cases the courts have adopted remedial devices such

as burden switching and loss of chance.
The origin of burden switching and alternative liability doctrines
comes from the concern that it is inequitable for a plaintiff to bear a loss

occasioned by the intersection of multiple negligent actors. If two
defendants act simultaneously and their conduct causes a single,
indivisible injury to the plaintiff, the plaintiff may not be able to prove
the liability of either defendant. The problem in these combined forces
226. See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn.
1920), overruled in part by Borsheim v. Great N. Ry. Co., 183 N.W. 519 (Minn. 1921).
227. See, e.g., Eramdjian v. Interstate Bakery Corp., 315 P.2d 19, 20-21 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1957) (regarding injuries suffered by a motorcycle passenger who, having been
thrown from the bike when its driver failed properly to negotiate a curve, was
subsequently run over by a truck while lying unconscious in the street); Cummings v.
Kendall, 107 P.2d 282, 283-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940) (involving a passenger injured when
the automobile in which he was riding was involved in an accident with another
automobile and shortly thereafter struck by the defendant's vehicle); Maddux v.
Donaldson, 108 N.W.2d 33, 34 (Mich. 1961) (regarding injuries suffered by a driver and
passengers of a car that was struck by two vehicles in succession).
228. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1071-72 (N.Y. 1989).
229. See Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733 (N.J. 1991). In this case,
the survivors of deceased employees brought suit against Witco Chemical Corp.,
alleging that the decedents' exposure to certain chemicals inside the Witco plant in
which they worked was responsible for their death. In this case, the court recognized
that causation is the most difficult element to prove in toxic tort cases because of the
time period that might elapse before the injury is discovered:
[B]ecause of the current inability of science to fully comprehend
carcinogenesis, plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation, despite strong and indeed
compelling indicators that they have been tortiously harmed by toxic exposure,
may never recover if required to await general acceptance by the scientific
community of a reasonable, but as not yet certain, theory of causation.
Id. at 739 (citation omitted).

cases stems from the individualistic "but for" causation requirement that
no defendant can be found liable unless the plaintiff proves that the
defendant caused her injuries.230 In these circumstances, the plaintiff is
confronted with the unenviable prospect of the negligent defendants

prevailing because the defendants' simultaneous conduct precludes
proof that either one of them caused the injury. Either defendant could
have caused all of the injury, but because the analysis can be reversed-

neither one can be shown to have been the cause-the injury would have
happened anyway. Without the conduct of one defendant, the other
would have caused the same injury. Thus, because both caused the
injury, neither can be proved to be the "but for" cause.
The combined forces cases must be separated into two groups. The
first involves the intersection of natural events and injurious conditions

caused by human actors. The second involves the intersection of
conditions caused by multiple human actors. The judicial concern with
multiplicity started with an exploration of the first type of case: the twin
fires case. 3' The "dueling motorcycles" cases of the early twentieth
centuryz " sparked the courts' analysis of the second type.
In both types of multiplicity cases, the defendants argued that they

could not be found liable because the harm would have happened
without their conductD3 This proposition was an accurate statement of
the facts in a case in which human and natural forces combine. The
defense in these "natural cause" cases rested on proof that the injury

would have occurred by the hand of God.' The premise of the defense
was that whether or not the defendant intervened negligently, the injuries
would have been caused by flood or lightning-induced fire.235 Initially,
230. The specific events causing this deficit may involve identical conduct by the
multiple defendants, such as setting fires, or entirely different types of conduct. See, for
example, Smith v. J.C. Penney Co., 525 P.2d 1299 (Or. 1974), where the plaintiff
brought a products liability action for injuries suffered when a gasoline fire broke out at
a gas station and ignited her coat. The fabric supplier's defective product combined with
the negligence of the gas station owner to prevent the plaintiff from being able to
apportion her injuries between the two. See id. at 1305. However, in Smith the court
resolved this situation by finding the defendant's jointly liable. See id. at 1305-07.
Thus, if unchecked, the defendant would prevail in the legalistic parallel to the famous
Thomas Nast cartoon of the Tweed Ring, in which the members were pictured facing
inward in a large circle denying responsibility by pointing their thumbs outward at their
neighbor on each side. See Scott Schrader, Icons and Aliens: Law, Aesthetics, and
Environmental Change, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 1789, 1793 n.17 (1991) (book review) (citing
M. KELLER, THE ART AND POLITICS OF THOMAS NAST 177 (1968)).
231. See, e.g., Anderson, 179 N.W. at 45.
232. See, e.g., Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69, 69 (Mass. 1902).
233. See Adams v. Hall, 2 Vt. 9, 11 (1829).
234. See, e.g., City of Piqua v. Morris, 120 N.E. 300, 301 (Ohio 1918) (outlining
the requirements of the "Act of God" defense).
235. See id.
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the courts resolved those problems by reference to rules influenced by
individualistic values. The human actor had caused no injuries."s
This analysis was rejected in the cases involving multiple human
actors. The pure individualistic standard, requiring the vindication of
the defendant unless proven liable pursuant to the "but for" test, was
found not to be appropriate.l 7 The basis for the rejection of the

individualistic standard rests in the multiplicity fact set. Human action
often leaves a murky trail that precludes proof.3 8 In the normal
circumstance, the positions of the plaintiff and defendant are evenly
balanced-both have access to information. If events have unfolded
naturally and witnesses are not available, then there is no inequity. The
lack of evidence is, in individualistic justice language, "God's will."
But in the "combined human forces" cases it is the very wrongful
conduct of the defendants that has deprived the plaintiff of information.
The defendants' joint activity may have been coincidental, but it is their
joint negligence that has caused evidentiary problems for the plaintiff.
The gap in proof is not part of the divine order; it is the result of the
human actors' negligent conduct.
Critical to the outcome in cases of "combined human forces" is that
defendants who participate in causing an injury have no equitable claim
upon which they can justify a denial of liability. There is no equitable
argument available to the defendants because two facts are present in all
of these cases. The first is that each defendant was negligent. The
second is that their joint negligence was the cause in fact of the injuries.
The defendants are thus proven wrongdoers who would evade
responsibility for their wrongful conduct because that very conduct
simultaneously caused the injuries and prevented the plaintiff from
obtaining proof of causation.
Thus the combined forces cases involving multiple human actors
contain the dependency fact set. The negligent conduct of the
defendants-the simultaneous setting of fires or the simultaneous
236. See id. at 303.
237. See, e.g., Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913, 915 (Wis.

1927) (rejecting the "but for" test when its use would permit "both wrongdoers to escape
and penalize the innocent party").
238. To further complicate matters, such decisions are left to the jury:
This question of 'fact' ordinarily is one upon which all the learning, literature
and lore of the law are largely lost. It is a matter upon which lay opinion is
quite as competent as that of the most experienced court. For that reason, in
the ordinary case, it is peculiarly a question for the jury.
KEroN, supra note 8, § 41, at 264-65.

incautious behavior of passing motorcyclists-dominated access to
information by making the apportionment of responsibility for injuries
impossible, and thereby deprived the plaintiff of the resources necessary
to prove her case-namely, proof of causation.
This scenario presented the courts with a facet of dependency that was
exquisitely limited to acquisition of proof. In the traditional dependency
cases, the defendant's conduct deprived the plaintiff of both the
independent capacity for self-protection and access to proof. Even in the
substantial factor and res ipsa cases both deficits are present,"' although
they differ in degree. In these combined forces cases the defendant's

conduct only deprived the plaintiff of the ability to prove causation.
Thus, it was not found to be significant that the combined forces cases
presented a narrower scope of the dependency-induced dangers. The
autonomous actor model, essential for individualistically based concepts
of justice, was still inapplicable. The multiplicity fact set is different,
but the problem and remedy are the same as in the other dependency
scenarios.
Whenever individualistic standards are inappropriate,
dependency status-based alternative liability standards are applied. This
has been the trend for nearly two centuries.Y In the combined forces
fact set, alternative proof rules, rather than alternative duty rules, were
developed.
The scope of these proof rules varied. Some courts altered traditional
standards by expanding the joint tortfeasor doctrine to include actors
who neither conspired nor acted in furtherance of a joint venture.24 By
this expedient, the two parties were jointly responsible for the actions of
the other. Thus, each would be responsible for the full amount of the
injuries and no proof segregating the damages would be needed.*2 Other
courts converted the "but for" test into a "substantial factor" test. In this
manner, the issue was no longer whether each defendant was responsible
for the damage, but whether the amount of fire caused by each was a
substantial factor in causing the damage.24
239. See supraPart IV.C.4.a-b.
240. For an overview of this trend, see the cases discussed supra Part IV.C.
241. See Malone, supra note 133, at 831; see also Benson v. Ross, 106 N.W. 1120,
1120 (Mich. 1906) (involving a plaintiff injured by a stray bullet fired by one of three

persons shooting at a mark).
242. In effect, this also expanded the duty of the negligent defendants. Since the
defendants became jointly liable, a violation of duty occurred if they failed to protect the
plaintiff against the conduct of the co-defendant. Negligent conduct imposed a duty to
protect against others' negligent conduct if it caused an indivisible injury. But see

Adams v. Hall, 2 Vt. 9, 11 (1829) ("[Defendant] was under no obligation to keep the
other defendant's dog from killing sheep; nor vice versa.").
243. See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 46
(Minn. 1920), overruled on other grounds by Borsheim v. Great N. Ry. Co., 183 N.W.
519 (Minn. 1921); Malone, supra note 133, at 89.
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These expedients were effective, but they did not satisfy the courts'
desire to arrive at a rule that appropriately balanced individualistic
values and status values in this type of fact set. The continuing concern
was that application of the pure substantial factor or "expanded joint
tortfeasor" tests previously described might impose liability too broadly.
The negligent defendant did render the plaintiff "proof dependent" in all
cases. However, in those cases in which the alternative cause was not of
human origin, although the plaintiff may have been rendered dependent
by the defendant's negligence, that negligence might not have caused a
compensable loss. If a simultaneous fire or flood of natural cause would
have caused all of the damage despite the defendant's conduct, the
plaintiff who gains compensation from the negligent defendant in that
situation acquires a windfall. Without any human intervention, the
damage would have been the same. The movement toward dependencybased rules had gone too far. A more nuanced approach to balancing
status and individualistic concepts of fairness was needed in these
"natural force" cases.
The effort to solve the problems caused by the type of multiple
causation case that includes a natural cause contained the seeds of the
burden-switching and loss of chance doctrines.2 5 The burden-switching
approach to alternative causation was initially applied in the multiplicity
fact set cases in Kingston v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.2
The loss of chance approach applied in medical malpractice cases was
not applied to personal injury cases until substantially later.247
244. One court demonstrated the appropriate role of individualistically based
concepts of fairness in a "combined forces" case by providing the following analogy:
An apt illustration which has been suggested is that if a river levee had
been maintained at the height of 10 feet, and the custodians of the levee had

been warned that flood waters might require a levee 16 feet in height, and they
neglected to so increase the height of the levee, and an unprecedented flood
should ensue, during which it should appear that a levee 26 feet in height
would not have held the flood waters, the parties responsible for the levee
would not be liable for negligence in failing to maintain a 16-foot levee, when
a 26-foot levee would have been unavailing.
City of Piqua v. Morris, 120 N.E. 300, 303 (Ohio 1918).
245. These cases are particularly critical to the analysis of the role of alternative
causation in legal malpractice. The malpractice defendant routinely claims that the loss
was not attributable to her negligence-that it was unavoidable. This is a claim of dual
causation identical to these "combined forces" cases. The behavior of a human actorthe attorney's negligence-intersected with a natural cause-a weak case-and should,
therefore, not lead to liability. See infra text Part IV.D.3.
246. 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927).
247. See Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 477 (Wash. 1983); see

d.

Burden Switching

In Kingston, the court confronted the task of developing an
appropriate balance between status and individualistic rules. Two fires

joined to destroy the plaintiff's property.'

One fire was clearly caused

by the defendant; the cause of the other was not known.249 The court
focused on the critical factors that had created the dependency

relationship. The defendant's fire was negligently set.2" However, the
court refused to hold the defendant liable solely because its conduct had
created a substantial factor that might have caused the harm. Such a
finding would have ignored the fact that the other fire might have been
of natural origin and caused all of the damage. Imposing liability would

protect the dependent plaintiff; however, this defendant's equitable
claims were not insubstantial. Rejecting the individualistic mandate of
individualized proof might sanction a windfall. Rather than engage in a
fiction that the defendant's fire was the cause,2' the court reiterated

previous doctrine that stated the defendant should not be liable if the
other fire was of a natural cause. z2
The court devised an evidence rule that would balance the competing
claims. The court protected individualistic values by retaining the
defendant's right to be free from liability unless there was proof of

causation. Status concerns were protected by switching to the negligent
defendant the burden of establishing the cause of the other fire. The

party that was the "substantial cause" might not be liable, but it should
have the burden of disproving causation in fact.23 The existence of the
also Linda M. Roubik, Recent Development, Recovery for "Loss of Chance" in a
Wrongful Death Action-Herskovits v. Group Health, 99 Wn. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474
(1983), 59 WASH. L. REv. 981, 981 (1984).
248. See Kingston, 211 N.W. at 913.
249. See id. at 915.
250. See id.
251. The pure "substantial factor" approach as applied in Anderson v. Minneapolis,
St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn.1920), overruled on other grounds by

Borshehn v. Great N. Ry. Co., 183 N.W. 519 (Minn. 1921), resulted in the defendant

being held liable, without regard to the independent role of the natural fire, if the
defendant's fire "'was a material or substantial element in causing plaintiff's damage."'
Id. at 46 (quoting trial court jury instructions); see id. at 49 (upholding the trial court jury
instructions).
252. See Kingston, 211 N.W. at 914-15.
253. The court said:
Now the question is whether the railroad company, which is found to
have been responsible for the origin of the northeast fire, escapes liability,
because the origin of the northwest fire is not identified .... An affirmative
answer to that question would certainly make a wrongdoer a favorite of the law
at the expense of an innocent sufferer. The injustice of such a doctrine
sufficiently impeaches the logic upon which it is founded. Where one who has
suffered damage by fire proves the origin of a fire and the course of that fire up
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defendant's fire eliminated evidence necessary to allocate responsibility

between the two fires, thereby depriving the plaintiff of information
necessary to prove causation. Thus, it is this Article's view that the
decision to switch the burden was based largely on this factor.
Individualistic substantive elements were retained, but their impact
was limited by alterations in proof allocations. The combined forces
cases demonstrate a synthesis of the techniques used in the earlier
development of status-based exceptions to individualistic proof and duty
rules. This synthesis takes the switching of proof burdens from the res
ipsa cases. It also takes the determination that proof of a substantial
factor justifies legal recognition from the early multiplicity cases. The
amalgamation of these doctrines likely led to the holding. When the
negligent conduct of the defendant deprives the plaintiff of proof of
causation, the probability that the negligence caused injury is sufficient
to establish a prima facie case. Proof of negligence plus substantial
factor causation creates a rebuttable presumption of liability.
The combined forces cases involving human actors had presented the
courts with a simple proof problem. Both defendants were clearly
negligent; only the indivisibility of the injuries barred the plaintiff's
recovery. A more problematic set of cases remained to be considered.
In these cases, the negligence of the defendants was provable but the
nature of the injuries established that only one of them could possibly
have been the cause.2- Rather than having twin "causers" whose roles
could not be severed, these cases presented the court with an "innocent"
wrongdoer. Both actors were negligent, but one did not cause injury.
One of the defendants was neither the proximate cause nor the cause in
fact of the plaintiff's injuries. The proof problem exists because the
causative role of one of the defendants is certain, while the identification
of the "innocent" defendant is impossible. Of the two or more negligent
defendants, one caused the injury and one did not. To add to the logical
conundrum, the defendants acted simultaneously.2"
The causation issue cannot be resolved in these difficult cases without
to the point of the destruction of his property, one has certainly established
liability on the part of the originator of the fire. Granting that the union of that
fire with another of natural origin ... is available as a defense, the burden is on
the defendant to show that, by reason of such union with a fire of such
character, the fire set by him was not the proximate cause of the damage.
Id. at 915.
254. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948).
255. See id.

creating the appearance of inequity. If the plaintiff loses because of
insufficient proof of causation, a certainly liable defendant has been
erroneously absolved. If both defendants are held liable, a certainly
innocent defendant has been intentionally penalized. The case cannot be
resolved without sacrificing the equitable claims of either the innocent
plaintiff or the non-causing defendant. If the case is decided by rules
generated out of individualistic values, the innocent defendant would be
absolved along with the responsible defendant. If the case is resolved
pursuant to status-based rules, the plaintiff would prevail against the
non-causing defendant.
In a case of monumental importance, the court resolved this
apparently unsolvable dilemma by applying the Kingston compromise.
In Summers v. Tice, 6 the California Supreme Court held that proof that
the defendants' simultaneous and negligent conduct had caused the
plaintiff's injury created a prima facie case against both defendants. 2 7
Individual causation was not ignored. The burden of proving which of
the two defendants actually caused the injuries was simply switched to
the defendants.25'
The facts generating this seminal decision were mundane. Three
men went hunting.5 9 Two negligently discharged their shotguns,
simultaneously, in the direction of the plaintiff. One hit the plaintiff.24
It was impossible for the plaintiff to identify the person who had actually
caused the injury.2 61 The defendants sought dismissal for insufficient
proof of causation.262 That argument was rejected, and the court held
that given "the relative position of the parties and the results that would
flow if plaintiff was required to pin the injury on one of the defendants
only, a requirement that the burden of proof on that subject be shifted to

defendants becomes manifest."263 This holding has been adopted by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts." It has been followed and expanded to
resolve controversies involving thousands of plaintiffs and scores of
defendants.6 5
256. 199 P.2d I (Cal. 1948).
257. See id. at 4.

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See id. at 4-5.
See id. at 2.
See id.
See id. at 4.
See id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTs § 433B(3) (1965).

265. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (creating the
market share liability doctrine); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E. 2d 1069, 107578 (N.Y. 1989); Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368, 381-82 (Wash. 1984); Andrew R.
Klein, Beyond DES: Rejecting the Application of Market Share Liability in Blood
Products Litigation, 68 TULANE L. REv. 883, 885-905 (1994); William J. Warfel,
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The court's statement that switching the burden was mandated
because of the "results that would flow" only indirectly reflects the
policy basis of the opinion. One of the "results that would flow" from
an application of traditional proof burdens would be that the defendant
who had not been proven to have caused harm, and who had not caused

harm, would be exonerated. Pursuant to a conception of justice based on
individualism, a verdict for that defendant would be a triumph of
fairness. No proof existed to show that pellets from his gun hit the

plaintiff; in fact, no pellets from his gun hit the plaintiff. The decision
that this defendant's just claim for vindication should be rejected can be
justified only by the existence of a greater claim. The claim is based on

individualistic values. Liability should not be imposed on those who
have not caused harm. Individuals should be liable only when they have
caused injury. The decision to switch the burden to the defendants
constitutes a rejection of this sense of equity. The choice was purely one
of policy.2 6 The factual setting precludes a fact-based resolution of the
cause issue.' Some particular aspect of the parties' conduct induced the

court to adopt a rule that would impose liability on a person who caused
no harm.
In analyzing the problem, the court first, following the pattern

established in Kingston, refused to adopt a rule that would have rejected
even de jure protections for individualistic interests.268 The rejected rule

Adoption of the Market Share Approach in Long-Tail ProductLiability Litigation-The
Transformation of the Tort System into a CompensationSystem, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
785, 787-800 (1991). The judicial journey from Summers to Sindell and beyond
represents the genius of the Anglo-American legal system. A minor case involving three
hunters is "uncollapsed" and becomes the foundational precedent for resolution of class
action defective product litigation and for reforming multi-defendant tort litigation.
Summers established the foundation through which the personal injury jurisprudence for
the second half of the twentieth century has been reformed along dependency value
based standards. See Terry, supra note 211, at 717. However, the expansion into
doctrines such as market share liability has not come without criticism. See David M.
Schultz, Market Share Liability in DES Cases: The UnwarrantedErosion of Causation
in Fact, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 771, 786-88 (1991); Aaron D. Twerski, Market Share-A
Tale of Two Centuries, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 869, 875 (1989); Christopher J. McGuire,
Note, Market-Share Liability After Hymowitz and Conley: Exploring the Limits of
JudicialPower,24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 759, 759-83 (1991).
266. See Summers, 199 P.2d at 5.
267. For a similar problem in loss of chance cases, see Vern R. Walker, Direct
Inference in the Lost Chance Cases: FacifindingConstraintsUnderMinimal Fairnessto
Parties,23 HoFsTRA L. REv. 247, 300 (1994).
268. See Summers, 199 P.2d at 3.

was an expanded, and factually fictitious, joint tortfeasor theory."9 The
court then identified the factors it found sufficient to justify sacrificing
the innocent defendant on the altar of fairness to the injured plaintiff:
They are both wrongdoers-both negligent toward plaintiff. They brought
about a situation where the negligence of one of them injured the plaintiff,
hence it should rest with them each to absolve himself if he can. The injured
party has been placed by defendants in the unfair position of pointing to which
defendant caused
the harm. If one can escape the other may also and plaintiff is
270
remediless.

The factors that motivated the court to abandon the individual in order
to compensate the plaintiff are identical to those traditionally found in
cases in which the courts have abandoned individualistic proof and duty
rules. The jointly negligent shooting caused the injuries and created a
dependency that deprived the plaintiff of information necessary to
protect his interests. The defendants' conduct (bringing about a situation
where one of them negligently injured the plaintiff) dominated access to
information (whose pellet caused the injury), and deprived the plaintiff
of the independent resources necessary to prove causation-placing him
in "the unfair position of pointing to which defendant caused the
harm." 27' The court concluded that the absence of proof would lead to
the unjust result of both defendants escaping liability, leaving the
plaintiff remediless. 272
The joint nature of the defendants' negligent conduct rendered the
plaintiff their dependent, and fairness to dependents mandates an
exception to individualism. The burden switching remedy in Summers
was not a novel judicial solution to a unique problem; it was the same
solution that had been used in Byrne and Kingston. The unique aspect of
Summers is that it expanded the scope of alternative proof doctrines so
that they could be applied even to a defendant who, although
unidentified, had been "proven" to have caused no harm. The plight of
the dependent plaintiff was too great to be ignored.
No matter how innocent the sacrificed defendant in Summers, he still
had clearly acted negligently. His innocence was limited to causation.
The rule of Summers is thus not significantly different from that of
Kingston. When the defendants' negligent conduct has deprived the
plaintiff of access to information, alternative doctrines are applicable.
They are fairer because the defendants created the information deficit
and because the defendants were more likely to have whatever
269. See id. ("These cases speak of the action of defendants as being in concert as
the ground of decision, yet it would seem they are straining that concept...

270.
271.
272.

Id. at4.
Id.
See id.
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information existed. The defendants, if anyone, know what they did.2 3
The court's application of a burden-switching rule in Summers rippled
broadly throughout the world of tort litigation.2 4 However, Summers did
not require the court to resolve the ultimate conflict of causation
between individualistic claims and the status claims of multiplicity-

afflicted plaintiffs.
All multiplicity cases involve concurrent action by a group of
potential defendants whose conduct prevents the plaintiff from proving

causation. There has, however, been a steady expansion of the types of
cases in which the courts have been willing to reject individualistic

claims and apply alternative proof doctrines. Benson v. Ross25 involved
three human causes. All were negligent and their conduct caused

injury.276 Alternative proof was deemed appropriate because of the
indivisibility of the injury.27 Kingston involved two causes. One cause

was a negligent party whose fire burned down the plaintiff's home.2 8
Alternative proof was deemed appropriate because it was not proven that
the other cause was an act of nature. 79 Summers involved two negligent

human actors. One caused the injury and one did not.2'

Alternative

proof was deemed appropriate because the simultaneous and negligent

conduct of the two defendants deprived the plaintiff of access to
information."u
In every situation discussed so far, however, the defendants upon

whom proof burdens have been imposed had committed a negligent act.
273. The most important single explanation for the decision to switch the burden
may be the factual finding that "[o]rdinarily defendants are in a far better position to
offer evidence to determine which one caused the injury." Id. The reference to the
theoretical knowledge of the defendants enhances the significance of an information
deficit as the essence of the dependency, which was created by the defendant's negligent
conduct. The presumption of knowledge was, of course, fictional. There had been a
trial. At the trial the evidence failed to show which defendant shot which pellet. See id.
at 2. This theoretical allocation of information strongly influenced the extension of the
Summers doctrine in the later DES product liability cases. Like the hunter defendants in
Summers, the courts found it feasible to assume that the manufacturers had more
information than the plaintiffs. See Warfel, supranote 265, at 788.
274. See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 929 (1980) ("The rule developed in
Summers has been emboddied in the Restatement of Torts.").
275. 106 N.W. 1120 (Mich. 1906).
276. See id. at 1121.
277. See id.
278. See Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913, 915 (Wis. 1927).

279. See id.
280.

See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948).

281.

See id. at 4.

In the ultimate burden-switching scenario, an innocent plaintiff suffers
an injury that may have been caused by one negligent actor and seeks the
imposition of proof burdens on others who may not either have been
negligent or have caused harm. This most difficult causation problem
arises because the actor who may have been negligent cannot be
identified in a group of non-negligent actors. This fact set represents the
ultimate test of the claims made by dependent plaintiffs. A decision to
apply a status-based rule of proof would imply that it is fairer to permit
totally innocent defendants to be held liable than it would be to deny
compensation to an injured dependent plaintiff.
D. Alternative ProofDoctrinesand Medical Malpractice
2 2
In Ybarra v. Spangard,
1 the court confronted the problem of applying

alternative proof doctrines to a group of defendants that included
individuals who were innocent of any wrongdoing. The fact set that
compelled the court to consider this issue was surgical medical
malpractice. During an operation, the unconscious patient suffered
nerve injury to his shoulder.2" The injured area had not been involved in
the operation, and the injury was not a foreseeable consequence
thereof.2 4 The plaintiff said that he felt something pressing at his
shoulders, an inch or so below his neck, just before he was
anesthetized."' What caused the pressure, how plaintiff2 6was subjected to
such pressure, and who was responsible were not clear. 1
Nonetheless, the plaintiff sought exemption from traditional proof
requirements and to switch the proof burdens to the defendants. The
plaintiff persuaded the court that two ameliorative doctrines should be
applied: (1) the res ipsa doctrine on the issue of negligence and (2) the
alternative proof-burden switching--doctrine on the issue of
causation.287 Both pleas were successful. In switching the proof burdens
the court pragmatically eviscerated, for members of a surgical team, the
individualistically justified right to be free from liability unless one has
been the perpetrator of a proven wrong that causes injury. 21'
282.

154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944).

283.
284.

See id. at 688.
Ybarra underwent an appendectomy. After the operation, the muscles around

his right shoulder developed paralysis and atrophied. See id.

285. See id.
286. See id. at 690. Although the court concluded that "[ijt may appear at the trial
that.., one or more defendants will be found liable and others absolved .... this should
notpreclude the applicationof res ipsa loquitur." Id. (emphasis added).
287. See id.
288. The Ybarra decision incorporates a rejection of individualistic rights exceeding

anything found in the enterprise liability cases that rely on Summers. All of the
defendants in those cases had been wrongdoers-marketing defective products. The
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The Ybarra decision's abandonment of individualistic rights cannot be
justified on the grounds of the defendant's improper conduct. The
plaintiff was unable to prove negligence by any of the defendants. The
absence of proof of negligence significantly alters the equitable standing
of the defendants. In Summers, both defendants were negligent although
one had not caused injury. The Summers policy, that the burden should
be switched to prevent two wrongful actors from blocking recovery by
pointing to each other, is simply inapplicable. When the court switched
the burden to the Ybarra defendants, it imposed a burden on several
defendants who had neither been negligent nor caused injury.
The Ybarra fact set created a unique problem. For the first time,
most-if not all-of the defendants were likely innocent. 9 It is likely
that all but one of them had acted with care and had not caused harm.
The court was confronted with a true Hobson's choice. On one side, the
court could impose individualistic rules and dismiss the case, knowing
that the injured plaintiff would be left without compensation and that the
negligent defendant would escape. On the other side, the court could

impose dependency-based rules that would almost certainly impose
liability on innocent defendants as well as on the negligent ones. The
choice was thus between true innocents on both sides.
Throughout the development of alternative proof and duty doctrines,
the equity problem had been to distinguish the situation in which the
innocent defendant deserved a preference-individualism-from that in
which the innocent plaintiff deserved a preference-dependency. In
these analyses, though, the defendant's innocence had always been
theoretical. Her innocence was not the result of any doubt about her
having committed wrongful acts. Innocence was the individualistic
innocence of one who has not yet been proven to have caused harm.
The status-justified claim of equity proposed by the dependent
plaintiff had two prongs. The helplessness of the plaintiff generated
sympathy and the skullduggery of the defendants deprived them of any
equitable claim. The Ybarra defendants, however, were doctors and
imposition of alternative proof doctrines was limited to the causation element of the tort.
Even in the subset of cases imposing market share liability and precluding exculpatory
evidence, all the defendants had wrongfully distributed a defective product. See
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989); Epstein, supra note
188, at 1377, 1381-82; Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple Causationin Tort Law: Reflections
on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713, 739-40 (1982).
289. The court did not squarely address this issue in the opinion. See Ybarra, 154
P.2d at 687-91.

nurses who had not engaged in skullduggery. Nonetheless, the statusdependent plaintiff obtained a status-justified rule.
As in the Summers decision, the court in Ybarra asserted its policy in
conclusory language: "it is manifestly unreasonable for them to insist
that [the plaintiff] identify any one of them as the person who did the
alleged negligent act."2'
This language is both conclusory and
unpersuasive because, pursuant to individualistically defined standards
of justice, such a result would not be unreasonable. Even dependent
plaintiffs have the right of discovery. They have the right to obtain the
hospital records and take depositions of everyone present. The
dependent plaintiff's access to information equals that of the defendants,
who would have to acquire most of their information through the same
means. The real problem in Ybarra was not access to informationdiscovery had been completed. There simply was no information
concerning either malpractice or causation. Thus, Ybarra creates a new
duty of care for members of a surgical team. The dependencygenerating medical defendants will now be required either to guarantee
that the dependent surgical patient will not be injured or to bear the
burden of proving that they are not negligent.
The dependency-resulting from the administration of anesthesia-of
the plaintiff did not actually cause an information deficit that prevented
proof of facts known to those who were awake. Thus, the nature of the
"manifest unreasonableness" that motivated the imposition of this new
duty must be derived from the other facts of the opinion.
The perception of unreasonableness stems from the court's view of the
status relationship between the surgeons and the patient. The patient
was helpless; the surgeons were in control. The court therefore
concluded that status-justified rules of proof and duty should be
imposed. Without any proof of wrongdoing and without any pragmatic
information deficit, the total dependency of the plaintiff induced the
court to apply both duty- and proof-switching doctrines. The following
critical language in the decision reveals the central role that the
plaintiff's dependent status played in forming the policy that underlies
the decision: "The control at one time or another, of one or more of the
various agencies or instrumentalities which might have harmed the
plaintiff was in the hands of every defendant .... Plaintiff was rendered
unconscious for the purpose of undergoing surgical treatment by the
defendants.
,,2"
The three dependency factors that historically have driven courts to
create status-based exceptions to individualistically justified rights are
290. Id. at 690.
291. Id.
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apparent from these words. The defendants' conduct-placing plaintiff
under anesthesia-dominated access to information; only the defendants
were able to make observations due to the plaintiffs unconsciousness,
thus depriving the plaintiff of sufficient resources to protect her interest
in gaining compensation for the malpractice.
The court's perception was that the dependency relationship was so
overwhelming that it dominated all other factors.2 2 The defendant
medical professionals had the professional and legal responsibility to
protect the plaintiff. Even if they had not personally erred, imposing
duty and proof burdens on those with the contractual and moral
responsibility would not recreate the real-world duties of the surgeon.

The members of surgical teams should have legal duties consonant with
their level of control over patients. The fairness of this perception was
corroborated by the two hundred years of doctrinal development of
status-justified proof and duty theories. Legal doctrines were available
to achieve the court's perception of a fair result in this type of situation.
Surgical patients needed special protection against medical malpractice;
alternative proof and duty doctrines were applied to provide patients that
level of protection.
1.

The Ultimate Development: Alternative ProofDoctrine
Transposed into Alternative Duties of Care

The doctrine in all of these alternative proof cases commits the courts
to rules that balance competing concepts of fairness. Protection is given
to plaintiffs who are in a dependent status, while courts continue to
verbalize a commitment to individualistic protections for defendants.
The compromise has been reflected in switching the burden of proof
rather than eliminating any relevance to proof of causation. Retention of
the causation element is emblematic of the commitment to the belief that
liability should not be imposed if the defendant's conduct did not cause
the injuries. Although the facts of cases such as Summers and Ybarra
strongly suggest that the proof opportunity is more de jure than de
facto-in Summers, the trial clearly indicated that nobody knew who
fired the injury-causing shot79 -the factual possibility has been
retained. 2'4
292.
293.
294.

See id. at 689.
See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948).
See Klein, supra note 265, at 886 ("[The] requirements [for shifting the burden

The alternative liability doctrine, however, has been extended in

limited situations so that it has virtually become a strict liability
doctrine. In the market share cases, 95 liability was imposed without
consideration of the causative role, or lack of such role, in the plaintiff's

injuries.

The perceived need to find a mechanism for ensuring

compensation, perhaps augmented by the affluent and insured status of
the defendants, led to the abandonment of the compromise. The
dependent status, combined with proof that the defendants had

distributed a defective product, led to a judicial mandate for
compensation. 296

In Anderson v. Somberg,27 the court made a further extension of the

alternative liability doctrine. The plaintiff was injured when a clamp
broke during surgery, and the plaintiff sued the operating team and the

manufacturer. 98 Discovery revealed that individuals who were not the
defendants might have damaged the clamp.2 9 The clamp was owned by
the hospital, was used by as many as twenty surgeons, and might have

been damaged by non-defendants during prior surgeries.m Further, the
damage may not have been detectable by reasonable inspection."' The
court suggested that at least one of the defendants should be held liable.
It reversed a jury verdict in favor of the defendants and remanded for a
finding of liability against at least one of the defendants.3° In Anderson,
even de jure adherence to individualism was abandoned. The murky

connection between alternative proof rules and alternative duty rules was
clarified.

The defendants were liable because they had the duty to

protect one placed in a dependent status. For those involved in surgical
procedures, that duty became absolute.
of proving causation from the plaintiff to the defendant] closely connect Summers to the
tradition of individualism by maximizing the possibility that a defendant will bear
responsibility only for damages caused by its own actions.").
295. See, e.g., McMormack v. Abbott Lab., 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985);
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989).
296. See Andrew B. Nace, Note, MarketShare Liability:A CurrentAssessment of a
Decade-OldDoctrine, 44 VAND. L. REV.395, 395 (1991).
297. 338 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1975).
298. See id. at 3.
299. See id. at 4.
300. See id. at 9 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
301. See id. at 2 (noting surgeon's visual inspection).
302. See id. at 8. The Anderson decision fundamentally changed the duty of those
who supply surgical implements and those who perform operations. The form of res ipsa
that was applied made their duty to the patient non-delegable. The fact that others may
actually have damaged the clamp, even if done in a way that could not be detected
through the use of reasonable care, did not prevent the imposition of liability. Cf Ariel
Porat & Alex Stein, Liabilityfor Uncertainty:Making EvidentialDamage Actionable, 18
CARDOZO L. Rv. 1891, 1891 (1997) (discussing imposition of liability for conduct that
creates uncertainty).
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2.

The Alternative Liability Remedy of Burden Switching
Liberatedfrom Its Multiplicity Roots

Although often criticizedP3° the growth of alternative liability
doctrines has continued throughout the gamut of fact sets. The
relationship between dependency and the application of alternative proof

and duty doctrines is clear. The particular alternative proof remedy of
switching the burden of proof, however, has been so popularly
connected to the specific proof problems caused by multiplicity, that
special consideration must be given to whether precedent or policy
requires multiplicity as a predicate for its use."
The legitimacy of such a restriction on the scope of this doctrine is
negated by an examination of analogous tort law doctrines. Tort law is
filled with fact sets in which proof inequities have induced the court to
switch proof burdens to the defendant without regard to multiplicity.
The development of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is one example of
burden shifting.3OS The classic example, however, may be the allocation
of the burdens of proof in defamation. The fact set of defamation

contains a systemic inequity. The plaintiff's right is limited to
protection against false statements that damage her reputation."" She
303. See O.C. Adamson, II, Medical Malpractice:Misuse of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46
MINN. L. REv. 1043, 1043 (1962); Klein, supra note 265, at 892-93; Schultz, supra note

265, at 771,773. Although alternative liability represented a substantial relaxation of the
cause in fact rule, it remained connected to the tradition of individualism. Indeed, a
careful reading of Summers shows at least three strong links to the maxim that an

individual should be responsible only for what he does. As discussed below, a plaintiff's
burden to prove cause in fact should be relaxed under Summers only if: "(1) all possible
'culpable' entities are joined in the action; (2) each defendant has an opportunity to
exculpate itself by proving that its conduct did not cause the plaintiffs injury; and (3)
each instrumentality that may have injured the plaintiff carried a uniform risk of harm."
Klein, supranote 265, at 885-86 (footnotes omitted).
304. See Melinda H. Van der Reis, Comment, An Amendment for the Environment:
AlternativeLiability andthe Resource Conservationand Recovery Act, 34 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 1269 (1994). Discussing comment h of section 433(B) of the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS, the author wrote:
Cases might arise where some modification of the rule would be necessary
because of the effect of lapse of time, the risks the defendants created, or other
circumstances.
The drafters of the Restatement internalized the purpose of the alternative
liability theory and embodied the intent of the Summers decision. Courts may
now use the Restatement as a flexible guide in providing redress for injured
parties.
Id. at 1280 (footnote omitted).
305. See supra Part IV.C.4.a.
306. See, e.g., Arthaud v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir.

must, therefore, prove a negative: that the statement is not true. Further,
reputation is an intangible. Proof of its existence and its demise is
extremely difficult. Courts, therefore, have switched both the burden of
proving the truth of a statement and the burden of proving the lack of
injuries." In theory, liability is based upon the publication of a false
statement. Proof of the publication of a defamatory statement, however,
satisfies all of the plaintiff's proof burdens. The proof of the publication
of a defamatory statement satisfies her burden on the issue of damages
as well as falsity. There is a presumption that all individuals have a
good reputation and that libel and per se slander injures the reputation.
In other words, the burdens of proving fault (falsity) and causation
(damages) are switched to the defendant. Whether referred to as a
presumption or as a switched burden of proof, there is no practical
difference between defamation burden switching and the burden
switching in multiplicity cases.'
The issue of multiplicity simply does not exist in these defamation
cases. The courts' use of alternative proof remedies without regard to
the multiplicity of causes is undeniable. Thus, the use of alternative
proof doctrines depends not on multiplicity of defendants, but upon the
existence of the dependent plaintiff whose status as such was created by
the action of the defendant.
Even when attention is turned to judicial uses of the specific form of
the alternative proof doctrine attributed to Summers, multiplicity has not
been found to be a limiting factor.31 ' Although both Summers and
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories31 2 involved multiple defendants, the
doctrine has been applied in scenarios that did not involve multiplicity.
The first instance of such agplication may well have been the decision in
Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel? The court in that case found the essential

elements of a dependency situation. Once the plaintiff was viewed as a
1999).

307. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS § 581A (1977). But see Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986) (rejecting this doctrine in the
setting of constitutional privilege); cf Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1321, 1339-43 (1992).
308.

See David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof,25 WM. &

MARY L. REv. 747, 748 (1984) (quoting Charles T. McCormick, The Measure of
Damagesfor Defamation, 12 N.C. L. REV. 120, 127 (1934)).

309. See EPSTEIN, supra note 101, at 1141 ("[The issues in a defamation case often
parallel those found with toxic torts, since the plaintiff must show a causal connection
between the defendant's false statements and plaintiffs loss or injury and thereafter
quantify the level of the loss.").
310.

See supra Part IV.C.4.

311. See Zweir, supra note 17, at 816 ("Sindell left unanswered the question of
whether its holding could be applied to an individual defendant.").
312.

313.

472

607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).

478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970).
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dependent of the negligent defendant, the court rejected individualistic
rules and applied alternative liability concepts.
In Haft, the plaintiffs sued because of the tragic drowning of a father
and son in a hotel pool." 4 The wrongful death action was based upon the
violation of a safety statute requiring pool owners either to have a
lifeguard on duty or to post a warning sign alerting users that no
lifeguard was on duty."" Although the case technically had more than
one defendant, multiplicity did not create the plaintiffs' problems in
proving causation. The problem was caused by the failure of the
defendant owners and managers of the motel to comply with the duties
imposed by the statute. There was neither a sign nor a lifeguard. The
responsibility was that of all defendants. The proof problem inducing
the court to apply alternative proof rules had a different genesis. The
defendants claimed that compliance with the requirement
of posting a
1' 6
sign could not be proven to have caused the drowning.
Despite the lack of multiplicity, the court analyzed the relationship
between the parties as one in which the plaintiffs had been dependent
upon the defendants:
To require plaintiffs to establish "proximate causation" to a greater certainty
than they have in the instant case, would permit defendants to gain the
advantage of the lack of proof inherent in the lifeguardless situation which they
have created. Under these circumstances the burden of proof on the issue of
causation should be shifted to defendants to absolve themselves if they can3 7

Haft is a situation in which the defendants' conduct had a direct and
logical relationship to the unfortunate events.3 8 The ability to prove that
relationship by a preponderance of the evidence had been impaired by
314. See id. at 466.
315. See id. at 468.
316. The pool area was unattended and nobody was around at the time of the
drowning. Thus, the defendants argued that the father had actual notice that there was no
lifeguard and a sign would have been redundant. Factual awareness having been proven
by the circumstances, the sign would not have stopped the use of the pool. The sign
would have made no difference. See id. at 468, 472.
317. Id. at 475 (citations omitted).
318. An alternative path to the court's verdict could have been to find that the sign
was a "substantial factor" in the injury. The legislative decision to impose the duty of
erecting the sign would have been a sufficient basis for such a finding. Once held to be a
substantial factor, proof of the absence of the sign would then become sufficient proof so
that the plaintiff would have established a prima facie case. Use of the Summers
alternative proof theory and switching of the burden was, of course, equally effective.
Either theory pragmatically imposes a duty to have the sign, without regard to its
effectiveness in avoiding specific drownings.

the defendants' negligent conduct. The statute imposed a duty to protect
those who used the pool. The very act of violating the statute was the
act that deprived the plaintiffs of proof. The presence of a lifeguard
would have both protected plaintiffs' decedents and provided
information about the cause of their death. Thus, even without
multiplicity, Haft fits the profile of an alternative proof case. Dependent
plaintiffs are denied compensation by the very act that could have
caused their injuries." 9
In a particularly apt decision for the consideration of the uniform
application of alternative liability to litigation malpractice, the court in
Kituskie v. Corbman320 switched the burden of proof on causation.
Kituskie was a legal malpractice case. The burden of proving that the
malpractice did not cause economic harm, which was asserted by
Corbman in defense, was placed on the attorney defendant. 2' Kituskie
did not, however, involve the typical case-within-a-case defense. The
attorney did not rely on a claim that the underlying action could not have
been won. The claim, instead, was that any judgment would have been
uncollectable.32 The court held that the plaintiff did not have to prove
collectability. The burden of showing that the misfeasance had not
caused harm because of uncoliectabililty was allocated to the
defendant. 3z
The court's decision was consistent with the factors that have
historically induced courts to apply alternative causation doctrines. The
attorney had controlled the litigation, and the negligence was at least a
substantial factor in creating the likelihood of harm.3?
319.

The Haft court stated:

[The evidentiary void in the instant action results primarily from defendants'
failure to provide a lifeguard to observe occurrences within the pool area....
The absence of such a lifeguard in the instant case thus not only stripped
decedents of a significant degree of protection to which they were entitled, but

also deprived the present plaintiffs of a means of definitively establishing the
facts leading to the drownings.
Haft, 478 P.2d at 474-75.

320.

714 A.2d 1027 (1998).

321.

See id. at 1028.

322. See id. at 1028-29.
323. See id. at 1032.
324. For an interesting review of legal neglect in client cases, see Loren E.
Mulraine, ProfessionalResponsibility: The Imminent Peril of Neglecting a Legal Matter,

33 How. L.J. 411 (1991). The essence of the lawyer client relationship in a litigation
matter fits the policy applied by the California court in Haft.
[T]he shift of the burden of proof. . . may be said to rest on a policy judgment
that when there is a substantial probability that a defendant's negligence was a
cause of an accident, and when the defendant's negligence makes it
impossible, as a practical matter, for plaintiff to prove "proximate causation"
conclusively, it is more appropriate to hold the defendant liable than to deny an
innocent plaintiff recovery ....
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Multiplicity is one scenario that has led courts to switch burdens of
proof. Throughout the history of the development of alternative
causation, however, it has never been the dispositive factor 3 2
3.

Loss of Chance

Switching the burden of proof was one resolution for the problem of
combined forces multiplicity. However, burden switching was not the
only resolution to this problem. Other fact sets exist that involve
multiplicity of causes but do not necessarily generate personal injuries.
The equitable dilemma caused by multiplicity has long been resolved in

an entirely different fashion in a series of English contract cases.3 2' This
English resolution focuses on the intersection of human and natural
causes of a loss.3 27
In the personal injury fact set, Kingston resolved the proof problem of
the dependent plaintiff by switching proof burdens. The negligent
human actor was given the burden of proving that the other cause was of
a natural origin.'2 This solution, however, is only just if the existence of
a natural cause absolves the defendant. Thus, when the existence of a
natural fire automatically leads to the conclusion that the negligently set
fire caused no avoidable harm, the Kingston rule logically solves the
proof problems. If the existence of a probable natural cause of the loss
does not absolve the defendant, then burden switching is ineffective.
The multiplicity fact set beyond Kingston arises when the relationship
between the loss and the defendant's conduct is merely proportional.
Rather than creating a fire that may have burned a home, the defendant
may have set in motion an action that merely increased the chance of the
home being burned. In this fact set, the plaintiff concedes that the loss
might have happened without the act of the defendant. However, the act
of the defendant increases the chance of the loss occurring and
compensation is sought for that impact.
The modem fact set raising this issue is the medical malpractice tort.
Haft, 478 P.2d at 476 n.19.
325. See supra Part IV.CA.
326. See Howard Ross Feldman, Chances as Protected Interests: Recovery for the
Loss of a Chance and IncreasedRisk, 17 U. BALT. L. REv. 139, 140-41 (1987); Margaret
T. Mangan, Comment, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: A Small Price to Payfor Human

Life, 42 S.D. L. REV. 279,285-86 (1996-1997).
327. See Mangan, supra note 326, at 283-86.
328. See supra Part IV.C.4.d.

The most common scenario involves negligence in cancer diagnosis.
The delay in diagnosis is associated with an increase in the severity of
the disease prior to treatment. The increased severity of the cancer
decreases the chances of survival. The multiplicity problem exists
because the natural outcome of the disease is death. The eventual death
may have resulted from the natural cause, the disease, or from the delay
in treatment, the malpractice. The evidence issue is easily resolved in
fact sets in which the plaintiff had a fifty-one percent chance of survival
prior to the malpractice. Because the delay in treatment is a substantial
factor in the causation, earlier alternative proof doctrines would readily
permit the finding of a prima facie case. However, when the plaintiff
did not have a fifty-one percent chance of survival before the negligent

failure to diagnose, the substantial factor model was useless.

The

statistical probabilities make it impossible to prove that the doctor's
negligence caused the death.329 Switching the burden of proof to the
defendant would not resolve the statistical impediment to knowing
whether the malpractice was a cause in a specific case. Since the
plaintiff had a less than a fifty-one percent chance of survival before the
negligence, the doctor can easily meet the preponderance of evidence
threshold. The plaintiff was "dead already." The doctor can prove that
her negligence could not have been the "more likely than not" cause of
the death.
However sufficient the proof, this resolution can only be judged to be
fair if individualistic standards of justice are applied. The cancer may
naturally have caused the death, but those with small chances sometimes
survive. By definition, a person with a ten percent chance of survival
survives ten percent of the time. Whether the actual plaintiff in a
medical malpractice case would have been among the lucky survivors is
a fact that is unknowable solely because of the negligence of the doctor.
In this fact set the human cause does not join with the natural cause.
Rather, the human cause stymies efforts to halt the natural cause. In this
sense, these cases are more like the failure to rescue cases. 3' When a
sailor falls into the sea, a natural peril exists. Unless saved, the sailor
will eventually drown. 3' When negligence prevents the sailor from
being saved, the death is the product of combined forces. The natural
329. See Walker, supra note 267, at 261-71 (discussing the impact of requiring
proof of "specific" propositions about specific individuals on loss of chance cases).
330. See Malone, supranote 133, at 75-81 (discussing the duty to rescue).
331. In many of these cases, the sailor is at risk because he cannot swim. See, e.g.,
New York Cent. R. Co. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334, 335 (2d Cir. 1920). The ability to

swim, however, is not relevant to the analysis. The inability to swim was important in
such cases because the sailor was close to shore. If the sailor is far from land or
confronted by strong currents, death from drowning is inevitable absent rescue. The
ultimate cause is the sea. See id.
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cause is the sea; the human cause is the negligent failure to save. The
most difficult failure to save cases are those in which the effort to save
332
almost succeeds. For example, in Kirincich v. StandardDredging Co.,
a seaman fell and was being pulled away from shore by perilous
currents.333 Lifelines were thrown to him. The lines were negligently
prepared because no flotation devices were attached.3 " The lines came
close to his hands but he was unable to grab them before being pulled
out to sea.' 5 The defendant claimed that proof of causation was
speculative.33 6 It was impossible to tell whether he would have been able
to grab lines with flotation devices. Thus, the defendant claimed that no
proof had been introduced to establish that death was caused by any
factor other than the sea.337 The court rejected this individualistically
based argument, holding that
[niobody could, in the nature of things, be sure that the intestate would have
seized the rope .... But we are not dealing with a criminal case, nor are we

justified, where certainty is impossible, in insisting upon it.... [W]e think it a
question about which reasonable men might 3at38least differ whether the intestate
would not have been saved, had it been there.
In Kirincich, the court was able to find that the evidence was
sufficient, despite the inherent impossibility of truly knowing, by
application of a factual determination that everyone has an instinct of
self-preservation.339 Such intuitive approaches are not, however, possible
in the statistic-laden world of modem medicine.
The courts cannot hold that reasonable men might at least differ as to
whether decedents victimized by delayed diagnoses would survive.
Scientific evidence supplants instinct and the probability of survival is
known. Reasonable people could differ as to whether a patient with late
stage cancer would have lived if he had not been the victim of medical
332. 112 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1940).
333. See id. at 163.
334. See id. at 165-66.
335. See id. at 163.
336. See id. at 164.
337. See id.
338. Id. at 164 (quoting Zinnel v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet
Corp., 10 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1925)). The court emphasizes the importance of the
defendant's control over the plaintiff. See id. at 165 ("'There is no other peaceful pursuit

in which the dominion of the superior is so absolute and the dependence of the
subordinate so complete, as in that of a sailor upon a vessel at sea."' (quoting Harris v.
Pennsylvania R.R Co., 50 F.2d 866, 868 (4th Cir. 1931))).
339. See id. at 164.

malpractice, but such differing is akin to differing about which horse
will win a race. The probabilities are clear. In the medical malpractice
cases the issue is the compensation of the loss of a chance to be a long
shot, because long shots are not more likely than not to survive in the
world of cancer recovery. The simple solution of ignoring the
imponderable sufficed to protect the dependent plaintiff in Kirincich, but
that solution is not viable in analogous cases.
However, the dependent status that induced the Kirincinch court to
emphasize the "instinct of self-preservation" cannot be ignored.m
Despite the miraculous increase in data, the patient with cancer is as
dependent upon the medical diagnostician as the patient during an
operation is dependent upon the surgeon. The dependent status, which
led to the res ipsa and burden-switching variants of alternative proof in
surgical malpractice cases, demands that the plaintiff be protected. If the
dependency of the plaintiff is made the core of the judgment, a victory
by the negligent doctor cannot be deemed just. Burden switching will

not satisfy the needs of these dependent plaintiffs. If, however, another
alternative proof doctrine will protect them, the dependent status of the
plaintiff would justify its application.
Loss of chance is such a status-based alternative. It stems from a 1911
English case, Chaplin v. Hicks."4 The multiplicity causation problem
was created in Chaplin by a contract between the plaintiff and defendant.
The terms of the contract entitled the plaintiff to become one of the
finalists in a beauty contest. " 2 The defendant breached by failing to
notify the plaintiff of the time to appear for the mandated interviews 43
The defendant claimed that no damages should be awarded, because the
lost opportunity to become a finalist did not guarantee winning a prize.4"
In other words, the defendant asserted that a chance of winning that was
less than one in four4' meant that the plaintiff was less than likely to
win. Because one chance out of four was considerably less than 3 a
preponderance of evidence, the defendant alleged that he should win. 4
However, the court rejected the defendant's analysis; the lost chance was
ruled independently compensable. 7
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id.
2 K.B. 786 (Crim. App. 1911).
See id. at 791.
See id.

344.
345.

See id.
Only 12 out of 50 contestants would be chosen. See id.

346. See id.
347. See id. at 793. Although the court acknowledged that each of the fifty
finalists' chance of being chosen was only about one in four, and thus no better than
even, it held that such a lost chance to obtain the acting position was worthy of legal
protection. See id.; Darrel L. Keith, Loss of Chance: A Modem ProportionalApproach

[VoL. 37: 401, 2000]

Alternative Liability in Litigation Malpractice
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The Chaplin court perceived the critical facts to be those actions of
the defendant that placed the plaintiff in a dependent status-reliance
followed by the breach24 The three factors that have induced courts to
reject individualistic rules permeate the case. The conduct of the
defendant in breaching the contract dominated the access to information
because without having appeared at the interviews, it was impossible for
plaintiff to prove whether she would have won. Thus, the defendant
deprived her of the opportunity to protect her rights.
Compensating the lost chance represented a compromise between the
competing standards by which fairness has been evaluated. Permitting
compensation for a proportion of the potential loss limits defendant's
liability to that amount for which he is individualistically responsible.
Of course, the doctrine creates a difficult proof problem, as evaluating
the lost chance is a difficult matter. In contract violations, the courts
adopting this doctrine took the simple expedient of evaluating the lost
chance as the percentage of the full amount represented by the chance. 349
The development of the loss of chance doctrine was restricted to

contract actions for decades.35 The language of loss of chance was first
applied in a medical malpractice action in Hamil v. Bashline.35' In
Bashline, however, the difficult causation issue was not confronted. The
plaintiff had a seventy-five percent chance of survival before the
malpractice.' 2 The holding that the loss of this chance was
compensable5 3 did not require analysis of the difficult causation problem
created by the loss of chance that was less than fifty percent.
The first case adopting the loss of chance doctrine in such a fact set
to Damages in Texas, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 759, 823 (1992).
348. See Chaplin, 2 K.B. at 791.
349. See Mangan, supra note 326, at 285-86. The author describes the historical
basis of loss of chance in contract law:
The plaintiff was awarded damages on a pro-rata basis by receiving an award
which reflected the percentage probability that the defendant had reduced the
plaintiff's chances of receiving a more favorable outcome. American
courts.., eventually followed the English common law in allowing pro-rata
recovery in contract litigation. Initially, American courts did not accept the

concept of chances as protected interests in tort law. Currently, out of those
American courts which have addressed the loss of chance doctrine, the
majority of courts recognize chances as protected interests.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
350. See id.
351.
352.
353.

392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978).
See id. at 1283.
See id. at 1289.

was Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative3 4 Herskovits had cancer,
and the defendant negligently failed to diagnose the condition upon
Herskovits's initial examination."' When the cancer was diagnosed, the
condition had progressed. At the time of diagnosis, the cancer had likely
progressed from a "stage 1" tumor to "stage 2." 336 Herskovits introduced
expert testimony proving that the progression of the cancer reduced the
chance of survival from thirty-nine percent to twenty-five percent. 57 He
did not survive.358
The Herskovits court clearly identified the dependent status of the
plaintiff as the critical fact in its adoption of the loss of chance doctrine.
"To decide otherwise would be a blanket release from liability for
doctors and hospitals any time there was less than a [fifty] gercent
chance of survival, regardless of how flagrant the negligence.
This
policy statement clearly rejects individualistic values.
Pursuant to individualistic values, the severity of Herskovits' cancer
prior to the negligence should preclude the imposition of responsibility.
Although the delay in diagnosis breached the defendant's duty to
provide aid,3" there is absolutely no way of knowing whether the
plaintiff would have survived.3 ' When the court identified the
dependent status as central to the issue of the sufficiency of proof, 62 the
adoption of alternative proof rules and the imposition of liability became
inevitable. The three factors of dependency were present. The conduct
of the defendant-the failure to diagnose the cancer competentlydominated the access to information. In other words, the negligence in
diagnosis prevented the plaintiff's decedent from obtaining prompt
treatment that might have stopped the progress of the disease,
and simultaneously denied the plaintiff's decedent the capacity to protect
himself by getting early treatment. Additionally, the negligent diagnosis
denied the plaintiffs decedent of the chance to prove that the negligence

354. 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).
355. See id. at 475.

356. Id.
357. See id.
358.

See id.

359. Id. at 477.

360. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 323 (1965) ("One who undertakes...
to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of
the other's person... is subject to liability to the other... for physical harm resulting

from his failure to exercise reasonable care... if [] his failure... increases the risk of
such harm .... ).
361. In Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978), the court permitted recovery for a

lost chance of survival. See id. at 1283. The lost chance in that case, however, was a
seventy-five percent chance of survival. See id, Thus, the rhetoric of lost chance was
used in a case that was actually a "substantial factor" scenario.
362. See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 477.
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caused the harm, by eliminating the knowledge of whether earlier
treatment would have succeeded.
The court's solution was to adopt the Chaplin balance.
The
individualistic value was maintained because the defendant's liability
was limited to the damages that were proved, and proof of the value of
the lost chance was the plaintiff's responsibility.
Providing a
mechanism through which the dependent victim gains some
compensation for the loss that undeniably caused the lost chance protects

the status value. 63

Loss of chance is a compromise. However, it is a compromise that
adheres far more closely to the spirit of status values than individualistic
values. The doctrine almost guarantees a verdict for the plaintiff. The
aspect of the rule that requires the plaintiff to prove the value of the lost
chance exploits the language of individualism, but is hollow. The value
of the lost chance is inherently speculative.3 Loss of chance in the
medical malpractice case thus has no factual justification. It is purely a
rule of status policy. The rule functionally expands the duty of the

doctor so that the doctor becomes a guarantor against negligence that
deprives patients of a chance of survival.
The continuing tension between the twin perceptions of fairness is
obvious in the language of both courts that have rejected this rule and
those that have adopted the rule. One decision rejecting the rule in terms
363. Justice Pearson, in his concurrence in the Herskovits decision, wrote:
A more rational approach, however, would allow recovery for the loss of the
chance of cure even though the chance was not better than even. The
probability of long-term survival would be reflected in the amount of damages
awarded for the loss of the chance. While the plaintiff here could not prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that he was denied a cure by the defendant's
negligence, he could show by a preponderance that he was deprived of a 30%
chance of a cure.
Id. at 486 (Pearson, J., concurring).
364. The lost "chance" is only statistically correlated to the lost case or life. A 39%
chance of survival tells nothing about the fate of Herskovits. Whether he would have
been among the 39% who survive or in the unfortunate 61% who do not cannot be
known. Thus, two solutions for awarding damages exist: (1) allow the jury to give
whatever damages it feels is appropriate; or (2) limit damages to the proportion of
chance lost (e.g., if a 25% chance of winning a million dollars was lost, damages would
be limited to $250,000). The latter approach emulates the resolution in the original
contract loss of chance cases. It discounts the full value. Unfortunately, the assumption
that the full value was ever attainable is hopelessly speculative. Loss of chance in
medical malpractice cases thus represents a rational discounting of an irrationally
selected number. See id. at 492 (Rosellini, J., concurring) (arguing that damages in loss
of chance cases should be limited to the value of the percent of loss); see also Falcon v.
Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 57 (Mich. 1990).

that highlight concern for individualistic values is Cooper v. Sisters of
Charity."' In Cooper, improper emergency room procedures failed to
disclose a major head injury and the child patient died."" The Ohio

Supreme Court stated that "[a] rule, which would permit a plaintiff to
establish a jury question on the issue of proximate cause upon a showing

of a 'substantial possibility' of survival, in our judgment, suffers the
same infirmity as a rule which would permit proof of a 'chance of
'
recovery' to be sufficient."367
Although no longer the law of Ohio,36 the

decision still illustrates the concern for individualistic values.

Shively v. Klein39 adopted the loss of chance doctrine. In that
decision, the dependency of the plaintiff, and the perception that the law
must permit others in that status to be protected, dominated.3 0 The court
said:
This loss of a chance doctrine ...has developed in part because of the difficulty
in the medical malpractice area of proving precise degrees of causation, and in
part because of the perceived unfairness in denying recovery when a doctor's
negligence, although not shown to be the probable cause of the patient's
malady
371
or death, significantly decreased the patient's chance of recovery.

Loss of chance is adopted by those courts that are influenced by the
values of the dependent status of the plaintiff. The doctrine is slowly
gaining acceptance."' In this area, as in the previously analyzed areas,

the claim of dependency eventually mandates a modification of the
individualistically justified rules of duty and proof. The further adoption
of loss of chance rules thus appears inevitable.
V. THE LITIGATION ATTORNEY'S CLIENT IS IN A DEPENDENT
RELATIONSHIP NECESSITATING APPLICATION OF
ALTERNATIVE LIABITY RULES OF PROOF
The client in a litigation matter is in a dependent relationship with the
365. 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971), overruled by Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med.
Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996); see Beth Clemens Boggs, Lost Chance of
Survival Doctrine: Should the CourtsEver Tinker with Chance?, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 421,
429 (1992) ("To recover, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's negligence
deprived the patient of a substantial or appreciable chance of survival. This approach
incorporates the substantial factor test and asks whether the defendant has substantially
decreased the plaintiff's chance of survival." (footnote omitted)).
366. See Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 99.
367. Id. at 103.
368. See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484.
369. 551 A.2d41 (Del. 1988).
370. See id. at 43.
371. Id.
372. See Mangan, supra note 326, at 286 ("Currently, out of those American courts
which have addressed the loss of chance doctrine, the majority of courts recognize
chances as protected interests.").

[VOL. 37: 401, 2000]

Alternative Liability in Litigation Malpractice
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

attorney. Litigation fits within the fact sets of cases in which alternative
proof doctrines have been applied. As discussed, alternative proof
doctrines have been applied in two different types of medical
malpractice cases. The alternative proof technique of switching the
burden has been applied to certain types of surgical malpractice."' The
relaxed causation doctrine of loss of chance has been applied to certain
types of diagnostic malpractice.37 4 The nature of the dependent status in
litigation cases is similar to that created in these doctor-patient
relationships.
The three critical factors of dependency that led courts to apply statusbased doctrines in medical malpractice cases also exist in litigation
malpractice cases. The conduct of the defendant (the representation of
plaintiff in a litigation matter) dominates access to information
(discovery and motion practice), and deprives the plaintiff of the abilit'
to protect her interests or prove her loss. Alternative proof doctrines"
have not, however, been adopted in legal malpractice actions"
The
rationale is opaque. Some analysts believe that the reluctance is a sign
of special favoritism. 7 It is likely that a more benign factor plays a
373. See supra Part IV.D.1.
374. See Stephen F. Brennwald, Comment, Proving Causation in "Loss of a
Chance" Cases: A ProportionalApproach, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 747, 767 (1985); supra
Part IV.D.3.
375. Dean Prosser may have coined this term for switching the burden of proof on
the causation issue. See Bush, supra note 29, at 1483. The fact that these modified
causation doctrines have existed for decades and have rarely been applied to a legal
malpractice case suggests strong system-wide mechanisms that protect the interest of the
attorney. The attitudes of judges towards attorney defendants is markedly different than
the attitude of the judiciary towards other defendants. See generally Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Dewey, Ballentine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 590 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1992) (extending

special consideration and understanding to a large law firm to limit its liability for
shoddy work). The legal profession is far less litigious in trying to effect legal change in
the legal malpractice area. It is thus likely that the only solution to the legal malpractice
debacle will be to remove the issue from the control of attorneys and their brethren on
the bench.
376. See Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads,
New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 9, 59-73 (1986) (discussing burden of
proof standards in legal malpractice claims); see also Richard Carl Shoenstein, Note,
Standards of Conduct, Multiple Defendants, and Full Recovery of Damages in Tort
Liabilityfor the Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 18 HoFSTRA L. REV.
37, 66-68 (1989) (discussing how alternative liability would play out in a case where a
plaintiff with AIDS claimed that multiple defendants were responsible).
377. For a scorching indictment of the degree to which legal rules favor attorneys,
see Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 12, at 151, and particularly the following
statements:

significant role. That factor is simple-judges and lawyers fail to see
the lawyer-client relationship as one of dependence. However, the

client's dependence in any lawyer-client relationship is substantial, and
the degree of dependence in litigation representation is extreme.378
An evaluation of the degree of dependence in the lawyer-client
relationship has already been made by the Supreme Court. The Court
has developed the doctrine of lawyer-client confidentiality because of its
belief that the client's need to trust the lawyer is essential to the

relationship.379 To enhance the lawyer-client relationship, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has been extended to include a right of

privacy in such communications."' Neither courts nor administrative
bodies can compel the revelation of privileged attorney-client
communications."' The articulated purpose for the privilege is to protect
the client's expectation that the attorney can be trusted.3' The value that
our legal system places on protecting the trust of the client has been held
to transcend all other interests.3"3 When the integrity of the attorney is
This is not the only example of lawyers creating special rules to govern
their own conduct different from those they have developed to regulate the
conduct of others. Consider the rules promulgated by lawyers for the medical

and legal system. The malpractice doctrine rule for doctors evaluates conduct
in light of the customary practice of physicians in good standing and requires
that "there must be a want of ordinary and reasonable care, leading to a bad

result." Conversely, under the malpractice rule for lawyers the client must
show that "but for" the lawyer's negligence, the client would have won.
Id.at 151 n.9 (citations omitted) (quoting Pike v. Honsinger, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (N.Y.
1898)).
378. The proposal to apply alternative proof doctrines only in litigation malpractice
cases conforms to the history of the development of these doctrines. Selective
application of alternative causation doctrines is inherent in these fact specific doctrines.
In every situation in which the doctrines have been applied, their scope has been limited
to the specific fact sets that create the dependent status. Burdens of proof are only
switched when the specific facts of the case demonstrate the dependency relationship,
such as surgical injuries to areas of the body unrelated to the operation. Res ipsa is only
applied on a case by case basis. Even in diagnostic malpractice, "loss of chance"
doctrine is not applied unless the "delayed diagnosis" scenario exists. See supra Part
IV.D.3.
379. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21 n.4 (1983).
380. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n.4 (1977) ("[T]he Sixth
Amendment's assistance-of-counsel guarantee can be meaningfully implemented only if
a criminal defendant knows that his communications with his attorney are private....").
381. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (broadening the
application of corporate counsel privilege).
382.

See id. at 389.

383. The standard by which clients are protected against incompetent counsel is
much less rigid than that protecting the client against the attorney's revealing privileged
communications. For a detailed analysis, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services
and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BuFF. L. Rnv. 329, 421 (1995) ("In Strickland v.

Washington, the Court held that errors of a defendant's attorney rise to the level of a
constitutional deprivation only if the defendant establishes that (1) the attorney's
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not at issue, the client's ability to trust the attorney has been held to be
more important than the fundamental interest of both justice and law
enforcement."' As recently as 1998, the Court held that the role of the
lawyer in our society is so critical to the protection of rights and
privileges that lawyer-client confidentiality must survive both the

client's death and a prosecutor's need for information."5 The Court has
held that society's interest in effective representation is so important that
the criminal should go free and the innocent should be convicted rather
than force the attorney to breach the sanctity of the relationship. 6
Because of that veil of privacy, the client's right to trust and rely on the
attorney is protected. The client's ability to trust the lawyer has been
protected beyond the client's death because the success of the
representation depends upon the client communicating all information to
the attorney. The attorney will be making critical decisions. The scope
of this communication protection is just one example of the dependency
in the relationship.
The greater dependence of the litigation client on the attorney
becomes apparent when the role of the attorney and the relationship to
the client is examined. Attorneys, by the nature of their training, know
more about litigation than any other group in society. The attorney has
superior training and access to information about the legal system.
Knowledge of the legal system is the single factor that empowers the
legal profession, providing the utility for its services. It is the
profession's raison d'9tre. However, transactional clients know more
about the underlying facts of their cases. They also know more about
the economic and social problems inherent in potential deals, purchases,
or agreements. Therefore, the attorney's only asset is knowledge of the
legal system. That knowledge, however, is sufficiently valuable to have
performance was constitutionally 'deficient,' and (2) this deficient performance resulted
in 'prejudice."' (footnote omitted)).
384. See generallyRobert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws andAttorney-

Client Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DuKE L.J.
203 (1992); Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences
to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REv. 1091 (1985); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking
ConfidentialityH: Is Confidentiality Constitutional?,75 IOWA L. REv. 601 (1990).

385. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,407 (1998).

386. The Court in Swidler held that the attorney-client privilege survives the client's
death, because the knowledge that the communication will remain confidential even after
death encourages clients to communicate fully and frankly with counsel. See id. The
Court further found that the fear of disclosure leading to withholding information might
be reduced if disclosure is limited to posthumous disclosure in a criminal context, see id.
at 410, but it would be unreasonable to assume that it would vanish altogether.

created a vast profession with substantial control and influence over
many important events. It is now inconceivable that substantial
contracts, mergers, securities offerings, and the like would be completed
without the involvement of an attorney.
The dependent nature of the relationship between the lawyer and
client is thus magnified in litigation representation.'
The client in a
transactional matter has more knowledge of that transaction than a client

does in any litigation. Thus, the knowledgeable transaction client has a
greater ability to monitor the attorney's conduct of the representation
and to take action to protect her own interests.
Regardless of whether litigation involves the protection of individual
rights or the recapture of assets, the essence of the lawyer-client
relationship is the reliance of the client on the lawyer. The client is
dependent on the attorney to wend a clear passage through the
Kafkaesque quagmire of pleadings, motions, document discovery,
interrogatories, and depositions. Those are but the preliminary hurdles
created by the judicial bureaucracy. After those hurdles are overcome,
the parties then face the rigors of a trial. Although each step in this
tortuous process has been created to ensure the fairness of the result, its
arcane formulations transcend the typical party's common experience.
The technicalities of litigation strategy and procedure are so great that
few laymen have become familiar with its idiosyncrasies. A client
relinquishes power or control and relies on the attorney for guidance
down the pathways and around the pitfalls of the litigation. The
attorney controls discovery and the investigative stages of the litigation.
It is the attorney who decides what factual investigations should be made
and which techniques should be employed. The attorney decides
whether depositions are to be taken, whether investigators should be
hired, and whether interrogatories should be filed. The client depends
on the attorney to prepare, defend, defuse, protect, and, when all else
fails, vindicate the client's interests.
Parties normally cannot proceed through the process without the
assistance of and reliance on the trained legal professional. The
attorney's obligation in return is to protect the client. The ethics of the
profession require the attorney to place the client's interest above all
387.

See Koffler, supra note 36, at 41-43.

388. See Bumele V. Powell, Lawyer Professionalismas Ordinary Morality, 35 S.
TEX. L. REv. 275, 285-86 (1994); see also Thomas D. Eisele, Avalon Ethics, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1287, 1300-09 (1992) (reviewing THOMAs L. SHAFFER & MARY M.
SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR CoMMuNiTIEs: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL

PROFESSION (1991)) (criticizing Shaffer's discussion of the ethics of the "gentlemanlawyer" as compared to the lawyer bringing family values over to the practice of law and
using Italian-American immigrants as an example to follow).
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else.
Another judicially developed doctrine corroborates the dependent
nature of the litigation relationship. To further the goal of litigation
efficiency, the attorney has been obliged to take virtually complete
control over the client's case."l The control is so complete that, despite
specific instructions by the client, the Supreme Court has held that
counsel can refuse to argue frivolous and even nonfrivolous issues. 9'
The Court has held that decisions about the filing of motions and the
structure of legal arguments belong to counsel."
The client is thus
pragmatically dependent because of the disparity of knowledge about the
litigation process, and legally dependent because of the profession's

arrogation of power over litigation decisions.
The dependent nature of the relationship is so obvious that
professional rules have been created in some jurisdictions to provide

special protections to the litigation client. For example, the New York
State Court of Appeals has imposed special restrictions on retainer
agreements, fee agreements, and other aspects of the representational
relationships for the matrimonial bar." The court's order was based
389. It is not an accident that litigation attorneys are the most often sued segment of
the bar. Their power leads to its abuse, while the client's dependency leads to suspicion.
According to a 1983-1985 American Bar Association survey, 52.8% of all malpractice
claims were filed against the litigation bar. See A.B.A. STANDING COMMITEE ON
LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILrrY, THE LAWYER'S DESK GUIDE To LEGAL
MALPRACriCE 16-17,23 (1992).
390. Ina litigated matter, the attorney is completely in charge of legal actions taken
in regard to the court. The control, and corresponding responsibility, is so complete that
an attorney can be sanctioned for frivolous motion practice even if the client specifically
requested that the motions be filed. "Once counsel is appointed, the day-to-day conduct
of the defense rests with the attorney." Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., concurring). The attorney takes responsibility for making the day-to-day
major decisions and, "must, as a practical matter," do so without even consulting the
client. Id.; see ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.2(b), at 200 (3d ed. 1993) ("Strategic and tactical decisions
should be made by defense counsel after consultation with the client where feasible and
appropriate."). The only exceptions to this exclusive province are the guilty plea,
accepting a plea agreement, a jury waiver, the decision to testify, and the decision to
appeal. See id. § 4-5.2(a), at 200.

391.

See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,751-54 (1983).
See id.; Berger, supra note 376, at 11-12 ("By the early 1980s. ...the Court
had accorded the attorney almost plenary power to bind the defendant, both in cases of
overt lawyer-client disagreement and in cases where counsel had 'waived' a client's
rights without his approval or even knowledge, often by heedlessness rather than
tactics.").
392.

393.

See Daniel Wise, Divorce Lawyers Win Most Fee Disputes, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 14,

1995, at 1 ("The new rule permitting clients to force lawyers to submit disputed fee

' The study
upon a study of the practices of the matrimonial bar.394
revealed that the combination of indigence and the emotional stress

caused by the matrimonial dispute left the clients vulnerable. 95 They
were unable to protect their own interests in the relationship with their
attorney.396 As a result, the study recommended limitations on the
matrimonial bar's right to seek nonrefundable retainers and to obtain
liens on the marital residence as security for fee payment 97 The special
characteristics of matrimonial representation necessitated modifications

in the traditional lawyer-client relationship.
The disparity of knowledge that generates power and the potential for

abuse in matrimonial litigation is present in all other litigation as well.
The members of other litigation bars similarly dominate their clients.
The special relationship demands special duties. 9
The underlying justification for these special rules regarding legal
representation is the undisputed fact that representation makes a
difference. The nature of the relationship imposes a dependent status on
the client in large part because of the importance of representation to
success. The importance of representation to a client's chances of

winning a lawsuit is so clear that it has been enshrined in Supreme Court
doctrine. There is an extensive line of Supreme Court decisions
expressly based on the finding that counsel is essential to litigation
success. Over thirty years ago, in Gideon v. Wainright,399 the Court held

that counsel's guiding hand was so critical to a fair trial that a trial
without counsel was a per se violation of a defendant's rights.4 ° "The
right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in
amounts to arbitration went into effect on Nov. 30, 1993, as part of a package of reforms
designed to redress serious problems in handling matrimonial cases."); infra notes 49697.
394. See N.Y. CoMMITEE
AcTrONs REPORT (1993).

TO ExmtAE LAWYER

CoNDucr

IN MAIuMONIAL

395. See id. at 1.
396. See id. at 6.
397. See id. at 11-23.
398. Courts have been reluctant to impose liability for merely failing to act, but
have tended to find a duty of affirmative action when there is some "special
relationship." See KEETON, supra note 8, § 56, at 373-75. Based on an analysis
demonstrating that the traditional standard of proof is merely a "surrogate tending to
ensure that [the] logical conditions [of direct inference] are met before liability is
imposed," Walker, supra note 267, at 304, a compelling case is made for the adoption of
a form of "substantial factor" causation that would permit plaintiffs to prevail in loss of
chance cases.
399. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
400. See id. at 344 ("[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court... cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.").
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ours. '" ° 1

In subsequent decisions, the Court made clear that the basis of

the rule requiring Npointment of counsel was that represented clients

got better results.
The Supreme Court has correlated competent
representation with success in litigation, and is so confident about the
importance of the relationship that it has used the conclusion as the basis
for its interpretation of the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.
This proposal to impose a special obligation on only the litigation bar

is a tort reflection of the special role the Court has given litigation
counsel. The attorney and her client share a special relationship forged

by the disparity of power necessary for the attorney to do her job. As a
result, the attorney enjoys a number of privileges designed to protect,
enforce, and enhance that special relationship.'o Unfortunately, the
concomitant obligations of the attorney to her client are not similarly
enforced. Once a malpractice action is filed, legal recognition of the
special relationship disappears. The disparity of power created by the
attorney's superior knowledge and control of the case do not obligate
that attorney to relinquish any of that knowledge in the subsequent
malpractice action. 4" In malpractice litigation, the previous special
401. Id. Gideon was a Sixth Amendment case; however, the critical issue for the
court was the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation issue. Gideon had represented
himself at his trial. A review of the transcript suggested that he did a reasonable job.
See id. at 337. Indeed, he certainly did a better job than those attorneys who have been
found incompetent Thus, the Court dramatically underscored the vital role of the
attorney in the adversary system, for even competent representation was deemed
insufficient when performed by a layman.
402. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31, 33 (1972). For an extensive
review of counsel effectiveness studies, see generally Steven Zeidman, SacrificialLambs
or the Chosen Few?: The Impact of Student Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62
BROOK. L. REv. 853 (1996).
403. The single most dramatic legal rule evidencing the special significance of the
litigation attorney's conduct and distinguishing the litigation attorney from other
members of the bar is the rule that grants the attorney absolute privilege against
defamation actions for statements made in the course of a judicialproceeding. See
Kennedy v. Cannon, 182 A.2d 54,58 (Md. 1962); Maulsby v. Reifsnider, 14 A. 505, 510
(Md. 1888); Irwin v. Ashurst, 74 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Or. 1938) (recognizing that the same
privilege applies to a judge).
404. See Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improvingon the ContingentFee,
63 CORNELL L. REv. 529, 570 (1978). The authors state:
The lawyer's economic interest in the outcome may tempt him to use improper
tactics for ensuring victory and to slight his duties as an officer of the court;
further, the lawyer may find himself unable to act disinterestedly in advising

his client and unwilling to allow client participation in controlling the lawsuit.

Id.

relationship becomes irrelevant. The lawyer is given all of the
individualistically justified protections of the traditional duty and proof

doctrines.
Under existing rules, the attorney's abandonment of her client in the
malpractice action is furthered and legally sanctioned by various
doctrines. These doctrines merge to lessen the chance of a client
recovering.'
Most significant among these is the traditional

individualistically based cause in fact doctrine. Its effect in the
malpractice tort is to give the benefit of the doubt to the defendant. It
turns the legal table on the client.4

During the underlying litigation, the

attorney receives compensation and trust because the legal profession
maintains itself as the repository of knowledge and skills that help the

client.'

In a malpractice action, the attorney's significance, although

previously assumed, is eradicated. The causation doctrine requires the
ex-client to prove the attorney's significance in the litigation, i.e., that

the incompetent representation was a causative factor in her loss.
In effect, the individualistically justified causation doctrine is based

upon a presumption that incompetence does not matter. Its logical
underpinning is the assumption that competent and incompetent
representation are equally likely to produce the same result. Malpractice
405. And effective they are in protecting the bar. See generally Manuel R. Ramos,
A Post Conference Reflection: The "Third Parties" Would Have Wondered- Why Can't
Lawyers Be TreatedLike Everyone Else?, 37 S. TEX. L. REy. 1277 (1996). Professor
Ramos stated:
However, even with insured lawyers there continues to exist unfair and
special defenses that only lawyer defendants are entitled to assert against
injured clients and nonclients seeking a remedy. Depending on the
jurisdiction, clients can be denied their opportunity to hold a former lawyer
accountable to a jury if they discover the malpractice after the expiration of
"occurrence type" statutes of limitations or the short statutes of repose; if their
lawyer can come under the judgment immunity rule regarding a "debatable"
legal issue; if the claim is for negligent settlement advice; if years later they are
unable to obtain the witnesses and evidence required to try the "case within a
case"; if the legal malpractice claim has been assigned; or if lawyers are
exempt from consumer protection statutes.
Id. at 1279-80 (footnotes omitted); see Harold H. Chen, Note, MalpracticeImmunity An
Illegitimate and Ineffective Response to the Indigent-Defense Crisis,45 DUKE L.J. 783,
784 (1996).
406. See generally David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV.

L. REV. 799 (1992). Referring to ABA studies, the author reported that "[a]s of 1984,
more than two thirds of all malpractice actions ended in no payment to the client.... [In
addition,] only 32.6% [of the malpractice claims reported to insurance companies
throughout the country between January 1981 and September 1985] resulted in
indemnity payments." Id at 831 n.129. "[L]itigation against lawyer-defendants is
particularly difficult to win." kld at 831; see Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Characteras a
ProfessionalCredential,94 YALE L. J. 491, 591 n.449 (1985).
407. See Ramos, supra note 405, at 1278-79 ("[L]awyers pretend to be in a
profession where lawyers owe the utmost loyalty to their clients and have obligations to
society .... ").

490
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does not establish prima facie proof that the loss in a lawsuit was caused
by the attorney. As a result of this presumption of the irrelevance of
competency, proof of malpractice has not been considered a substantial

factor in causing a loss. Res ipsa loquitur has not been applied as a
judicial recognition of the importance of competent representation. The
courts have also refused to switch the burden of proof on causation to

the defendant. Despite the judicial recognition of the critical role of
representation and of the lawyer-client relationship, no shred of this
recognition exists in the malpractice tort.

It has always been a tortuous process to attempt to reconcile these
rules with the concept of professional ethics. 4S The attorney has every
responsibility to the client until she breaches them. 40 Then, the attorney

has no shred of responsibility to her client. The ex-cient has the duty to
pierce the attorney's records, pierce the solidarity of the profession,
identify the errors, and prove that the errors were harmful.4 0
408. See Note, supra note 51, at 1102. The author states:
[C]ourts have been unable to gloss over the conflict between the
client-protective function of the court-adopted ethics codes and their own
refusal to permit clients who seek recovery for attorney-caused harms to
invoke the codes' protection.... [A] variety of doctrinal and policy arguments
have driven many judges to grant only minimal consideration to that conflict in
determining the proper role of the ethics codes in malpractice proceedings ....
Such denial also causes unfairness to those whom the legal system is
designed to serve. In effect, the legal profession offers to hold itself
accountable to a defined code of conduct-as long as those in charge of the
accounting are professional colleagues.
When the power to demand
accountability shifts to clients, however, plaintiffs must recreate the standard
of care from the ground up in each case, without reference to any verifiable or
pre-existing rules of conduct. At best, this divergence appears to be a de facto
double standard; given the legal profession's unique responsibility to regulate
itself, the appearance is less than ideal.
Id. at 1102, 1119 (footnote omitted).
409. It is not the purpose of this article to review the debate on responsibility. For
such a debate, see generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOvERISHMENT
OF POLrIcAL DISCouRSE (1991). However, Professor Glendon's book might well have
been even more impressive if the legal profession's indifference to its responsibilities in
the tort of legal malpractice was discussed in addition to her insightful analysis of the
general tort "no duty" rules. The "no duty" of affirmative action rule is an unsightly
aspect of the attempt of Anglo-American jurisprudence to balance competing interests,
but the legal profession's shedding of its duties to a client, like a snake shedding its skin,
affects far more people and is, thus, a more important aspect of our legal system.
410. Koffler provides:
The test frequently favored by the courts is what "would have" been the result

in the underlying action. However,... where the client was or would have

been the plaintiff in the underlying action, it is observed that Lewandowski v.

This causation doctrine applies even if the attorney concedes that the
representation was deficient. Without regard to the specific facts or the
nature of the relationship, the malpractice plaintiff has the burden of
proving that malpractice caused damage. Even if a client proves that an
attorney breached the bond of trust and negligently attended to the
client's legal needs, the client still must prove that the attorney billed for
hundreds of hours of slipshod work, ignored the client's interest, or
placed his or her own self-interest in front of the client's. The attorney,
on the other hand, is granted the protections of the individualistically
justified doctrines of proof. The causation defense is the best friend of
the incompetent attorney.4 '
The rigid rules requiring the plaintiff to meet those proof burdens
create an embarrassing aura of special treatment. An attorney can admit
incompetence, keep the client's fee, and then exploit the ex-client's

dependency-generated ignorance in the malpractice action. The attorney
can prevail, not because the incompetence was irrelevant to the poor
result, but because the very negligence that caused the injury deprived
the client of the ability to meet a burden of proof. In no other area of the
causation doctrine has the defendant been allowed to benefit from
negligent conduct that deprives the plaintiff of access to information.
Consideration of the appropriateness of creating a loss of chance option
in legal malpractice cases, however, cannot end with the determination
that there is a sound policy reason to impose a legally enforceable duty
to carefully represent clients with weak cases.
Although the lawyer-client relationship imposes a dependent status on
the client, before alternative liability doctrines can be adopted, the
dependency must be shown to be detrimental to the plaintiff. The
dependency must deny the plaintiff information and a fair opportunity to
Continental Casualty Co., [276 N.W.2d 284 (Wis. 1979),] makes reference to
the test of what "should have" been the result in the underlying action.
Koffler, supra note 36, at 58 (footnotes omitted).
411. In using the case-within-a-case defense, the attorney-defendant's goal is to
diminish the value of the underlying case as much as possible. The defendant attempts
to persuade the jury that the case had no value ("even a competent attorney would have
made no difference with this dog"). This argument is made despite the fact that the
attorney (the defendant) took this case to begin with and charged substantial fees while
keeping it going. To maintain that a case has no merit or is of little pecuniary value at

this stage of the game certainly reflects poorly on the well-compensated attorney. But it
more greatly discredits the system that routinely encourages attorneys to interpose such a

defense, With this defense the lawyer is trying to have her cake (the fee) and eat it too
(deny that the activities the fees generated were worthwhile). See Fowler, supra note 14,
at 25. The extent to which the individualistic burdens have been developed to protect
attorneys is best exemplified in Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566 (Alaska 1993), in which the
court found that in the majority of courts, the burden is placed upon the plaintiff in a
malpractice action based on representation in a criminal case to prove both his actual

innocence and that the malpractice caused the conviction. See id. at 572-73.
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prove her case. The core of this question requires an analysis of the
efficacy of the case-within-a-case component of the malpractice action,
to determine whether it can reasonably recreate the malpractice-tainted
proceeding.
The fundamental premise justifying the case-within-a-case element of
legal malpractice is that the jury in a malpractice trial can come to a
reasonable and fair determination of what would have happened if the
underlying action had not been contaminated by the defendant attorney's
negligence.
With the acceptance of this presumption, the legal
malpractice case presents no unfair proof problems for plaintiffs. The
negligence of the attorney deprives the client of nothing. The evidence
necessary to prove the case exists. It can simply be presented at the
malpractice trial. If this view is accurate, the only detriment to the
plaintiff is the loss of time between the underlying trial and the
malpractice trial. However, the accuracy of this view must be carefully
considered.
Decisions to reject individualistically justified proof
burdens are based upon the existence of a dependency that deprives the

plaintiff of evidence. '

If malpractice causes no information deficit,

there is no dependency relationship sufficient to justify application of a
status-based rule of proof.
Such a possibility does not exist in the type of alternative proof fact
sets that led to the adoption of loss of chance in contract and diagnostic
medical malpractice cases. 3 In a medical malpractice case, the jury can
never know what would have happened to the patient if the doctor had
not negligently delayed the commencement of treatment.
The
fundamental elements of corrupted medical treatment cannot be
changed. The patient's health cannot be restored to its prenegligence
status to determine the progress of the disease without the negligence.
In the contract fact sets, a lost interview cannot be rescheduled to
determine who would have won a contest.41 4 Similarly, in the fact sets
that led to the adoption of the substantial factor standard, the
41
impediment to proving what happened cannot be surmounted. 1
Whether Ms. Reynolds would have fallen if the stairs were illuminated
can never be known.41 6 Which defendant's shotgun propelled the pellet
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

See supra Part IV.C.4.
See supra Part IV.D.3.
See supra notes 341-48 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.C.4.b.
See supra Part IV.C.4.b.

that hit Mr. Summers is not ascertainable.417

It seems that a similar logical barrier to replication does not exist in
legal malpractice cases. The proof that should have been presented in

the original case is available; in theory it can be presented to the
malpractice jury. The client lives, the witnesses are available, and a jury
can be found to decide the merits of the underlying case. It thus appears
that the case can be tried, or retried as it should have been originally.
This analysis, however, is flawed in two ways. The first flaw stems
from the fact that the only mechanism by which the legal malpractice
plaintiff can obtain the information about her case is through discovery

in the malpractice action. The ability of a party to obtain information
through discovery is not unique to the legal malpractice fact set. In
Ybarra, the anesthetized patient had access to discovery that would have
provided all of the information known to any of the defendants. Ybarra
was still considered dependent because of his helplessness during the
operation."' Similarly, in the DES cases, the corporate defendants'
records were available through discovery."9 Nonetheless, alternative

liability was imposed. Access to information through discovery is not a
sufficient protection for the party who is in a dependent status.
The second flaw centers upon the viability of recreating the original
result through the case-within-a-case component of a malpractice trial.4"0

The belief that the original case can be replicated is an illusion. Legal
malpractice defendants have been able to maintain the illusion only by
avoiding careful analysis of the dispositive factors that are irreparably

altered as a result of litigation malpractice.4 The malpractice jury can
never determine what would have happened in the underlying
litigation.sn
417.
See supra notes 256-73 and accompanying text.
418. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 265 & 288.
420. See Koffler, supra note 36, at 47 ("If there is no damage to the client in the
nature of emotional distress, and the client is not entitled to punitive damages, the 'suit
within the suit' may be the only available refuge for the client seeking an award of
damages .... "). Koffler also discussed Gautam v. DeLuca, 521 A.2d 1343 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1987), in which the court implied that the case-within-a-case approach is
not needed. See Koffler, supra note 36, at 47.
421. See Jody Keys, Comment, The Use of Expert Testimony in Actions Against

Litigation Attorneys, 14 WILLAi~rr L. REV. 425, 440 (1977) ("The notion that a jury

can determine the verdict an earlier jury would have rendered by considering
psychological and other data on the first jury is at best debatable.").
422. The degree of special protection offered to the bar in malpractice litigation
permeates decisions at every level. In a medical malpractice action, there is no dispute
about the issue the jury is to decide. That issue is what would have happened but for the
negligence. However, the bar has been successful in generating doubt about the standard
in legal malpractice actions. The defense bar urges the court to charge the jury that their
job is to decide what should have happened. Through this change, the litigation bar
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A.

The Malpractice Case-Within-a-CaseDoes Not FairlyRecreate
the Lost Chance of the Negligently Lost Trial

The illusion of replicability is founded on the myth that cases are
decided exclusively on their facts.4n Although the facts are important,
many other factors participate in the complex enterprise of a trial and
sway the outcome. Among the collateral factors that are critical to the
disposition of a lawsuit are the specific jurors and the specific judge.
The clearest example of the critical role of the exact jury in case
outcomes can be seen in the difference in damage awards different juries
give to plaintiffs. The facts of a knee injury do not change if the case is
tried in Bucks County, Pennsylvania or in Brooklyn, New York, but the
people who are on the jury will be different. Their attitudes will be
different and the size of their verdicts will likely be dramatically
different. Even within the same jurisdiction, the compensation awarded
for similar injuries varies widely because of the identity of the specific
people who happen to be on the jury.
The belief that the identity of the specific jurors on a case is an
important right of the parties is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment. The
importance to the parties of the exact people who compromise the
original jury in a lawsuit is such an important factor in the just outcome
of a case that it has gained constitutional protection. The standard for

determining when double jeopardy rights vest is the selection of the
jury.424

Once that jury is impaneled, a criminal defendant gains a

would deprive the client of compensation for her actual loss. Her loss is the loss of what
would have happened. What should have happened is an entirely different matter.
Reality often provides individuals with more than they deserve. But the fact of
malpractice is that it deprives people of exactly that- what they would have gotten. The
impact of this confusion in the compensatory obligations of the bar helps to insulate the
bar from the onerous requirement of fully compensating injured clients. See Charles M.
Liebson, Legal Malpractice Cases: Special Problems in Identifying Issues of Law and
Fact and in the Use of Expert Testimony, 75 Ky. L.J. 1, 9 (1996) ("The question is
whether the jury at the second trial should decide what the first jury would have done if
the case had been properly tried, or simply what the first jury should have done.").
423. See Jerome Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes andNon-Euclidean Legal Thinking, 17
CORNELL L.Q. 568, 593-95 (1932); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realist Jurisprudence-The
Next Step, 30 CoLum. L. REv. 431, 438 (1930). See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND (1930); K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND
ITS STUDY (1951); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmON: DECIDING

(1960).
424. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35-36 (1978). The Court held that once a jury
is selected, a defendant has a "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular
tribunal." Id. at 36 (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949)). The Court also
APPEALS

constitutional right to a decision from those particular jurors4 -- they are
unique. The defendant in the criminal case chose them. A decision

from them is her right. The legal malpractice plaintiff has lost that jury.
It can never be recreated. Its decision, without the influence of
malpractice, can never be known.
Similarly, the personality and legal viewpoint of the judge have a
decisive impact on the course of litigation. The judge controls decisions
to admit or exclude evidence. The judge rules on motions to amend or
dismiss pleadings. These rulings can vastly alter the course of a trial.4"
The judge, however, can also affect the result through more intangible
actions. The judge's tone of voice, rulings on form of question
objections, and general attitude toward the parties can send a message to
the jury. These latter factors are practically unreviewable and usually
are not contained in the printed record.
A case-within-a-case retrial of the issue can never restore these critical
factors. The impact of unique jurors and a specific judge on the outcome
of a case is so substantial that trying the issue in a different forum cannot
recreate the pattern of factors that would actually have caused the result

but for the negligence. The illusion of knowledge about the original
outcome is created. The reality is not.
The case-within-a-case concept suffers from a further defect. There is
a core difference in the "jury issue' ' 2 in the two cases. In the two cases,
declared that an essential component of that tribunal was the defendant's participation in
the selection of its members. "The federal rule .... reflects and protects the defendant's
interest in retaining a chosen jury." Id. at 37-38.
425. See supra note 424.
426. The criminal prosecution of television sports announcer Marv Albert is a prime
example. See Michael Janofsky, Mary Albert Pleads Guilty and Is Dismissed by NBC,

N.Y. TwIES, Sept. 26, 1997, at Al. The defense anticipated being able to undermine the
credibility of the complainant by showing that she had engaged in a course of conduct
involving retaliatory actions against others. This evidence was entirely excluded. See id.
Further, the defendant did not believe that testimony about an alleged prior similar act
would be admitted. The trial judge admitted the prior similar act evidence and excluded
the retaliatory course of conduct evidence. See id. The result was a trial-ending guilty
plea. See id. A different judge might well have decided these two issues differently. In
light of the standard of review, either ruling would probably have been sustained on
appeal. See, e.g., Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276, 289-92 (Ind.Ct. App. 1993).
427. The "jury issue" is the term for the fundamental issue that the jury has to
decide. This issue may not be the technical legal or factual issue presented in the charge.
In some cases, for example, the jury issue might be, "Is this the type of person who

would do this type of thing?" See STEvEN

LuBET,MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYsIs

AND PRACTICE 7-8 (1994). A similar concept was applied to explain the importance of
the first Reagan/Carter debate in the 1980 presidential election. Theoretically, the
electorate was deciding on the policy initiatives of the two men. The jury issue,
however, was whether Reagan could be trusted with the atom bomb. See Peter Goldman
et al.,
Campaign '80: The Winner Is ...
,NEwSwEEK, Nov. 3, 1980, at 27, 27; see also
Washington Whispers, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 3, 1980, at 20, 20. It was
reported:
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the jurors are being asked to resolve different disputes. In the
underlying action, the focus is on the conduct of the individuals who are
before them, The defendant did something. The jury must decide
whether it was proper and whether it injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff
who was hit by a car, for example, stands before the jury seeking
judgment against the driver of the car. The jury must evaluate who is
more deserving of the verdict. That is not the setting in a malpractice
action. The individuals before the jury are the attorney-a very different

person from the car driver-and the client. These two people were
involved in a different kind of relationship than were the defendant car
driver and the pedestrian plaintiff. The act of judging the individuals
inherently involves judging the relationship that led to the injury.
Attorneys present very different personas to the jury than the defendants
in the underlying actions. They acted improperly for different reasons
and created different risks. The speeding driver could kill people. The
lawyer who is not energetic and does not review all of the documents is
just as negligent as the speeding driver, but that lawyer may be
perceived as presenting far less danger to society.42 This difference can
be critical to outcomes on both liability and damages.
Whether the issue is liability or damages, the result that would have
been achieved had the trial not been destroyed by malpractice cannot be
duplicated. The result of that trial is the composite of those individuals
who were on the bench and in the jury box. Those people, and thus their
verdict, are as unavailable as is the person who died because of medical
malpractice. In both cases the result of proper representation cannot be
replicated.
B. Replicability Test
The conclusion that the case-within-a-case process cannot fairly
replicate the chance of victory for a plaintiff with a weak case does not

Id.

One thing both sides agreed on in the Carter-Reagan TV debate: The
President had to score a clear victory in order to come out ahead. If Reagan
were to hold Carter to a draw, the Republican contender would torpedo the
Democrats' argument that he was not of presidential caliber.

428. Some in the legal malpractice defense bar agree with this claim that jurors will
view the different defendants, the one in the underlying case and the one in the
malpractice case, differently. However, their view is that the jurors so dislike lawyers
that it is the malpractice defendant who suffers from jury bias. See Interview with Peter

Contino, Rivkin, Radler &Kremer, in Uniondale, N.Y. (Mar. 5, 1999).

rest on mere argument. The failure to replicate is demonstrated by
applying a "replicability test." The exercise of comparing known results
against predicted results will help reveal the degree to which the present
system fails to protect negligently represented clients. Although weak
cases occasionally win at trial, the apparent lack of merit in the case
always prevents the plaintiff who had the underlying weak case from
prevailing in the case-within-a-case segment of the later malpractice
trial.
Thus, the cases selected for this analysis are ones in which a

reasonable attorney would predict that the client would lose. This is
critical because the inequity of the case-within-a-case element only
exists in malpractice actions in which the client always had a losing
case. In these cases, it is the salvation of the inept attorney. Therefore,
the replicability test explores the capacity of the case-within-a-case
segment to protect the client when the client's success is unpredictable."'
The replicability test is an objective measurement of the reliability of
the case-within-a-case element. The test is simple. The first step is
identifying a known result: the jury verdicts in actual cases. The next
step is to hypothesize malpractice in that case and assume that the
malpractice caused a different result. The final step is an analysis of the
probability that the malpractice jury would come to the same result as
the actual jury-the actual verdict. If the case-within-a-case process
reasonably replicates the original result, the two juries should, within a
margin of error, come to the same judgment. However, if the analysis
demonstrates that there is virtually no probability of the second jury
replicating the actual verdict, then the case-within-a-case mechanism is
not a valid mechanism for protecting the client against the loss
occasioned by legal malpractice.
This reverse prediction technique is commonly used in scientific
analyses. For example, scientists who have developed models that show
the impact of global warming are challenged to demonstrate that their
models would predict the present environment, if run with data from
previous decades. 40 In the legal context, this scientific method involves
429. Thus, it is the legal malpractice equivalent of the medical malpractice patient
with a 35% chance of survival without malpractice. One-third of those patients will
survive. All of them would lose a malpractice action, however, if they had to establish
that it was more likely than not that they would have survived.

430. If greenhouse computers are set to the conditions of the past in order to see if
they "predict" present climate, the result would be global temperatures that should have
risen about five degrees Fahrenheit by now. This sentence is not a summary of current
forecasts, as Mr. Oppenheimer of the Environmental Defense Fund suggests, but is

confirmed by the upcoming report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
See William K. Stevens, Computers Model World's Climate, but How Well?, N.Y.
TaiEs, Nov. 4, 1997, at Fl. Andrew R. Solow reported the following regarding
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Applying the reverse
analyzing "stories" from the courtroom.4 3'
prediction method to a real case will demonstrate the degree to which
trial outcomes vary from the predictable. 32
Any discussion of the ability of a second jury to replicate the result of
a prior jury in a case in which the result is not predictable must consider
the trials of O.J. Simpson. His overwhelmingly publicized prosecution
and acquittal for the murder of his wife and Ronald Goldman, and the
subsequent civil trial in which Mr. Simpson was found liable for
wrongful death, provide a dramatic representation of the weakness of the
replicability concept.
These two trials reveal the gap between
replicability and reality. The case is a perfect model to test replicability
because there is no need to assume the result of a subsequent civil trial

on the identical issues. Rather than having to speculate about what
would have happened in a derivative trial with a different judge and jury,
the Simpson case includes a subsequent civil action.
The test begins by positing the exact facts of the real case. Three
assumptions are then added. The first is that Mr. Simpson was
convicted of the criminal murder charges, and the second is that his
attorneys were concededly negligent in his representation. 433 Based upon
these two assumptions, the third assumption is that Simpson has brought
a civil damage action against his attorneys for legal malpractice.
computer models:
The second way of making climate predictions is through computer models.
These models are large systems of equations representing our understanding of
climate processes. Because our understanding is limited, the models are of
limited use. For example, these models have a hard time reproducing current
climate from current data. They cannot be expected to predict future climate
with any precision.
Andrew R. Solow, Pseudo-ScientificHotAir, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1988, at A27.
431. As in other settings in which the unique experiences of the individuals
involved preclude total understanding by outsiders, only the trial attorney has
experienced the vagaries of a jury trial. Nobody outside the world of the courtroom can
really appreciate the degree to which the exact individuals who comprise the "trial"-the
jurors, attorneys, and judge-affect the outcome.
432. The inherent uncertainty of trial outcomes does not, however, apply to
settlement negotiations. The standard for settlement predictions is the custom and
practice in the region. This is a standard created by attorney conduct, dominated by
attorneys, and predictable by them.
433. For the purposes of this hypothetical, the exact nature of the assumed
malpractice is not important. It could be the failure to make necessary motions,
interview available witnesses, or comply with discovery rules. The critical concepts are:
malpractice is conceded by the attorneys, and their defense against civil liability is that

Mr. Simpson cannot prove it is more likely than not that he would have been found not
guilty without the malpractice.

Because the attorneys in this hypothetical are forced to concede that they
were negligent, their defense against civil liability would be that the
negligence did not cause the conviction-the case-within-a-case
segment of the malpractice trial. By imposing this defense, they would
require Simpson to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he
would have been acquitted in the criminal case. The Simpson case fits
the profile because evidence of his guilt appeared overwhelming. A
brief summary of just some of the incriminating evidence includes:
DNA matching blood was found at the scene of the crime; the victims'
blood was discovered in his car and on his socks; Simpson had
purchased a pair of expensive and rare gloves, and one was found at the
crime scene; he had a cut on his hand that the prosecution argued
explained how his blood came to be at the crime scene; and finally, he
had no alibi.4"
Virtually everyone in the United States knows that O.J. Simpson was
acquitted of the criminal charges against him. However, to estimate the
ability of a malpractice jury to replicate the result of the trial had it not

been hypothetically corrupted by attorney malpractice, it is necessary to
determine whether Simpson could prove that he would have been
acquitted. Fortunately, the answer need not be derived from speculation
as there was a civil trial. The issue in that trial was whether the plaintiff
could prove that O.J. Simpson was responsible for the murders. Once
again, the publicity surrounding the case has made the result common
knowledge-Simpson was found liable. Thus, the results in the two
trials of the same factual issues were different.
Commentators have argued about the factors causing the difference.
One view is that the lower burden of proof combined with the absence of
a Fifth Amendment right not to testify in the civil case caused the
difference.435 Another is that the civil attorneys learned from the
mistakes of the prosecutors. 36 A third is that the rulings of the different
judges were dispositive. 437 But the consensus is that the acquittal in the
criminal case was the result of the exact jury that was empaneled in the
criminal case. 438 That jury did not sit on the civil case. The exact jury,
434.

See generally JOSEPH Bosco, A PROBLEM OF EVIDENCE: How THE

PROSECUTION FREED 0. J. SIMPSON

(1996);

JEFFREY TOOBiN, THE RUN OF HIS LIFE: THE

PEOPLE V. O.J. SIMPSON (1996).
435. See B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Back on Stand, Simpson Again Denies Role in 2
Killings, N.Y. TMES, Jan. 14, 1997, at A10 (reporting Simpson's testimony during the

civil trial).

436. See generally Elaine Lafferty, The Inside Story of How O.J. Simpson Lost,
TIME, Feb. 17, 1997, at 28 (analyzing the usefullness of evidence in the civil trial).
437. See William Booth, Legal Experts Cite Many Factorsas Making a Difference
h Simpson Verdicts, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1997, at A6.
438. See Roger Parloff, Race and Juries: If It Ain't Broke..., AM. LAw., June
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and therefore the verdict of that jury, was not duplicated in the civil case
and certainly would not have been duplicated in a hypothetical
malpractice action.
The result of this analysis is clear. In the real world without
malpractice, O.J. Simpson was acquitted. In a retrial of the same issues
he was found liable. The result of the first trial was not replicated
because it was not replicable; its lack of replicability is a feature shared
by all cases in which the predictable result is that the client will lose.
The legal system produces unexpected results. The jury considers the
fates of the human beings that are parties in a particular case. The legal
system focuses an enormous amount of energy on the task of arriving at
4 9 A jury's verdict is
a result that juries perceive as fairfor those parties.
a composite of the technical law that it is required to apply and its
communal sense of justice. A jury verdict arrived at during a secret
deliberation is inherently an equitable resolution. Change one of the
parties and the equities change. Change one of the jurors and the
perceptions change. These intangibles have a great impact on the jury.
The case-within-a-case concept is a sham. The legal significance of
the inability to replicate the underlying case should be that plaintiffs
with weak cases are not being adequately compensated for their lost
chance with the initial jury. They lost their jury.44 The result of that
proceeding will never be known, but the loss that the plaintiff suffered

can be compensated. Long shots sometimes win. They are in the race
and they have a chance. Therefore, negligent attorneys should be liable
for the chance that they took from their clients.
1997, at 5, 5; Tim Hanes, American Justice Is the Loser, TIMES (London), Feb. 6, 1997,
at 16; Isabel Wilkerson, Whose Side to Take: Women, Outrage and the Verdict on O.J.
Simpson, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, § 4, at 1. See generally NATHAN AASENG, THE O.J.
SIMPSON TRIAL: WHAT IT SHOWS Us ABouT OuR LEGAL SYSTEM (1995); JEwELLE
TAYLOR GIBBS, RACE AND JUSTIcE: RODNEY KING AND 0. J. SIMPSON IN A HOUSE

DIVIDED (1996).
439. The desire of the jury to reach a verdict it perceives as fair is so strong that
there is little doubt juries can, and do, nullify the law when such drastic conduct is
perceived as appropriate to achieve the verdict they believe is fair. The chance of
obtaining a nullification verdict is certainly one of the benefits of having a right to select
and retain your jury. For a discussion of the degree to which the system should
encourage jury nullification, see generaally United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL.
L. Ray. 168 (1972); Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification": When May
and Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice?,30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 239 (1993).
440. Even if the case did not get to trial because of malpractice in motion practice,
client counseling, or case management, there still should have been a jury, and that jury
will not be the malpractice jury.

There is no logical basis to conclude that the case-within-a-case trial
can recreate the result that, absent negligence, would have been reached
in the malpractice-tainted proceeding. Therefore, the only remaining
justification for relying on it for the resolution of legal malpractice
controversies is that, whatever its weaknesses, it has the appearance of
fairness. According to this hypothetical justification, justice correlates
more to the appearance of fairness than its reality. Thus, the "illusion of
replicability" may be a sufficient basis to justify imposing the burden of
proof on the client, because the appearance of justice is justice."1 This
theory would justify distinguishing legal from medical malpractice
actions, as the legal malpractice action appears to be fair under
traditional proof standards.
It is not necessary to explore subtle philosophical theories of justice to
destroy the notion that special protections for attorneys can be justified
under this type of logic. Attorneys are part of the nation's elite, and they
42
have predominant control of information and decisions in litigation*
The client is often not a member of the elite, and when she is not, she is
always less educated in the law. Even in an academic world in which
the relativity of all events has become an accepted reality 43 and virtually
nothing can be neutrally justified as superior or inferior, the protection of
the elite against the economically and educationally weaker segment of
society is not urged.4" The attorney's domination of the relationship
between lawyer and client precludes the special protection that the casewithin-a-case process represents. In such a context, any suggestion that
an unfair doctrine should remain the law because it appears to be fair is
nothing more than a rationalization for privilege.

The most important principle in developing the criteria for tort review
of client representation should be reinforcement of the legal
community's responsibility to the client community. Any system that
441. See Phillip J. Closius, Social Justice and the Myth of Fairness:A Communal
Defense of Affirmative Action, 74 NEB. L. Rnv. 569, 575 (1995); Jon Elster, Solomonic
Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 42 (1987);
Philippe Nonet, In Praiseof Callicles,74 IOWA L. REV. 807, 807-13 (1989); Ed Sparer,
Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly
Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509, 560 n.128

(1984).
442. See supra notes 378-92 and accompanying text.
443. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its
Application to Normative Jurisprudence, Sociolegal Studies, and the Fact-Value
Distinction, 41 AM. J. JUrIs. 315, 327-28 (1996); Jay Tidmarsh, Whitehead's
Metaphysics and the Law: A Dialogue,62 ALB. L. RaV. 1, 41.(1998); David B. Wilkins,
Legal RealismforLawyers, 104 HARV. L. RV. 468,475 (1990).
444. See Robert W. Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63-64
(1984); A.E. Keir Nash, In Re Radical Interpretationsof American Law: The Relation of
Law andHistory, 82 MICH. L. REV. 274, 327 (1983).
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minimizes the possibility of deterring negligent representation unduly
protects the bar. Because lawyers predominantly create the rules,
continuing to provide the bar with this protection creates the appearance
of impropriety.

It is essential that the litigation bar accept, and not attempt to avoid
through litigation, its responsibilities to the client. To achieve this
result, a legal structure must be adopted that extends the special lawyerclient relationship that exists in the representational stage through
any adversarial proceedings.
Once attorneys have accepted the
responsibilities and the rights of representing a client in litigation, a
special continuing duty exists. Indeed, the least compelling situation in
which to terminate the attorney's special duty to her client is when the
client claims that she was incompetently represented. The integrity" 5 of
the profession depends upon creating and reinforcing rules which
demonstrate that lawyers deserve the trust of society. Alternative proof
doctrines are the mechanisms through which this special duty can be
implemented.
VI. ALTERNATiVE PROOF DOCTRINES IN LEGAL
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS

Clients should be able to trust their attorneys, and all attorneys, in
exchange for this trust, should have greater responsibilities to their
clients where representation was negligent.
Applying alternative
causation doctrines will begin the task of synthesizing the malpractice
tort with the ethical obligations of client representation. Alternative
proof doctrines should be incorporated into the cause in fact element of
the legal malpractice tort. 46 The doctrines that underscore and protect
the dependent status inherent in the lawyer-client relationship also
illuminate the applicability of alternative proof doctrines to the legal
malpractice tort.
The Supreme Court's holdings on the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel justify the incorporation of the substantial factor doctrine.
Additionally, the various doctrines that establish the attorney's control
445. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, INMGRTY (1996) (providing an analysis of

the critical role of integrity in social institutions).
446. Alternative causation doctrines are well developed. See generally Porat &
Stein, supra note 302, at 1891 (discussing the alternative causation doctrine). Legal
malpractice victims, however, have generally been denied such assistance. See supra
Part IlI.

over strategic litigation decisions, when considered in the context of the
settlement rate in litigation, support the adoption of the alternative proof
doctrines of burden switching and loss of chance.
A.

SubstantialFactorDoctrine

The substantial factor doctrine is particularly applicable to litigation
malpractice. The courts in structuring duty and proof burdens in
malpractice actions have ignored the fact that the attorney is in a

dominant position to create the record of the representation. The fact
that all of the information about the case is in the attorney's files, and
that any lack of information may be the result of her incompetence, is
legally irrelevant. The obligation to protect the client's interest ends
whenever there is a claim that the attorney committed malpractice; the
lawyer's defenses in a malpractice action are unaffected by the fact that
there was a lawyer-client relationship. The attorney is given all of the
rights of a stranger being sued by another stranger. When the clientattorney relationship fails and the client seeks recourse against the
attorney for incompetent representation, the fact that the attorney was
the party in the relationship who gathered all information and most, if
not all, of the critical decisions is ignored. The ignorance of the client
caused by this reliance has never been considered. In a malpractice
action, the attorney has the right to abandon every vestige of her duty to
the client, and the right to exploit every piece of information collected at
the expense of the client pursuant to the privileges of the lawyer-client
relationship.
The substantial factor doctrine permits the plaintiff to establish the
relationship between the injury and the proven negligence of the
defendant through a presumption. The presumption is that the type of
negligence has, as its natural and probable consequence, enhanced the
probability of injury. In Reynolds,447 the inference of causation was
based on the absence of illumination on a stairway that the defendant
encouraged the plaintiff to descend quickly. The substantial factor
concept was substituted for traditional proof of causation. Mrs.
Reynolds might have fallen because of her neglect or the intervention of
fate, or the fall may have been a pure accident. However, the facts that
she was induced to hurry down the stairway and that the defendant had

failed to keep it properly illuminated were held sufficient evidence to
permit the jury to infer causation. The reason for the application of this
alternative proof concept was that Mrs. Reynolds had been rendered
dependent by the defendant's act of encouraging her to descend the
447.

For a detailed discussion of Reynolds, see supra Part IV.C.4.b.
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unlighted stairs quickly.
Litigation malpractice has the same relationship to the loss, or poor
result, in a case as the lack of illumination on a stairway has to falling.
First, the attorney, by controlling the decisions in litigation and
dominating the accumulation of information, renders the client just as
dependent as was Mrs. Reynolds. Second, malpractice naturally and
probably increases the chances of losing a lawsuit. The Supreme
Court's Sixth Amendment doctrines mandating appointment of counsel
strongly corroborate the relationship between competent litigation
representation and success."
The existing causation doctrine requiring proof that the client would
have won the underlying case can only be justified by an assumption
that incompetence does not matter. Our legal system has the dexterity to
simultaneously adhere to the inconsistent principles that counsel is
central to a fair trial but that incompetent counsel is most likely
meaningless. The former is the central tenant of the right to counsel
cases; the latter is inherent in the notion that plaintiffs must prove that
malpractice affected the result. However, both principles cannot be
maintained. Because the courts clearly view counsel as central to a fair

trial, the incompetence of counsel has, by definition, a high probability
of affecting the fairness of the trial. The assumption that incompetence
is not more likely than not to make a difference is simply wrong. It is
inconsistent with Supreme Court doctrines of both right to counsel and
lawyer-client confidentiality. It is hypocritical to permit lawyers to hide
incompetent representation behind an assumption that competence does
not make a difference, or that incompetence, by itself, does not naturally
lead to a detrimental result.
If the substantial factor standard were applied in legal malpractice
litigation, the client would be able to establish a prima facie case by
proving malpractice and the loss of the litigation. Proof of malpractice
would establish the prima facie case because such proof would
simultaneously be direct proof of fault and circumstantial proof of
causation. The attorney would, of course, be able to introduce evidence
to rebut the circumstantial inference. The burden, however, would
appropriately be allocated to the party with the greatest access to
information-the lawyer.

448.

See supra notes 378-92 and accompanying text.

B.

Combined Forcesand Burden Switching

Litigation representation has the essential characteristics of the
combined forces scenarios." 9 Litigation is perilous. In a trial only one
party can emerge victorious. A loss could be the result of natural forces,
such as a weak case, or human intervention, such as legal malpractice.
Because the two causes combine, the plaintiff is left without the
resources to establish which of the causes was dispositive. The attorney
is able to dominate access to information because of her representation
of the plaintiff. The client is dependent upon the attorney. If the
attorney was negligent in discovery, motion practice, strategic planning,
or witness preparation, an examination of the record would fail to
uncover information sufficient to establish that the case should have
been won. The very negligence that lost the case simultaneously reduces
the information about the case.
This power over information creates a dependency status. Statusbased proof doctrines have been developed to protect similarly
dependent plaintiffs, and must be applied to protect the client who
receives negligent representation in a lawsuit. The dilemma of the

plaintiff in litigation malpractice actions is identical to that confronted
by the plaintiff in Kingston.45
The combined forces dilemma
confronting the plaintiff was proving the source of a second fire. The
defendant's fire had burned the home, but it had done so in combination
with the other fire. The act of negligently starting a fire that burned
down the plaintiff's house both rendered the plaintiff dependent and
deprived the plaintiff of information. The resolution was to switch the
burden of proving the source of the other fire to the defendants.
In litigation malpractice, the combined forces problem is only slightly
different. The plaintiff must prove which of the two causes was
responsible for the loss. The dependency is the same; the lawyer has
dominated access to information. More important to the application of
this alternative proof doctrine is the fact that the attorney's negligence,
by its very nature, reduces the chances of proving that the case would
have been won.
In this aspect it is similar to Summers.451 There the dependent plaintiff
449. For a detailed discussion of the combined forces scenarios, see supra Part
IV.C.4.c.
450. For a detailed discussion of Kingston, see supra Part IV.C.4.c. The plaintiff's
dilemma is also found in situations in which the legal system must rely on baseline or
data compilations. See generally Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of JuridicalProof, 13
CARDOZO L. REv. 373 (1991); V.C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and
Standardsof Proof, 14 VAND. L. REv. 807 (1961); John Kaplan, Decision Theory and
the FactfindingProcess,20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1083-91 (1968).
451. For a detailed discussion of Summers, see supraPart IV.C.4.d.
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was deprived of information needed to prove which of two causes was
responsible for the loss. The resolution, again, was alternative proof and
switching the burden to the dominant defendant. As in litigation
malpractice, the defendants' negligence was proven; the only issue was
causation of injury.
The application of this doctrine to surgical malpractice suggests the
doctrine's relevance to litigation malpractice. One of the medical
malpractice fact sets in which it is applied involves an anesthetized
patient.4 52 In this fact set, the patient is unable to witness the events
taking place around him. The litigation client is virtually as removed
from the events of legal malpractice as that patient. The malpractice
occurs in the attorney's office: in motion papers, interrogatories, and the
like. None are likely to be viewed or fully understood by the client. She
is as oblivious to the facts of legal malpractice as the surgical patient is
to the facts of surgical malpractice. The mechanism that can rectify the
imbalance in access to information is to switch the burden of proof to the
defendant.
Of course, in switching the burden, courts must recognize, as they
should in applying the substantial factor test, that malpractice is a likely
cause of litigation loss. In surgical malpractice, the burden is switched
on two issues. On proof of negligence, res ipsa is applied; on causation,

Summers-style burden switching is applied.4" The entwined doctrines
are jointly applied. Therefore, they can only be relevant when the injury
is to a part of the body that was not threatened by the surgery. 4 This
fact element is necessary to establish the probability that there was
negligence in the surgery, which is a predicate for the res ipsa aspect of
the doctrine. In litigation malpractice, there is no role for res ipsa. The
plaintiff must prove the malpractice. It should not be inferred. Once
proven, however, the attorney's conduct is so important that it is more
likely than not that malfeasance affected the result.45' After malpractice
has been proven, the surgical and litigation malpractice cases should be
452. See supra notes 282-302 and accompanying text.
453. See supra Part IV.D.
454. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
455. There is little doubt that the bar generally accepts the proposition that
representation by an attorney is a critical asset and that the attorney virtually always
makes a difference. See Berger, supra note 376, at 96 ("When society can say with
confidence that entirely adequate representation would not have changed the result of the
case, and only then, I believe... judgments [should be salvaged] despite [the ineffective
assistance of counsel].").

resolved similarly. The attorney should bear the burden of proving that
the inept representation did not have an effect.456
Specifically, cause in fact should be assumed. The jury should be
instructed that, if they find that the defendant was negligent, they must
find that this negligence caused harm, unless the defendant establishes as
an affirmative defense that the negligence did not cause any harm. The
causation element would not be eliminated. Rather, the burden of proof
concerning causation would be allocated to the defendant. Once proven
negligent, the attorney should be required to prove that the conduct did
not cause injury.
C. Combined Forcesand Loss of Chance
Burden switching will lead to fairer results in many legal malpractice
situations. Its adoption, however, would not guarantee just results in a
vast number of them. The remaining inequities derive from the fact that
trials are competitions in which one party will lose, and many of those
"losers" appear to be identifiable prior to their trials.
Under
individualistic proof rules, none of these individuals can successfully sue
her attorney for malpractice. Each person in this group of apparently
predictable losers will be unable to prove that they would have won the
underlying case. Even if the burden is switched to the attorney, many in
this "loser class" will find that their attorney is able to prove they would
have lost in the underlying case.

These clients are in a combined forces dependency relationship akin to
that of the patient in Herskovits.4 7 Herskovits had a thirty-nine percent
chance of surviving cancer before the negligent failure to diagnose his
cancer. The odds were that his death was the result of the natural cause
of cancer. However, the court applied the loss of chance doctrine; it
held that Herskovits had a chance of survival and that the negligence

456. Whether this change is effected under the Summers type doctrine or by
creating a veritable rebuttable presumption akin to that in Reynolds (the "substantial
factor" standard) is unimportant. In light of the reluctance of the courts to apply novel
concepts to the legal malpractice tort, it is possible that this doctrine could be adopted by
legislation. It is a presumption that is based on reason and reflects the appropriate
balance between the institutional defendant and the individual.
For a more
comprehensive discussion of rebuttable presumptions, see Hinds v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 155 A.2d 721, 725-31 (Me. 1959); Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 163
S.E.2d 577, 580-84 (Va. 1968); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENcE 820-22 (John W. Strong
ed., 5th ed. 1999) (discussing presumptions in paternity actions); Neil S. Hecht &
William M. Pinzler, Rebutting Presumptions:Order Out of Chaos, 58 B.U. L. REv. 527
(1978); Edmund M. Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of
Proof,47 HARV. L. REV. 59, 82-83 (1933).
457. For a detailed discussion of Herskovits, see supra notes 354-63 and

accompanying text.
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took that away from him. The defendant might have saved him with an
earlier diagnosis, but her negligence left the plaintiff both without a cure
and without proof to establish that it was the negligence that caused
Herskovits's death.
The litigation malpractice plaintiff is in the same position. Many
clients have weak or predictably losing cases. They are thus more likely
than not to have lost the case without regard to legal malpractice. The
malpractice, however, deprives them of the chance of winning. As with
Mr. Herskovits, the litigation client who had only a thirty-nine percent
chance of winning the case would win approximately two out of every
five times. The malpractice deprives these clients of both the chance of
winning and the proof to establish that the negligence caused the loss.
The underlying policy that persuaded the courts to adopt loss of
chance in diagnostic malpractice cases applies equally to litigation
malpractice. That policy is based on the belief that potential tort liability
induces careful conduct in the potential defendants. If doctors were
never liable for negligent treatment of dying patients with losing odds
for recovery, there would be no legal enforcement of the duty of care.

These patients could never win a malpractice action, because the doctor
could always prove that death was more likely than not the result of the
disease. Attorneys have an identical obligation to represent their clients
competently; no matter how inept the representation, these losing clients
will never have a remedy at law. The attorney will always be able to
avoid liability by claiming that the negligence caused no damage. And,
of course, because the group of losers never had a sufficient chance of
winning without malpractice, in these cases the attorney will always
win. Fortunately, this inequitable benefit has been removed from the
medical malpractice tort by the adoption of loss of chance compensation.
Unfortunately, the legal malpractice defendant still reaps its benefits.
The inequity created by the individualistic proof standard is
particularly severe in litigation malpractice cases. In these cases, the
"win or lose" paradigm of malpractice litigation does not reflect the
actual world of litigation.45 s While half of all litigants necessarily lose at
458. A similar problem has been extensively analyzed in the analogous area of
permitting verdicts to rest exclusively on statistical data. See L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE
PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE

75 (1977) (discussing the gatecrasher hypothetical);

David Kaye, The Paradoxof the Gatecrasherand Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L..
101, 101 (1979) (citing Dr. Cohen's book and exploring the inequities caused in a similar

situation). In the gatecrasher hypothetical, 1000 people are killed in a fire in a circus
tent. The problem is created by assuming that 501 of them did not pay. Since it is more

trial, perhaps ninety-five percent or more of lawsuits are settled without
trial.4" The significance of this settlement statistic is that a large
percentage of clients who file cases and who would theoretically be

losers, receiving nothing from a trial, actually wind up "winning" in a
settlement.4 ° In the real world, the litigation clients who would lose at

trial do not lose. This is because they do not go to trial; instead, they
settle. But in legal malpractice litigation, reality is ignored, as the fact of
settlement is ignored.

In the abstracted world of causation, legal

malpractice plaintiffs cannot win unless they prove that they would have
won at the trial that would never have occurred. 46'

A different articulation of this problem is that, in reality, virtually
every case has value. Representational negligence has different impacts
on different groups of clients. It deprives the potentially victorious

client of her verdict and the potentially losing client of her settlement.
For the winner, the loss caused by negligence is the lost verdict. For the
loser, the damage caused by negligence is the lost settlement. In both
cases, negligence deprives the client of the case's value.

likely than not that each person in the crowd of 1000 had not paid, all 1000 would lose in
a wrongful death action. This absurd result is replicated in legal malpractice actions.
Among the 50% of clients who are predicted to lose, some would have won. But
because of the burden of proof requirements, every single client in that 50% will lose.
See Keith, supra note 347, at 770-80. Regarding causation requirements, Professor King
wrote:
Causation has for the most part been treated as an all-or-nothing

proposition. Either a loss was caused by the defendant or it was not.... A
plaintiff ordinarily should be required to prove by the applicable standard of
proof that the defendant caused the loss in question. What caused a loss,
however, should be a separate question from what the nature and extent of the
loss are. This distinction seems to have eluded the courts, with the result that
lost chances in many respects are compensated either as certainties or not at
all.
Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.L 1353, 1363
(1981).
459. See Joseph Kelner & Robert S. Kelner, The Settling of PersonalInjury Cases,
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 25, 1994, at 3; see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases
Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. Rnv. 1339,
1339-40 (1994); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in
a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1, 2 & n.2 (1996); Frances A.
McMorris, 10 Firms Win $52 Millionfrom City: Vast Majority of Year's PersonalInjury
Claims Result in Settlement, N.Y. L.J., May 31, 1994, at 1.
460. Settlement benefits defendants in litigation as much as plaintiffs. While
plaintiffs who might get nothing at a trial settle for a lower amount, defendants who
might pay vast sums after a trial settle and pay smaller amounts. For both sides,
settlement permits a guaranteed success compared to the uncertainty of a trial. Indeed,
trials have been called "failures" in the system. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D.
Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases
for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REv. 319, 321 (1991).
461. See Jensen, supra note 13, at 669.
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The logical coherence of the malpractice system thus suffers from two
defects. First, it does nothing to protect a large segment of litigation
clients. This alone should be of paramount concern in light of the
dismal record of attorney self-regulation.' 2 Second, malpractice
litigation does not reflect the results of actual litigation. 43 The high
settlement rate, when considered in combination with the overwhelming
probability that malpractice affects results in litigation, is a factor that
must be considered in the development of rational rules to control legal
malpractice litigation while appropriately compensating its victims. The
significance of these facts is that the alternative proof doctrine of loss of
chance must be adopted. The attorney for the suing ex-client should be
given the right to sue for the lost chance-the settlement value of the
case.
Application of loss of chance in legal malpractice actions would mean
that the plaintiff would be given an option. She could sue for the full
loss. If she made this choice, she would have to prove malpractice and
the jury would have to decide that the malpractice caused her to lose the
case. Alternatively, she could establish a prima facie case by proving
that a breach of duty caused a loss of the chance of winning. She would
then have to prove the value of the lost chance through expert testimony
establishing the settlement value of the case. This value of the
opportunity to settle the case, as will be shown, is a far more precise
valuation than any available in medical malpractice actions. Plaintiffs
who choose to sue for the lost chance would not need to establish that
the underlying case would have been won. There would be no trial of
the case-within-a-case. The injury would become the loss of settlement
value, and the proof would be of that loss. Under this doctrine there is
no shifting of the burden of proof; instead, the injury is redefined.4 5 The
462.

See supra note 26.

463. Increasing litigation based on malpractice in settlement does not eliminate this
concern because the elements have been strictly confined. Plaintiffs must establish
either that settlement was proximate or that the attorney was negligent in failing to
advise about likely settlement options. See 3 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 10, § 28.23
(discussing the role of insurance counsel in settlements).
464. Her prima facie case should, as discussed supra Parts VI.A-B, be evaluated
pursuant to the substantial factor or burden switching doctrines.
465. The attorney must have an affirmative defense to this action, however.
Settlement negotiations may have proven to be fruitless in the specific case. The
defendant should be liable for injuries that she caused, but should not be a guarantor of
compensation. The settlement value of the case is an expert assessment of its value.
That value is a composite of the results in similar cases. However accurate this valuation

may be, the realities of life are such that, in a particular case, this figure may not have

dependent status of the plaintiff who lacks proof of causation because of
the combined forces situation is partially rectified by permitting partial
compensation. This is the only legal doctrine developed that would
achieve the goal of imposing an enforceable duty on attorneys to make
reasonable efforts to competently represent all of their clients.
Application of the loss of chance doctrine would harmonize the
relationship between the reality of the practice of law and the tort of
malpractice. In both situations, the real
4 6 value-the settlement value-of
the case would be the matter at issue.
1.

The Calculationof Loss of Chance

A predicate to the adoption of loss of chance compensation in legal
malpractice cases is certainty that there is a rational basis upon which
damages can be determined. The lack of such basis is the primary
reason for the rejection of loss of chance in medical malpractice cases by
4 67
a significant minority of the states that have considered the issue.
Whether compensation should be given for the full loss of life, for the
discounted value of life to the percentage of chance lost by the
malpractice, or some other standard, has been much bruited about in
both the cases and the literature. 4 8 This is a serious concern in medical

been attainable through negotiation. The underlying defendant may have refused to
settle for this amount. Of course, since malpractice has a natural and probable influence
on outcomes, the refusal to settle may have been caused by the proven malpractice.
Nonetheless, providing compensation when settlement at the "settlement value" was
rejected is not appropriate. Thus, the malpractice defendant should have an affirmative
defense. Recognition of the loss of settlement value effectively creates a presumption
that malpractice influenced the outcome. If the malpractice defendant can prove that
competent settlement efforts, uninfluenced by the malpractice, were rejected at the loss

of chance value of the case, she should prevail.
466. See Bauman, supra note 85, at 1131 ("The issue is always whether or not an
element of damages was properly recoverable in the underlying action. The problem for
the plaintiff.., is how to put satisfactory evidence of the amount of damage before the
trier of fact."); see also Boggs, supra note 365, at 446-47.
467. See Fennel v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 209 n.3 (Md.
1990); see also Dionne R. Carney, Note, Smith v. State of Louisiana, Department of
Health and Hospitals: Loss Chance of Survival: The Valuation Debate, 58 LA. L. REv.
339, 349 (1997) (criticizing the valuation of loss of chance); Ellis, supra note 16, at 384
(discussing over and undercompensation).
468. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 18, at 378. The author states:
The two seminal cases from which loss of chance was derived-Hicks v.
United States and Hanil v. Bashline-involved patients who were able to
prove that the defendants more likely than not caused their injury.... Both
decisions indicate that if the plaintiff can show a better-than-even chance of
survival at the time of the defendant's negligence, the court should allow the
jury to infer that the doctor was a cause in fact of the ultimate injury suffered
by the patient and thus award full damages.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted),
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malpractice actions, because the loss of chance concept does not
comfortably fit the available data. The nature of the financial injury to a
person who lost a chance of living is entirely speculative. If the person
would have died anyway, the value of the lost chance is zero. If the
person would have lived, the value is the full loss of life. The
speculativeness derives from the fact that it is impossible to tell whether
a particular person would have lived or died.4 Doctors evaluate the
chance a patient has of living, not the economic value of her life at
various stages of a disease.
This practical limitation does not exist when the doctrine is applied to
litigation malpractice. Lawyers are in the business of turning disputes
into dollars. The entire litigation industry exists to achieve such a result.
The settlement value of a case is a clear and generally accepted standard
of evaluating cases. This is a standard that can be determined by the
testimony of experts who practice and are familiar with both trial and
settlement results in similar litigations. It is a fair and ascertainable
standard.470 It is a far more precise and well-developed measure of value
than the type of loss of chance calculations relied on in those

jurisdictions that permit recovery for such losses in medical malpractice
cases.
The existence of this settlement value is ironic, because many courts
469. This speculativeness has forced courts to deal with the virtually imponderable
issue of how to evaluate the economic consequences caused by the loss of chance theory
in a medical malpractice case. It has split those jurisdictions recognizing the tort in the
medical malpractice area. See Fennel, 580 A.2d at 209 & n.l-3. The problem derives
from the very nature of the theory of liability. Liability exists without proof that the
ultimate injury was caused by the defendant. Thus, the propriety of awarding full
damages for that injury is questionable. All that is truly known is a chance of avoiding
damage was lost by the defendant's conduct. Using the settlement value as the standard
to judge the value of the chance lost avoids this issue by replacing a conceptual solution
with a pure issue of fact. However, the use of settlement value as the definition of loss
of chance in a legal malpractice case prevents any plaintiff from being overcompensated.
This is becaause the nature of the underlying transaction in legal cases is different than
that in medical cases. In medical cases the injuries are the result of disease and the
deterioration of the body; it is a biological process and may not fully be understood.
Litigation, however, is a human interaction. In medicine, with or without malpractice,
some will die, some will not. Those who would have died without regard to the
negligence of their doctor deserve no compensation. Those who lose in litigation, even
those whose lawsuits would have been lost, are in a different position. In litigation, even
losers can win. Disease cannot be "paid off," but litigants can be; even losers can settle
for something.
470. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AccnENTr LAW 117 (1987)
(proposing that without loss of chance injurers will have "inadequate incentives to
reduce risk")

permit loss of chance recovery in medical malpractice cases while

precluding it in legal malpractice cases under the rationale that

settlement is speculative.47 In fact, one of the least speculative facts in
the American legal system is that cases will settle. The litigation system

is almost entirely dependent upon the settlement of cases. In both the
criminal and civil trial worlds the vast majority-over ninety-five

percent-of lawsuits are resolved by a settlement.72 The numbers of
judges and courtrooms are insufficient for resolving a greater number of
cases through trial. The present caseload has created burdensome delays
which, in many cases, come perilously close to depriving the parties of a
just hearing of their controversy. Virtually everything has to be settled.
Because of the enormous pressure to settle cases, the litigation system
is dependent upon the ability to predict the value of a case.
Predictability of value enables settlement. In personal injury cases,
attorneys provided through the defendants' insurance companies
represent most defendants. These lawyers negotiate and settle a vast
majority of cases.473 As soon as a case is filed, the insurance company
471. However, suits for negligence in settlement are growing. See Joyce K. BakerSelesky, Commentary, Negligence in Failing to Settle Lawsuits: Malpractice Actions
and Their Defenses, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 191, 191-92 (1995-1996). However salutary, the
viability of these actions is limited by technical proof requirements. See Steve France,
Giving Up the Fight,A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 28, 28. The reform herein proposed would
operate differently than the tort of negligence in settlement. It would expand the
definition of compensable injury to all victims of legal malpractice. The advantages of
this approach are obvious:
Plaintiffs and commentators alike have argued that plaintiffs should be allowed

to prove causation through expert testimony regarding the value of the
mishandled claim-that is, either the settlement value of the lost claim or the
value of the lost chance to prevail. Underlying the idea of settlement value is
the realization that most cases are settled prior to trial. The injury to the
plaintiff, then, is not the loss of a valid claim, but the loss of a reasonably
calculable settlement amount. Proof of causation would thus involve the
presentation of expert testimony on the likely settlement amount of the
underlying claim based on prior cases in the jurisdiction. The loss-of-chance
doctrine, developed in medical malpractice cases, rests on a probabilistic view
of value. Losing a claim that had a 20% chance of winning a $1 million award
would thus be worth $200,000. Under this theory, proof of causation would
entail testimony about the chance of victory and potential value of the claim.
At least two courts have explicitly rejected testimony regarding loss of chance
or settlement value as insufficient to prove causation in the legal malpractice
context.
Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses, 107
HARv. L. REV. 1547, 1569-70 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
472. See supra note 459 and accompanying text.
473. In New York, there is a weekly publication, The New York Jury Verdict
Reporter, published by Moran Publishing Company. The publication is sub-titled, Civil
Jury Verdicts and Settlements Throughout New York State. The publication is not a
gossip column for civil litigators; it is a source of information to be used to evaluate
cases for settlement. The information is so important that lawyers pay for this
information on a weekly basis. The system provides information not only on verdicts
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analyzes it to predict its value. Insurance companies make these
predictions and then create financial reserves for every personal injury
case. The reserve is based upon their professional analysis of the

maximum risk in the matter.

4

This risk analysis is a professional

assessment of the value of the case, the risk to which the company

believes it is exposed. Of course, this sum is greater than the amount for
which they hope to settle the case, but that is not the issue. The ability
of a vast enterprise such as the insurance industry to rely upon
assessments of case outcomes for their economic viability demonstrates

that the determination of settlement value is not speculative. It is a task
that is routinely done by experts in an industry that has an enormous
financial commitment to the accuracy of the predictions.
Because of this pattern of settlement, attorneys who practice in the
various subspecialties of the law have substantial experience in

evaluating a case. In many cases, what is known as a "number" can be
put on the case well before the end of discovery. It is certain that
substantial agreement can be achieved as to the likely settlement figure
for most cases by the end of discovery. 475
Of course, the ability of lawyers to agree upon the value of a case is
often dependent upon how they are involved. An attorney's evaluation
of someone else's case is likely to be far more reasonable than that same
attorney's evaluation of her own case. But it cannot be doubted that the
profession has, with experience, developed the ability to predict with a
reasonable degree of accuracy the amount for which a case will be
but also on the amount of verdicts that are sustained on appeal. In the June 21, 1999
issue alone, 43 jury verdicts and 5 settlements are summarized. The issue also reports
the case name, date, type of injury, county, and verdict (in exact dollars) for 164 cases on
appeal. See N.Y. JuRY VERDIcT REP., June 21, 1999, at 1-33. Similar publications exist
in other jurisdictions. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 459, at 5 ("Jury Verdicts Weekly
[is] a state-wide California jury verdict reporter that is widely used by lawyers in
evaluating their cases."); Joseph Kelner & Robert S. Kelner, The Setting Aside of Jury
Verdicts-II,N.Y. L.J., Oct. 28, 1997, at 3.
474. See N.R. Kleinfield, The Malpractice Crunchat St. Paul, N.Y. TIMaS, Feb. 24,
1985, § 3, at 4; Interview with Victor A. Rotolo, Personal Injury Defense Specialist, Law
Offices of Victor A. Rotolo, P.A., in Lebanon, N.J. (Jan. 5, 1999).
475. The predictability of this "number" is the reason that such a vast majority of
cases are settled. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 459, at 4 ("But for practitioners,
trials are important primarily because they influence the terms of settlement for the mass
of cases that are not tried; trials cast a major part of the legal shadow within which

private bargaining takes place."); see also Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 228
(1982); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law:
The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979).

settled.

Settlement value is an extremely regional concept. The value of a
case can be predicted only by reference to the history of jury verdicts

and settlements in that particular jurisdiction. The same case has a very
different value depending upon the jurisdiction in which it is pending.
Within each jurisdiction there will be a high degree of agreement about
the value of a case, but there is not going to be any consistent value of a

case across regional lines.

In fact, the value of a case can vary

dramatically from one segment of a community to another, depending
upon the nature of the residential community from which the juries are

drawn.476 For example, a knee injury in a case with clear negligence may
be worth $125,000 in Brooklyn, New York, but only $20,000 in Bucks
County, Pennsylvania.4" In both jurisdictions the local attorneys will

substantially agree upon the number.478
The settlement value of any litigated matter is thus a predictable
quantity. Both strong and weak cases have a settlement value. The
value is a composite of the damages and the prospects of winning. That
knee injury worth $125,000 with clear negligence would be worth
considerably less if there were a comparative negligence problem. It

would be worth even less if the plaintiff had marginal proof that the
defendant was negligent. Damages for legal malpractice in a litigation
matter would be the difference between the actual recovery and the
case's settlement value.479

476.

See Edward A. Adams, Venue Crucial to Tort Awards, Study: City Verdicts

Dependon Counties, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 1. The author states:
Over the past decade, juries in Manhattan have awarded an average of
$1.9 million in cases where people have died because of someone else's
negligence. But in Brooklyn, juries put a lower price tag on the value of a life,
awarding an average of only $1.2 million-37 percent less than for lives lost
across the East River.
A study of almost 4,600 personal injury verdicts by juries in New York
City over the past decade, conducted for the Law Journal by the New York
Jury Verdict Reporter, found that the value of a limb or a human life varies
dramatically depending on where a case is brought.
Id.

477. CompareAdams, supranote 476, at 1 (stating that the average knee injury case
in Bronx, New York produces a jury verdict of $552,000), with Interview with Rea
Boylan Thomas, Esq., Boylan & Serpico, in Doylestown, Pa. (Sept. 22, 1998) (stating
the average knee injury case in Bucks County, Pennsylvania produces a jury verdict of
$45,000).
478. The predictability of settlement value is so common that the litigation bar
refers to the recovery in a case as "the number." This refers to the amount that a case is
worth.
479. This might not seem fair to the client who can often "hit" for a much larger
sum in a jury verdict. But, in light of the common practice of granting remittiturs,
settlement value often represents a close approximation of the amount of a jury verdict
that would actually be collected. See Kelner & Kelner, supranote 473, at 3.
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Despite the dependence of the profession on settlements and the vast
data accumulated for their rational negotiation, based on proximate
cause analyses, no jurisdiction presently permits recovery for the
settlement value of a legal malpractice action that the plaintiff cannot
prove would have been won at trial. 0 Judicial decisions rejecting
claims for the settlement value of cases are common. The central

justification for the prohibition is that such damages are speculative.!"
Even when clients sue for negligence in the settlement process itself,
they must establish that the opposing party would in fact have settled
and that the settlement would have been for a specific amount.4, Thus,
the malpractice plaintiff in a case in which no serious settlement

discussions took place, or in which settlement was not provably
prevented by the malpractice, is prohibited from seeking the settlement
value of that case.4 3 The case, or the aspect of the case seeking damages
for the lost settlement, is dismissed as a matter of law.4m
It is a disgrace that the victim of legal malpractice cannot gain
compensation for the lost settlement value of a case.48 Although it may

seem that loss of chance liability will make attorneys guarantors of their
clients' success, such a result is not unfair because every case has
settlement value. No attorney would be liable unless the client first
proved the attorney's negligence. If shown to be negligent, the attorney
should not be protected from the obligation of compensation.46
480. The only exception to this generally accepted rule is that a lawsuit is permitted
for specific negligence in settlement negotiations. If such negligence is proven, then the
plaintiff may recover the negligently lost settlement. For a compendium of cases
involving settlement malpractice, see 3 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMnrh,
LEGAL MALPRACTiCE § 29.38 (4th ed. 1996 & Supp. 1999).
481. See Muhammed v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod & Gutnick, 587
A.2d 1346, 1352 (Pa. 1991); see also Schlomer v. Perina, 485 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Wis.
1992) ("[W]e conclude that recovery must be denied under public policy grounds
because the injury in this case is simply 'too removed from the negligence,' and
furthermore, the injury is 'too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent
tortfeasor."' (quoting Coffey v. Milwaukee, 247 N.W. 2d 132, 140 (Wis. 1976))).
482. See, e.g., McConwell v. FMG of Kansas City, Inc., 861 P.2d 830, 839-40
(Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1305 (N.J. 1992).
483. See Campbell v. Magana, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32,36 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1960).
484. See 3 MALLEN & SmrrH, supra note 10, § 28.23, at 609 (discussing insurance
settlements).
485. This is especially true in light of the escalating complaints of attorney
misconduct. See Mark Hamblett, 1998 Marked by Battles and Bonuses, N.Y. L.J., Jan.
4, 1999, at 1 ("Misconduct complaints against [New York] Appellate Division, First and
Second Department lawyers rose about 50 percent from 1990 through 1996, according to
the New York State Bar's Committee on Professional Discipline.").
486. Compensation for "tortious risk" as distinguished from the physical injury is

2.

The Percentageof Chance Lost Is Provable

In legal malpractice lost chance cases, litigation experts would testify
as experience-based experts. Although the method by which they obtain
their expertise is different than that
487 of medical experts, lawyers are
equally competent expert witnesses.
In a medical malpractice case, the methods by which the medical
profession analyzes and treats disease have created a paper trail of data
concerning causation. Doctors analyze most diseases as progressive
events. Each stage has distinctive presenting criteria. Additionally, each
stage has treatments that have been established as reliable through time
or patient studies. 4" Reference to such data to prove that a patient has
lost a chance of survival through negligence provides direct proof of a
loss. A stage II cancer is far more likely to be stopped than a stage IV
cancer. Negligence that delays diagnosis and treatment automatically
means a loss of a statistically provable chance of success. The same
cannot be said in the law. No data are kept; no case analyses compare
different legal strategies to determine their impact on client survival.
Thus, there seems to be no ready source of data to prove that negligence
had any result upon the outcome of a case. Even failure to file within
the applicable statute of limitations may not have affected the client
negatively! After all, the case may have been a loser. Of course, this
ignores that in the medical world, the client may have died anyway-a
loser in legal case terms. But the data make proof of the degree of
"loserness" clear.
Although a medical patient might be a likely loser-her chances of
survival might be as low as ten percent-the exact chance is derivable
the essence of loss of chance liability. See Glen 0. Robinson, ProbabalisticCausation
and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 782-83 (1985). The

difference between "settlement value" and the actual recovery in a case is the tortious
risk created by litigation malpractice. See King, supra note 458, at 1381-87 (discussing
the process of valuing chance).
487.

See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1174-75 (1999)

(broadening the application of the Daubert expert testimony gatekeeping factors).
488. Compare ABA GUiDELNEs FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
COUNSEL INDEATH PENALTY CASES 1-28 (1989) (providing a representative example of

the very generalized practice standards developed for the legal profession), with Julius G.
Mendel, Letter to the Editor, JudgingManaged Care, N.Y. TIMEs, May 31, 1997, at 18
("'The [managed care] external review process is now performed by recognized peers in
the same medical specialty and uses criteria of accepted standards of practice without
cost-benefit calculations."). See Lawrence K. Altman, Drug Used in Emergencies
Despite Warnings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at Cl; Koch R. Guttler et al., Mild
Hyperphenylalaninemiaand Heterozygosity of the Phenylalanine Hydroxylase Gene,

available at National Lib. Med., PubMed (revised Jan. 10, 2000)
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/PubMed>; K. Geier, Perioperative Blood Management,
available at National Lib. Med., PubMed (revised Jan. 10, 2000)
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/PubMed>.
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from treatment data compiled over a large number of cases. Because
one out of ten with a ninety-percent chance of dying do survive, even
those with small chances have a perceptible chance of living. In the
legal practice world, however, there are no such data. The chances of
winning are the same; the legal profession simply lacks the data to

articulate precisely the difference between a one in ten and a two in ten
chance of winning. Nonetheless, clients who have a one in ten chance of
winning win ten percent of the time, in exactly the same proportion as
patients with a one in ten chance of survival. Interviews with trial
counsel indicate that attorneys have substantial experience with turning
statistical losers into winners. 9 Their experience gives them a basis to
estimate the chances of success.
The fact that the sources of proof of probabilities are different in legal
malpractice loss of chance situations should not prevent them from
being used to vindicate the interests of injured clients. In both the
medical and legal malpractice cases, reliable proof exists to evaluate the
loss of chance caused by malpractice. In a trial on legal malpractice the
settlement value of the case would be a matter for testimony by litigation
experts. Undoubtedly, there would be disputes about valuation. As with
other fact issues involving experts, both parties could call witnesses.
These experts would be attorneys or insurance company appraisers who
have acquired a provable expertise. The experience basis for the
expertise would not be an impediment to having these experts qualified.
There is admittedly no science of predicting case value; however,
scientific verifiability is not an essential basis for the qualification of an
expert.49° The litigation experts who would testify about the value of a
case would not be experts relying on science. Litigation experts rely on
skill and experience based on observations for their expertise.49'
489.

See Interview with Victor A. Rotolo, supra note 474; Interview with Evan

Torgan, Evan Torgan, P.C., in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 17, 1999).
490. See Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1174-75.

491. The four-part Daubert standard, by which the scientific validity of expert
testimony must be assessed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, would apply to
legal experts. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1992).

Trial lawyers and insurance company appraisers would clearly fall into the non-scientific
category considered in Kumho Tire. In Kumho Tire, the expert had

acquired his

specialized knowledge as to whether a tire failed because of a defect or abuse by years of
looking at the mangled carcasses of tires. See Kuhmo Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1176. It was
held insufficient to meet the Daubert standard. See id. at 1178-79. However, the vast
industry of "settlement value" predictors creates a basis for expertise far more substantial
than that of the expert in Kumho Tire.

Thus, the legal profession has developed an expertise in predicting the
settlement value of cases, and there are experts who could provide juries

with information about this value. 49 This represents the best method for

evaluating the worth of a lost chance. Nonetheless, courts refuse to
permit plaintiffs to sue for the settlement value of the case. To prevail,

plaintiffs must still establish that they would have won but for the
malpractice of the attorney.
VII. CONCLUSION
Recently, decisions in criminal cases have permitted appeals to be

filed despite counsel's negligent failure to file a timely notice of apeal
and without regard to the improbability of the defendant prevailing. 9 In
limited areas, some courts have even been willing to modify the
malfeasing lawyer's most successful defense: the causation defense. For
example, in California, causation burdens are relaxed in spoliation
cases, 494 and several states have even denied dismissals of complaints
alleging a loss of chance. 495 But the greatest sign of progress in imposing

492. Although the standards of care in the medical community are more precisely
defined, expert testimony concerning their violation and its significance is obtainable.
See supra note 488.
493. Some United States Courts of Appeals have held in ineffective assistance of
counsel claims that counsel's failure to timely file a notice of appeal violated the
defendant's rights without consideration of the merits of the appeal. See, e.g., Romero v.
Tansy, 46 F.3d 1024, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Peak, 992 F.2d 39,
41-42 (4th Cir. 1993); Bonneau v. United States, 961 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1992). The
result was reached despite the very slim chance of a criminal defendant prevailing on
appeal. In New York, for example, the prosecution won 81% of criminal appeals in the
1997-1998 court year. See Gary Spencer, Prosecutors Win Big at Court of Appeals,
N.Y. L.J., July 13, 1998, at 1; see also Norman A. Olch, Soft on Crime? Not the New
York Court of Appeals, N.Y. L.J., May 6, 1996, at 1 ("The results are striking: of the
thousands of defendants each year who seek access to the [c]ourt after losing in the
[a]ppellate [d]ivision or the [a]ppellate [tierm only [one] percent will ultimately prevail
on the merits in the [New York] Court of Appeals."). In the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, the government wins at a higher rate--91%. See Deborah Pines,
Appeal in Bomb CaseSeen a Long Shot, N.Y. L., Mar. 8, 1994, at 1.
494. See Pati Jo Pofahl, Note, Smith v. Superior Court: A New Tort of Intentional
Spoliation of Evidence, 69 MINN. L. REv. 961, 969-70 (1985); see also Paul Gary
Kerkorian, Negligent Spoliation of Evidence: Skirting the "Suit Within a Suit"
Requirement of Legal Malpractice Actions, 41 HASYTINGS L.J. 1077, 1084-87 (1990)
(citing cases that recognize the spoliation tort, including the following: Pirocchi v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137
(Cal. 1983); Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maintenance Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Ct.

App. 1985)); Steffen Nolte, The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying Principles,
26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351, 389 (1995) (discussing Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 796 P.2d
101 (Idaho 1990), and spoliation as a way of avoiding the cause in fact element in
malpractice tort).
495. See, e.g., Weiss v. Pegalis & Wachsman, No. 95-CV-2901, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15175, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 1995); see also Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 402-03
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that once the client had a valid claim for breach of fiduciary
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a reasonable standard of care on attorneys has come from quasi-ethics
rules. In New York, for example, a litany of complaints about
matrimonial attorneys led to the adoption of special court rules that
imposed new duties on attorneys.4 Perhaps for the first time, a body
assigned to regulate the conduct of attorneys recognized that the bar has

excessive power over clients. Matrimonial attorneys were prohibited
from engaging in conduct that would exploit their domination of
information and power in the relationship. Actions such as requiring
nonrefundable retainers and taking liens on the matrimonial residence
were prohibited.4 "4

These rules by New York and other states498 represent the breach in the
dike of protection for the malfeasing attorney. They represent the
possibility that the judicial and attorney regulators of the bar will begin
to energetically develop mechanisms to control the bar.

These rules

begin the process of reevaluation that has been the hallmark of postWorld War II torts jurisprudence. They begin the dialogue about the
appropriate rules of conduct and how those rules can best be enforced.
In this regard, the participation of the judiciary in the enactment of these
ethics rules suggests a new willingness to reconsider the propriety of

protecting malfeasing attorneys.

Decisional law reform does not,

however, begin with the courts. Judges can only rule on cases and issues
duty, there was no need to prove proximate causation); Davis v. Parker, 58 F.3d 183, 190
(5th Cir. 1995) (discussing the difference between legal malpractice and breach of
fiduciary duty).
496. See N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 6509 (McKinney 1985) (defining professional
misconduct); 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 130-1.1 (1998) (providing
courts the power to impose sanctions for frivolous conduct).
497. See 22 N.Y. COMp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.16 (1998). The section
provides, in part, as follows:
(c) Retainer agreements and closing statements.
i2)" An attorney seeking to obtain an interest in any property of his or her
client to secure payment of the attorney's fee shall make application to the
court for approval of said interest on notice to the client and to his or her
adversary. The application may be granted only after the court reviews the
finances of the parties and an application for attorney's fees.
Id. § 202.16(c)(2). This section eliminates the possibility of the attorney putting a lien
on the client's home or other personal property without the matrimonial court's
knowledge.
498. See generally PA. CONTItNG LEGAL EDuc. BD. REGS. § 8 (1999) (describing
"Compliance Procedures Applicable to Active Lawyers" and defining standards of
professional conduct); Practice Book Revisions Being Considered by the Rules
Committee of the Superior Court,60 CoNN. L.J. 46 (1999) (discussing proposed rules for
professional conduct under consideration).

presented to them. Judicially created law reform starts with attorneys
who propose legal theories to the courts. But the new court-imposed
ethics rules are a signal of changing judicial perceptions. Once the

signal has been given, the magical power of contingent fee litigation
should create the same drive for legal change that has been so effective
in curbing industrial and medical depredations. There is now an
opportunity for the malpractice bar, the attorneys who represent those
who have been victimized by malpractice, to seek changes in doctrines

that unduly protect the malfeasing attorney.49 The causation defense and
the case-within-a-case anachronism should be the first areas tested. In

seeking the adoption of alternative liability standards, the malpractice
bar could significantly benefit the victims of legal malpractice and
simultaneously improve the protection afforded clients.'

Like the police officers who routinely violated the Fourth Amendment
before the Supreme Court created an effective remedy in Mapp, °1
attorneys have been able to violate the standard of representational care

with impunity. The standard of care has existed and the tort remedy has
been available, but causation defenses have protected these attorneys
from liability. Thus, the panoply of causation defenses has rendered the
tort remedy ineffective. Without an effective tort remedy, the rules have
had little real meaning. The legal rule changes proposed in this Article,
if adopted, will create an effective tort remedy for litigation malpractice.

499. The instant increase in malpractice litigation was already motivated, in part, by
the money that can be made by the plaintiff's bar. See Stephen Gillers, Ethics that Bite:
Lawyers' Liability to Third Parties, LIG., Winter 1987, at 8, 9 ("First, lawyers are
insured, and insurance companies can pay judgments. Lawyers are discovering that
"); Ramos, supra note 76, at 1683 ("Greed is
other lawyers can be attractive targets....
the most common reason for legal malpractice cited by academic and lay writers").
500. Of course, since the Herskovits decision, there has been a precedent that could
have been exploited in an effort to expand lawyer's liability. Remarkably few suits
tested the courts' willingness to apply this doctrine. The uncharacteristically placid
reaction of the plaintiff's malpractice bar should change with encouragement from
increased verdict sizes and doctrinal support from the academy.
501. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that individuals may
move to exclude illegally seized evidence in state criminal court proceedings).
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